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Abstract 
 
This thesis presents an examination of the notion of ‘normal development’ and 
its role in biological research. It centres on a detailed historical analysis of the 
experimental embryological work of the American biologist Edmund Beecher 
Wilson in the early-1890s. Normal development is a fundamental concept in 
biology, which underpins and facilitates experimental work investigating the 
processes of organismal development. Concepts of the normal and normality in 
biology (and medicine) have been fruitfully examined by philosophers. Yet, 
despite being constantly used and invoked by developmental biologists, the 
concept of normal development has not been subject to substantial 
philosophical attention. In this thesis I analyse how the concept of normal 
development is produced and used in experimental systems, and use this 
analysis to probe its theoretical and methodological significance. I focus on 
normal development as a technical condition in experimental practice. In doing 
so I highlight the work that is required to create and sustain both it and the work 
that it enables.  
 
Variation between embryos can cause problems for scientists trying to produce 
valid and comparable results. In my study of Wilson’s work, I examine how the 
practices associated with normal development deal with the variation between 
embryos. In the 1890s, Wilson became increasingly interested in which causes 
were responsible for the processes of differentiation (the production of different 
cells and organs) and determination in the process of embryonic development. 
He performed a series of experiments on the marine invertebrate Amphioxus, 
which exhibits considerable variability in early development (Wilson, 1893a). 
Wilson carefully observed his samples and outlined a normal development 
based on them, which included a considerable range of variation. How Wilson 
treated variation was reflected in the different way in which he conceived of the 
process of development compared to other prominent embryologists, such as 
Hans Driesch and Wilhelm Roux.  
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Having introduced and assessed normal development, I use two analytical 
approaches to make further sense of it. Furthermore, these approaches identify 
why appreciating the role of normal development enables us to understand 
important aspects of scientific practice, such as experimental methodology and 
making causal attributions based on the results of experimental manipulations. 
The two main analytical approaches I use are James Woodward’s 
manipulationist theory of causation (Woodward, 2003 and 2010), and Hans-
Jörg Rheinberger’s experimental systems approach (Rheinberger, 1997). The 
former assesses the factors involved in assessing proposed causal factors, 
rather than simply demarcating between causes and non-causes. The latter 
focuses on the way experimental set-ups are configured by scientists in ongoing 
series of experiments to frame phenomena of interest: “epistemic objects”.  
 
My analysis establishes the centrality of the concept of normal development to 
the way experimental systems are produced and reproduced, and to how 
attributions of causality which arise from experimental work are made. 
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Introduction 
The concept of normal development is central to experimental work in 
developmental biology. It provides researchers with standardised controls, 
against which the results of experimental manipulations can be compared. It is 
at the heart of developmental biology. But it is a concept that remains hidden in 
plain sight, for biologists and philosophers alike. I aim to find out how normal 
development is produced, distributed, and used, and what the implications are 
of how it is produced and used. 
 
In this introduction, I provide some background on how philosophers and 
biologists have analysed and interpreted the normal – and normal development 
– in biology. Following this, I detail why focusing on normal development 
provides a valuable way of understanding key features of scientific practice in 
experimental biology, and I touch on two of the accounts I will use to help me do 
this. I then detail the methodological aspects of my thesis, clarifying the nature 
of my integrated history and philosophy of science (HPS) approach, which 
centres on practice, on how normal development is generated and put to work 
by scientists. Central to my thesis is my case study on the early experimental 
embryology work of Edmund Beecher Wilson (1856-1939), and I outline what 
role that has in the thesis in the methodology section. Finally, I provide a plan of 
the thesis.  
 
The concept of normal development (including related terms) is frequently 
invoked by biologists, in one form or another. Despite this, definitions of it are 
rare. Jonathan Slack is one of the few developmental biologists to actually 
define it. He defined normal development as “the course of development which 
a typical embryo follows when it is free from experimental disturbance.” Normal 
development, thus defined, “must not be confused with pathways of 
development which give a normal outcome” (Slack 1983, 11).  
 
Slack’s definition is interesting because of its rarity, but also because it 
misrepresents the ways in which terms such as normal and normal 
development are actually used by biologists, for example in the following quotes 
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which demonstrate that normal development is sometimes used to denote 
“pathways of development which give a normal outcome”:  
 
Parasitism by this species elevates dopamine levels in the nerve cord 
and hemolymph, slows normal development, and delays pupation of the 
host  
Goodman and Granger, 2009: 328  
 
[B]oth blastomeres of the two-cell mouse embryo can give rise to normal 
embryos if separated…normal development can still occur even after 
cells are removed or added to a preimplanatation embryo…in normal 
development, individual blastomeres in early embryos have different 
developmental properties and fates  
Wolpert et al, 2011: 138 
 
[B]oth the maternal and the paternal genome are necessary for normal 
mammalian development…both are required for the normal development 
of the embryo and the placenta. 
Wolpert et al, 2011: 340 
 
In more complex organisms, such as vertebrates, in which the 
regenerative power is primarily limited to the appendages (limbs and tail), 
regeneration may recapitulate normal development. 
Minelli, 2003: 131 
 
[D]uring normal development, differences in cytosine methylation are 
critical in telling a nucleus which genes can be expressed, and which 
genes are expressed determines what type of cell it will become  
Gilbert and Epel, 2009: 43 
 
Slack may have been attempting to discipline the use of the term, but he was 
far too late. By the time he wrote about normal development, it had become 
entrenched, conceptually and in practice, with a different meaning, one which 
does in fact include “pathways of development which give a normal outcome”. 
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An additional problem with Slack’s definition is that it presents a conception of 
normal development as passive, something with is given or revealed to the 
scientist. For Slack, all the scientist needs to do is observe (this of course is not 
merely a passive process) development and not interfere. However, as we shall 
see, producing normal development is in fact an active process, which involves 
much scientific and technical work to produce, circulate, use and maintain. It is 
this work that I wish to examine. As I will show in this thesis, to establish normal 
development is not as simple as allowing development to unfold unmolested. 
Normal development is not merely just a control or non-manipulated arm of an 
experiment. The conditions to allow normal development to ‘happen’ must be 
constructed. Observations and results must be abstracted – an active rather 
than a passive or automatic process – to produce a standard. Furthermore, a 
neat conceptual distinction between a course of development followed free from 
external intervention, and pathways resulting in a normal outcome, is not easily 
(or actually) made in practice. Partly, this is because assumptions concerning 
what normal outcomes of developmental processes actually are help to 
establish what is normal in the first place, a process I will describe in more detail 
in my account of Wilson’s experimental work.  
 
Although biologists have generally not explicitly assessed their use of the 
normal, some philosophers have, particularly in the philosophy of medicine. In 
his work on the concepts of the normal and the pathological, Georges 
Canguilhem observed two linked meanings of normal, remarking that 
“[s]ometimes it designates a fact that can be described through statistical 
sampling; …And yet it also sometimes designates an ideal, a positive principle 
of evaluation, in the sense of a prototype or a perfect form” (Canguilhem, [1965] 
2008: 122). Thus, there is a more descriptive sense of normal, describing what 
is most common, or typical. This can be conflated with the more evaluative or 
normative sense of the normal. 
 
This conflation, or elision between the two senses, has been of concern to 
philosophers dealing with disability and mental health. In this respect, the 
relationship between the descriptive and normative senses of the term normal 
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has been examined by John Dupré in his work analysing the concept of ‘normal 
people (1998) and Ronald Amundson assessing what constitutes normal 
functioning (2000).  
 
The term ‘normal’ originally derives from geometry, with the Oxford English 
Dictionary citing examples from the seventeenth-century in which ‘normal’ 
meant right-angled. In the eighteenth-century, it came to mean ‘standing at right 
angles to’, or ‘perpendicular to’. In Latin it means ‘conforming to a rule’ (as well 
as ‘right-angled’), and before the nineteenth-century, in French it meant ‘which 
serves as a model’. It is in the nineteenth-century that the use of the term 
becomes more common, and the meanings of it multiply. Ian Hacking has 
identified medicine in the 1820s as the root of this explosion in the use of the 
term ‘normal’, though he has also identified “nonmedical routes to the normal” 
related to the increasing importance of standardisation in an industrialising 
world (Hacking, 1990: 164-165). Hacking observes that once the notion of 
normal had been established in medicine, “it moved into the sphere of – almost 
everything” (Hacking, 1990: 160).  
 
One sphere it was able to move into with ease was the science of physiology, 
which studies the proper functioning of organisms. Towards the end of the 
nineteenth-century, experimental embryology adopted many of the 
methodological precepts of physiology, including causal analysis, strict control 
of conditions, and the existence of experimental control arms (Churchill, 1973). 
The concept of the normal therefore did not have far to travel to arrive in 
experimental embryology, and the more normative sense imported from 
medicine via physiology would rest alongside a more descriptive sense of the 
term used in the embryology of Karl Ernst von Baer (1792-1896) (Hopwood, 
2005). As Nick Hopwood (2005, 2007) detailed, in comparative embryology 
normal development was formalised at the end of the nineteenth-century in 
tables of normal stages. Normal stages or series became used in experimental 
embryology as well. In experimental embryology, normal development became 
a stable and standardised comparator against which the effects of experimental 
manipulations could be observed, measured and evaluated. 
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Variation within and between species makes it difficult to make comparisons, in 
both non-experimental and experimental embryology. This, and the fact that 
organismal development is a continuous process, makes necessary the 
development of certain procedures of abstraction. Ways to abstract from 
variation and process were (and are) absolutely necessary to ensure that 
investigative work can be done at all in the biological sciences, not least those 
concerned with ontogeny. Precisely how this abstraction is done, for what 
purpose, and to what effect, is the main question of this thesis. One way it is 
done is by establishing a normal development.  
 
This thesis demonstrates the role of normal development in biological practice 
and thought, particularly in how biologists set up experiments and interpreted 
their results. Based on this, I analyse how the role of normal development in 
practice as a ‘technical condition’ and a ‘background condition’ provides us with 
a way of understanding attributions of causality and how these relate to 
experimental practices. These terms derive from the experimental systems 
approach of Hans-Jörg Rheinberger (1997, 2010, 2012) and some 
developments of the manipulationist theory of causation promoted by James 
Woodward (2003, 2010). Elements of these approaches have been used to 
form the analytical framework I use in this thesis. 
 
The experimental systems approach focuses on the ways in which scientists 
investigate what they do not yet know – “epistemic objects” or “epistemic things” 
– by directing, assembling and coordinating various resources termed ‘technical 
conditions’ to bound or frame the epistemic object to enable its contours to be 
traced. A technical condition functions to “set the boundary conditions of 
experimental systems and in the process create the space in which an 
epistemic object can unfold” (Rheinberger, 2010a: 218). In this way, “technical 
conditions determine the realm of possible representations of an epistemic 
thing” (Rheinberger, 1997: 29). The technical conditions may be conceived of 
as particular technologies, techniques and materials configured in particular 
ways. I interpret normal development as a technical condition which is, in part, a 
methodological norm as well as involving or being related to particular materials 
and techniques. Rheinberger’s approach is attractive as it focuses on the 
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dynamics of the establishment and development of experimental systems. My 
concern is how embryologists such as Wilson were able to establish 
experimental systems to satisfactorily approach the problems they wished to 
investigate. Some of Rheinberger’s insights provide me with conceptual tools to 
assess Wilson’s actions.  
 
Woodward’s theory of causation posits that “causal and explanatory 
relationships are relationships that are potentially exploitable for purposes of 
manipulation and control” (Woodward, 2003: v). The details of a manipulationist 
or interventionist theory of causation are not important to my account. I am 
more interested in what more recent work based on it allows philosophers of 
biology to do. The identification of three kinds of criteria – of specificity, stability 
and proportionality – which define how strong or weak candidate causes can be 
considered to be, provides a valuable basis for analysing how scientists make 
causal attributions. It sidesteps the question of whether a particular factor is a 
cause or not and instead focuses attention on how causally relevant the factor 
is. This approach allows me to assess how attributions of causality may be 
made in developmental biology, in which attributions of normality and relegating 
certain factors to background conditions are commonplace, and relevant for 
assessing causal factors.  
 
When biologists want to identify what relevance particular factors have for 
development, one way in which they can proceed is to divide the factors into 
internal and external factors. Internal factors are commonly those internal to the 
organism, or more precisely, internal to the cells contained in the organism. 
External factors are often those outside of that, for example, what we might call 
‘environmental conditions’, such as the temperature (or range and gradient of 
temperatures) or pH (or range and gradient of pH) in the medium surrounding 
the organism. The distinction between internal and external factors is less clear 
when we consider the role of the organism in shaping the environmental 
conditions in which it lives, for example by releasing chemicals (including waste 
products, but also signals). There is also (as identified by Claude Bernard), the 
internal environment, the environment within an organism and outside the cells 
within it, which mediates between cells in the same body, and also between the 
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external environment and the cells. In terms of biological practice, factors in the 
external environment are generally easier to control than internal factors or the 
internal environment, with the exception of being able to control the genome of 
organisms through practices of pure breeding and cloning.  
 
If an investigator wanted to investigate the role a particular internal factor has, 
they will attempt to keep all other factors (internal and external) constant – they 
will relegate them to background conditions. Through the use of a heuristic 
idealisation known as the instructive-permissive distinction, internal and external 
factors play different roles in attributions of normality, and consequently external 
factors are more likely to be relegated to background conditions to be kept 
constant. This is evident in the distinctions and methodological choices made by 
Wilson. The instructive-permissive distinction distinguishes between two kinds 
of factor that have different explanatory roles in a given explanation or causal 
account. Internal factors are often attributed as instructive causes, causes that 
make a difference, that exhibit greater specificity, stability and proportionality. 
External factors, on the other hand, are often deemed to be permissive 
conditions, factors that can allow normal processes to occur, or to not occur, but 
not specify in any level of fine-grained detail how normal processes might 
produce different results. These permissive conditions or causes are thought to 
exhibit less specificity and stability.  
 
In addressing the role of normal development in experimental systems, I 
concentrate on how normal development is produced, how it functions as a 
technical condition, and how aspects of that role affect how causal inferences 
and attributions are made. This, together with my analysis of how normal 
development can become entrenched as a possibly inappropriate technical 
condition for certain epistemic objects, provides a basis for assessing in 
concrete situations what normal development is doing, which might assist 
efforts to make it a more appropriate technical condition for the task at hand.  
Methodology 
I take an HPS – integrated history and philosophy of science – approach in this 
thesis. This means that I take a detailed historical case study and an 
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examination of scientific practices as a necessary foundation for my 
philosophical analysis. I embed my analysis of normal development in late 
nineteenth-century experimental embryology, developing a historical case study 
based on the career and work of the biologist Edmund Beecher Wilson. Wilson 
was a well-connected and highly respected biologist, active in research for over 
four decades, whose work ranged over numerous modern disciplines of biology. 
Wilson became interested in the nascent field of experimental embryology in the 
early 1890s, and conducted experiments with the marine invertebrate 
Amphioxus (Wilson, 1893a) that I reconstruct, describe and interpret in detail. I 
draw upon close reading of Wilson’s published work as well as historical 
scholarship on Wilson and contemporary scientific developments, particularly in 
embryology. I use my interpretation and analysis of Wilson’s published works 
and the existing historical scholarship to pose questions and draw conclusions 
about normal development, its role in practice, and in mediating practical and 
more theoretical concerns. The case study and subsequent analysis of it will 
provide the basis for the later analysis of normal development in chapters 6 and 
7 using the framework developed from the work of Rheinberger and Woodward. 
Given the centrality of the case study, however, in chapters 2 to 5 I do not draw 
heavily upon my framework, as I will need to spend a considerable amount of 
the thesis detailing the case study and its consequences.  
 
The historical material is aimed at providing the material for a conceptual 
clarification of normal development. It will allow me to assess the role of normal 
development as a technical condition in experimental systems and the 
consequences of this for attributions of causality in biology. In taking a wider 
view of the historiography of embryology, I intend to avoid the criticised 
selectivity and particularity (with consequent evidential limitations) of case 
studies used in philosophy of science (Kinzel, 2015). I acknowledge this, and 
the related criticisms of the ‘confrontation model’ of HPS in which “[t]he role of 
history was to provide the data for the evaluation of philosophical theories about 
science” (Schickore, 2011: 464). Instead, the historiography I assess, and the 
history I examine, is there to provide the basis for an interpretive conceptual 
analysis that highlights and interprets the origin and role of particular aspects of 
scientific practice revealed by the histories. It uses the concrete historical 
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examples to “extract abstract insights”, but not to generalise inductively from 
particulars (Chang, 2012: 110).1 My thesis is intended to be historically rigorous 
in the same way that it is intended to be thoroughly naturalistic – I aim to be 
faithful to and draw inspiration from the histories as I do from natural science 
and the practices of scientists.  
 
As I take an integrated HPS approach, historical detail is vital in establishing the 
basis from which my conceptual analysis will proceed. My historical approach 
reconstructs changes in practices and research interests using the work of 
Wilson and his contemporaries, contextualised and situated using some of the 
existing historical and philosophical literature. I identify the decisions, problems 
and questions that Wilson encountered in a particular phase in his research 
career, which helped guide the direction of his research.  So much of the 
progress of science involves a form of rational reconstruction; making the 
contingent, the uncertain and the nonlinear into something naturalised, 
necessary, linear, and rational.2 A classic example is the transformation from 
convoluted trains of thought and trial-and-error bench work with hunches and 
promising approaches attempted, modified and discarded, to a resultant well-
organized, logically presented scientific paper in a journal. In such papers, the 
questions motivating the partial representation of some of the work done and a 
selection of results may not have appeared until late in a series of experimental 
procedures (Schickore, 2008). My interest in the methods and practices of 
science means that I do not merely present the science I examine as just a 
linear temporal series of connected questions, hypotheses, results and 
conclusions concerning organismal development, though temporal sequence is 
still important to my account. The relation of the methods and materials to those 
                                                          
1
 In my thesis I aim to demonstrate the two key criteria of cogency and range of application for 
demonstrating the worth of such abstract ideas (Chang, 2012: 111).  
2
 My approach, and use of the term ‘rational reconstruction’ should not be taken to be an endorsement 
of a rigid distinction between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ factors in the history of science, nor should it be 
interpreted as an adherence to Lakatosian rational reconstruction in the strict sense, or logical positivist 
conceptions of rational reconstruction. Acknowledging the difficulties of truly integrated HPS (which 
would imply doing history as much as philosophy), I restrict my aim to conducting historically (and 
historiographically) informed philosophy of biology, which does more than “fabricating examples”, an 
accusation directed by Kuhn at Lakatosian philosophy of science (Kuhn, quoted in Chang, 2011). Lakatos 
developed the insight that “[p]hilosophy of science without history of science is empty,” (Lakatos, 1970: 
91), but he also acknowledged, albeit in the form of a humorous coda to his paper, that “rational 
reconstructions are frequently caricatures of actual history” (Lakatos, 1970: 122). 
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questions, hypotheses, results and conclusions will in fact be my main focus. 
My intention is not to unpick the linear threads sown into the scientific literature 
by logically presented papers, but to see how they have been sown, and how 
the individual strands move through the fabric, change direction, and relate to 
other threads. I do not adjudicate the rationality or otherwise of Wilson’s 
research path, but rather examine how the internal logic of Wilson’s research 
proceeded from the late-1880s and into the 1890s. There are differences 
between my approach and the historiographical approach of considering 
competing research programmes. For instance, I focus on one scientist, and 
track his development.3 Wilson might be interpreted as someone who moved 
from one research programme (which one might say was degenerating) to 
another which was progressive. Interestingly, taking the approach I do blurs the 
lines between research programmes – there was not a saltation-like leap from 
one programme to another, but a gradual shift in research priorities, and a 
change in methods to accompany them.  
 
I compare Wilson’s experimental work, and the role of normal development in it, 
to the other key early experimental embryology work carried out by Wilhelm 
Roux (1850-1924) and Hans Driesch (1867-1941). Analysing the 
methodological and epistemic features of early work in a field allows us to see 
the plurality of different approaches taken before that field becomes sufficiently 
stabilised and standardised. This is even more the case here, in the era ‘before 
there were standards’ of all sorts: educational, material, informational, 
communicative, organismal (Logan, 2002). This allows us to compare current 
practices to the plurality of practices which were pioneered by the likes of 
Wilson, exposing certain features, assumptions and implicit structures lying 
behind them and in association with them. The historical analysis therefore 
allows us to conceive of alternative ways in which normal development can be 
produced and used in experimental systems in embryology and developmental 
biology.  
 
                                                          
3
 Though I do compare him to contemporaries such as Roux and Driesch, I do not consider their 
trajectories in any depth, and use my depictions of them in contrast to Wilson, to enable me to 
demonstrate what differences between their work and Wilson’s were significant. 
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On the latter point, it is practice that I am concerned with, particularly the 
relationship of practice – how scientists generate and use experimental systems 
– to attributions of causality. It is therefore a practice-oriented or pragmatic lens 
through which I examine the development of experimental systems and 
elements of them (see Ankeny et al, 2011 for a programmatic introduction to the 
philosophy of science in practice). This lens focuses attention on the role of the 
conceptual apparatus of science and methods as tools for producing 
knowledge, as opposed to a concern solely with theory (Gimmler, 2012). These 
tools must be produced, and scientists must learn (how) to master them, adapt 
them, and make them productive, as well as integrating them with the other 
tools in their toolbox. Normal development is one such tool (or set of tools). 
While a focus on practice is a lens, and informs my analysis of the materials at 
my disposal, it was not an undergirding methodology in the sense of conducting 
ethnographic or archival work to reconstruct ways of working and ways of 
making and reproducing elements such as normal development in experimental 
systems.4 I am primarily concerned with experimental practices and methods 
relating to the technical condition of normal development, not the theories which 
arise from them or uncovering exactly how the experiments actually happened 
(as with historians of science in the mould of Holmes, e.g. 2001).  
 
What does the pragmatic lens offer? Firstly, it asks questions of the everyday, 
the seemingly mundane, the accepted, the invisible, and the naturalised. It 
therefore offers an approach suited to the analysis of the role of normal 
development, something which is present yet invisible, hidden in plain sight. It is 
a central part of the furniture of developmental biology, and the daily work of 
developmental biologists, yet it recedes into the background like the hum of a 
refrigerator. Of course, this is inevitable. The process of coming to belong (by 
education, training, and acculturation) to a particular discipline, research 
tradition and research group is one of naturalising the contingent and the 
produced, including the material and conceptual elements of experimental work, 
infrastructure, and analysis (Bowker and Star, 1999; Knorr-Cetina, 1999). Even 
when that system is as unnatural as a laboratory, this point stands. It is 
                                                          
4
 As a consequence, though I draw on the approach of Rheinberger, it would not be accurate to consider 
my thesis as a work of historical epistemology (see Rheinberger, [2007] 2010b).  
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therefore the job of outsiders to identify what is contingent and produced and 
how it could be produced differently. That is the final task of this thesis on 
normal development.  
Plan of the thesis 
In the first chapter, I outline my framework of analysis for the thesis. I detail the 
parts of the experimental systems approach developed by Hans-Jörg 
Rheinberger (1997, 2010) that are relevant for my purposes. I define the 
elements of the experimental system – epistemic objects and technical 
conditions – and indicate the interplay and dynamics between them. 
Additionally, using this framework I assess the ways in which experimental 
systems can change. The second part of my framework is one aspect of the 
interventionist account of causation developed by James Woodward (2003, 
2010). Rather than identify criteria for distinguishing between causes and non-
causes, Woodward has developed criteria for assessing how strong or relevant 
a cause might be in an experimental system of interest. The three main criteria 
are stability, specificity, and proportionality and I indicate linkages between all 
three in my opening chapter. I identify the role of background conditions in 
Woodward’s analysis of attributions of causation, and link this to the role of 
normal development as a way of managing the relationship of the phenomena 
of interest to certain background conditions. This is examined later in the thesis, 
alongside the implications of considering normal development as a technical 
condition in experimental systems. This chapter picks out the elements of the 
two main approaches which provide me with the tools I need for my analysis. 
 
In chapter 2, I begin the historical account by describing the changes that 
occurred in the biological sciences in the latter half of the nineteenth-century, to 
provide a context for the work and research trajectory of Wilson. After briefly 
outlining the history of embryology and morphology in the first half of the 
nineteenth-century, I establish what the key questions, approaches and 
concepts were in those disciplines. This illustrates the historical roots of the 
problems of investigating and understanding organismal development, 
particularly the identification of homologies, and the debates over the 
significance of germ-layers in embryos (and their homology). I establish the 
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context of evolutionary morphology in the latter half of the nineteenth-century, 
the area of biology in which Wilson was trained and worked early in his career. 
The use of embryology for identifying (evolutionary) relationships between 
organisms was challenged in the late nineteenth-century by advocates of 
experimental methods such as Wilhelm Roux. I detail what this meant, and how 
it related to a change in the sorts of problems tackled by embryologists. It was 
also related to a shift in interest from historical causation of organismal form, of 
the phylogenetic explaining the ontogenetic; to a proximate or mechanistic 
understanding of the generation of form. Leading on from this, I review the 
differing historical and philosophical perspectives on this period in biology.  
 
Methodological changes, such as the increasing experimentalisation of 
embryology (Allen, 1978; Churchill, 1973; Coleman, 1977; Maienschein, 1986, 
1991), were linked to changes in the types of questions asked and problems 
tackled by biologists. To understand this more clearly, I follow with a more 
conceptual section, assessing the epistemic and methodological challenges that 
conducting comparative (and also experimental) work in embryology entails. 
One of the key challenges is making comparisons. This challenge provided 
impetus towards the creation of standards, and also the drive to divide the 
process of embryonic development into stages. I discuss the role of abstraction 
and idealisation in the production of normal stages and series of stages, and 
how one such standardised system of stages, the Hamburger-Hamilton normal 
stages of the chick, worked (Hamburger and Hamilton, 1951). One of the ways 
in which stages are produced is through abstraction of variation, a procedure I 
revisit throughout the thesis. This section establishes many of the key problems 
faced by embryologists. Debates between biologists concerning those problems 
raged in this period, and still do today.  
 
As a way of narrowing the focus, in the third chapter I introduce the biologist 
Edmund Beecher Wilson (1856-1939), the first half of whose career forms the 
spine of much of the rest of the thesis. Wilson’s long career spanned the zenith 
of evolutionary morphology, and the classical genetics of the Morgan laboratory. 
He had a wide range of interests and activities, from field naturalism, to detailed 
morphological work, cytology, sex-determination, heredity, embryology and 
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evolution. H. J. Muller’s 1943 obituary of his former teacher Wilson 
acknowledged the latter’s role in straddling scientific epochs: 
 
Wilson’s contact with science began when the establishment of the 
theory of evolution and even of the cell theory in its primitive form was 
still fresh in men’s minds…experiment had hardly entered the fields of 
morphogenesis, cell study or evolution. As for the teaching of biology, it 
and other sciences were practically unknown…Thus Wilson’s life spans 
practically the entire period of growth, not only of genetics, but of biology 
as we know it. More-over, his own scientific activities largely illustrates 
this growth, for as improved methods of approach – either those of hand 
or brain – arose, Wilson time and again was to be found among the 
vanguard of those adopting them. 
        Muller, 1943: 5-8 
Considering Wilson’s career trajectory, I look at the development of the 
methodologies he employed, and the problems he attacked in his first full 
decade as a professional scientist. In particular, I examine his work on cell-
lineages (Wilson, 1892a) which emerged from the problems and questions 
generated by his previous work in evolutionary morphology. This cell-lineage 
work, in turn, led him into areas where cell-lineage work would no longer be 
sufficient for answering newly posed questions. 
This chapter provides the springboard for an examination of the changes 
occurring in Wilson’s interests, methods and practices in the wider context of 
such changes (and continuities) in the sciences of morphology and embryology. 
Wilson’s morphological interests led him to embryological study, and those very 
same interests, and the challenges of embryological research and 
interpretation, led to new research questions being generated. These included 
questions on the determination of development, on how the developmental 
potential of cells changed in embryogenesis. Most significantly, many of these 
new research questions were prompted by the variation he found to be 
exhibited in early embryogenesis. I therefore highlight variation as an object of 
research. The morphological and embryological research of the late nineteenth-
century, Wilson’s work in particular, has not previously been examined in this 
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way. But I argue that an interest in variation and its morphological significance 
is crucial in understanding how questions concerning determination became 
established as a key part of Wilson’s overall research interests. 
The fourth chapter deals with Wilson’s adoption of experimental methods, which 
he used to try to answer the questions his previous work had produced. These 
questions concerned the variability of cleavage forms in early development, 
their significance, the determination of development and the causes of 
differentiation and emerging form during the process of development. One such 
experimental approach involved manipulating embryos by shaking apart cells at 
early stages of development. This was carried out in addition to some of the 
previous ways he studied development, including careful descriptive, 
observational, and comparative studies. When experimental methods 
accompanied comparative methods, Wilson needed to characterise a normal 
development. This arose from descriptive and observational work, but was 
given a normative edge by the need to establish a standard against which 
experimentally manipulated embryonic development could be compared. In as 
much detail as possible, I re-construct his experiments with Amphioxus, and 
focus in particular on how he produced a normal development. This concept of 
normal development conditioned how Wilson conceived of the interaction of 
internal factors within the organism with external factors during development. 
The concept of normal development arose as a way of dealing with the variation 
exhibited in early development, for the purpose of making comparable the 
manipulated and non-manipulated embryos in his experimental set-up. It led to 
variations away from a specified ‘normal range’ being treated as deviants to be 
explained. Wilson’s normal development incorporated considerable variation in 
the early stages of development. As well as focusing on the way Wilson 
observed and represented embryos, I analyse the nature and significance of 
Wilson’s production and use of normal development, and compare it to the way 
normal development was used by Driesch and Roux.  
In chapter 5 I build on this comparison with Driesch and Roux by moving from 
the strictly methodological to the realm of theory. In this chapter, I begin to 
examine the relationship between biological variation and normal development. 
In examining the way Wilson presented and interpreted his results from the 
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Amphioxus experiment, I identify how the management and explanation of 
variation is related to normal development. To further explore this, I compare 
Wilson’s conceptualisations with those of Roux and Driesch. I detail how their 
ideas relate to six parameters which characterise conceptualisations of 
development: mode of differentiation, type of cause, source of causation, mode 
of transmission, type of cell division and metaphor of cell relations. I especially 
focus on the explanation of differentiation and determination of development, 
and use this to characterise certain elements of theories concerning the 
developmental process. I argue that some of the differences between Wilson’s 
theory and the dichotomous difference between Driesch and Roux’s theories 
can be explained by the differences in the production and methodological role 
that normal development had for the three men. 
 
In the sixth chapter I account for the role of normal development in experimental 
embryology and developmental biology, and how the practices of biologists in 
treating and conceptualising variation relate to this. I build on the insight that 
there exist various types of ‘normal’ in embryological and developmental 
biological work, what I term a ‘taxonomy of norms’, and that these correspond to 
different ways of managing variation (DiTeresi, 2010). Normal development as 
generated and used by Wilson does not fit into the existing categories of the 
normal that have been outlined, so I propose an additional one. To develop this 
analysis, I consider these varieties of normal as, at least in part, methodological 
norms. I then make the case for considering normal development as a technical 
condition of an experimental system, and that the methodological norms 
previously described form part of the technical condition of normal development. 
I conclude by speculating that if the questions to which experimental systems 
are directed change to include interest in variation (e.g. its significance, origin 
and maintenance), then the technical conditions required to frame the epistemic 
object in that experimental system must change, by incorporating 
methodological norms which include new ways of abstracting variation. 
Combining the ‘taxonomy of norms’ with the experimental systems approach 
highlights the distinctive roles that different types of normal development can 
play in experimental systems.  
 
 
30 
 
In the seventh chapter I extend the ideas originally introduced in the first 
chapter concerning change in experimental systems, using the example of 
normal development as a technical condition. I detail in what circumstances a 
particular technical condition may affect the nature and dynamics of change in 
experimental systems. In characterising normal development as a technical 
condition in experimental systems, I have been able to identify conditions in 
which normal development may become entrenched in experimental systems.  , 
I propose some consequences of this, which includes the limiting of the types of 
questions that can be generated by an experimental system. Such an 
entrenchment may therefore prevent other types of questions from being 
investigated, such as those concerning the production and significance of 
biological variation. Additionally, normal development as a technical condition 
and methodological norm enables certain ways of attributing normality to other 
elements in an experimental system (including epistemic objects), and in 
identifying and controlling background conditions. As both attributing normality 
and identifying and controlling background conditions are key parts of the 
criteria of specificity, stability, and proportionality for assessing causal claims, 
the role of normal development in helping biologists to generate and evaluate 
causal claims is important. These findings emphasise the importance of 
carefully assessing how normal development impacts on the practical and 
theoretical aspects of investigations into the nature of organismal development, 
and whether for some purposes it is produced and used in ways appropriate to 
those purposes.  
 
I conclude with a chapter detailing the key philosophical lessons derived from 
the thesis, and possible consequences for the analysis of scientific practice 
concerning developmental biology, including the role of normal development. I 
then outline some possible opportunities for, and problems faced by, a more 
variation-sensitive developmental biology. I close with a series of questions 
opened by this present work concerning the philosophical examination of 
variation in biology.  
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Chapter 1 – Framework of analysis 
1.1. Introduction 
The task of this chapter will be to establish the analytical framework, which I will 
then use for the rest of the thesis.  The two key elements which constitute this 
framework are experimental systems and the assessment of the significance of 
purported causal factors in organismal development. The analytical framework 
will be used in an investigation of the nature and role of normal development 
within early experimental embryology, and in embryology and developmental 
biology more generally. Using the two elements of the framework, my case 
study will demonstrate the links between the need to produce, maintain, and 
evolve experimental systems, and the assessment of putative causal factors in 
development. In terms of normal development, the task will be to establish a link 
between the nature of normal development as a key component of experimental 
systems and more ontological conceptions of normal development and variation 
in development. 
I begin by outlining the Rheinbergerian experimental systems approach, and 
elaborating upon what I take to be its key aspects. The notion of the 
experimental system introduced by Hans-Jörg Rheinberger (1997) is a way of 
conceptualising the progress of research as an investigation into epistemic 
objects or epistemic things (as yet unclear objects of investigation) by directing 
various resources (technical conditions) to bound the circumstances in which 
the epistemic object’s contours can be traced. I will use what are for my 
purposes the key aspects of experimental systems, with the intention of using 
them to highlight the role of normal development within a nascent experimental 
system.  
The ability to successfully identify the causes of phenomena is central to the 
scientific and social worth of the biological sciences. However, the phenomena 
biologists deal with – not least, the complexity of the development of organismal 
form – often means that factors in biological systems are not merely partitioned 
into the categories of cause and non-cause. Instead, different candidate causes 
are considered to have more or less weight. One influential way of assessing 
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the extent to which a proposed cause is relatively strong or weak has been 
proposed by James Woodward (2010). Woodward’s manipulationist theory of 
causation (2003) has been used by participants in the debate concerning the 
precise causal role of different factors in organismal development. One example 
is the question of whether DNA has causal primacy (Waters, 2007), or if instead 
there is a “causal democracy” involving significant causal contributions from 
non-DNA factors (Griffiths and Stotz, 2013). This demonstrates that, although 
Woodward’s approach is not uncontested (cf. Bogen, 2004; Cartwright, 2002; 
Imbert 2013), it can be taken as common ground by participants on either side 
of a fundamental debate in the philosophy of biology and theoretical biology.  
I will describe the criteria of specificity, stability and proportionality outlined by 
Woodward, draw out relations between them, and identify how they provide the 
means for understanding the links between methodological practices and 
causal explanations in developmental biology.  
1.2. The experimental systems approach 
My account foregrounds the role of practice in driving scientific agendas. In this 
respect, I am following a path well-worn by philosophers and historians who 
have, in the past thirty years, attempted to correct for previous (and still extant) 
theory-dominated/centric accounts of scientific episodes and change. The 
historian of science Hans-Jörg Rheinberger is a prominent exponent of the 
focus on experimental practice. For my own purposes, I employ elements of his 
framework of experimental systems with which he makes sense of his own 
detailed research. 
The first full exploration using an experimental systems approach was 
Rheinberger’s account of the activities of a group of protein synthesis 
researchers in the 1950s and 1960s. This work, arising out of cancer research 
and biochemistry, led indeterminately through a meandering path to the 
characterisation of messenger RNA and transfer RNA (Rheinberger, 1997). The 
experimental system is a notion which seeks to make sense of the uncertain 
trajectories of research. Rheinberger analyses an experimental system in the 
making, and in the process elucidates many aspects of the nature of 
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experimental systems: their constituents, properties and uses for historians and 
philosophers. 
An experimental system has two main features – an “epistemic thing” (or, using 
a term Rheinberger came to adopt, an ‘epistemic object’), and technical 
conditions or objects. The epistemic object is the object of inquiry – an entity or 
a process which “present themselves in a characteristic, irreducible vagueness” 
due to them embodying “what one does not yet know” (Rheinberger, 1997: 28). 
Epistemic objects are “things contained within the arrangements of technical 
conditions in the experimental system” (Lenoir, 2010: xiv). Epistemic objects, 
being less known, and therefore less amenable to control, are the relatively 
unstable elements of experimental systems. Conversely, technical conditions 
are produced and deployed in combination with each other as a stable context 
for experimentation, being arrangements that allow “operational redefinition” of 
the epistemic object by adding items to the “list of its constitutive actions” 
(Rheinberger, 1997: 29; Latour as quoted by Rheinberger, 1997: 29). Technical 
conditions have also been described as “tools to produce answers about 
epistemic objects” (Green, 2013: 171). It is through technical conditions “that 
the objects of investigation become entrenched and articulate themselves in a 
wider field of epistemic practices and material cultures…and the floating 
theorems or boundary concepts attached to them”. In this way, “technical 
conditions determine the realm of possible representations of an epistemic 
thing”. This means “that within a particular experimental system both types of 
elements [epistemic things/objects and technical conditions] are engaged in a 
nontrivial interplay, intercalation, and interconversion” (Rheinberger, 1997: 29).  
It is important to bear in mind the role of the technical conditions in framing the 
epistemic object, and in providing the conditions in which the epistemic object 
gradually gains contours and becomes less of a vague entity or process. 
Additionally, one must be mindful of the fact that technical conditions must work 
together and mutually adapt to each other to frame an epistemic object. 
Therefore, if a new technical condition is added, or an old one modified, through 
addition of some aspect of what was once an epistemic object, we would expect 
the assemblage of technical conditions (or, the technical assemblage) to also 
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change. It adapts to accommodate the new or modified technical condition. A 
change in epistemic object might also be expected to cause such a change.  
In the “experimental situation…there are scientific objects and the technical 
conditions of their coming into existence, there is differential reproduction of 
experimental systems, there are conjunctions of such systems, and 
graphematic representations. All these are notions related to the process of 
producing…epistemic things. …Within these complex, tinkered, and hybrid 
settings of emergence, change, and obsolescence, scientific objects continually 
make their appearance and eventually recede into technical, preparative 
subroutines of an ongoing experimental manipulation. As a result, there is again 
a continuous generation of new phenomena, which need not have anything to 
do either with the preceding assumptions or with the supposed goals of the 
experimenter. They usually begin their lives as recalcitrant “noise,” as boundary 
phenomena, before they move on stage as “significant units” (Rheinberger, 
1997: 21). It is therefore a characteristic of an experimental system that 
“sufficiently stabilized epistemic things turn into the technical repertoire of the 
experimental arrangement” (Rheinberger, 1997: 29). While this means that 
“Epistemic things turned into technical objects become integrated as stable 
subroutines into other, still growing experimental systems and may help to 
produce unprecedented events in different contexts”, these very technical 
conditions, while generating “a historical burden” constraining the future 
development of experimental systems, are usually “completely replaced by 
subroutines that embody the actual stabilized knowledge in a subtler way” 
(Rheinberger, 1997: 80-81). The outputs of prior experimental systems 
therefore condition the way that future experimental systems are configured, 
which in turn shapes future outputs. 
The experimental systems approach focuses on the dynamics of experimental 
enquiry; how one experimental set-up, with particular epistemic object and 
attendant technical conditions leads to the next. This is not a logical step, nor a 
predictable one. The experimental system functions as a “generator of 
surprises” producing results (and re-definitions of epistemic objects) that could 
not be anticipated at the outset of the particular experiment or series of 
experiments. Furthermore, it presents a surplus of possibilities open to the 
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researchers following the surprise(s) (Rheinberger, 1997: 161). The particular 
resources, skills, theoretical commitments, histories, collaborations and 
conjunctures experienced by the scientists working with a particular 
experimental system conditions which one (or a few) of the multitude of open 
paths are taken.  
Rheinberger identifies three processes by which the relation of different 
experimental systems can be understood: conjuncture, hybridization, and 
bifurcation. A conjuncture is “the emergence of unpredictable constellations in 
the development of experimental systems resulting from a connection of 
phenomena that do not derive from an expected relation of cause and effect but 
that, once set in place, can enter into a kind of structural coupling” 
(Rheinberger, 1997: 135). Hybridizations are “linkages between mutually 
independent systems” (ibid.). A hybridization carries with it the production of a 
hybrid system potentially (and unpredictably) qualitatively different from the pre-
hybrid systems (Rheinberger, 1997: 136). Bifurcation is the formation of 
separate “offspring systems” from a ‘parent’ experimental system. This tends to 
occur when an experimental system “has reached a certain complexity that 
allows researchers to pursue slightly diverging epistemic tracks but which are 
sufficiently different to enable them to arrive at significantly different results” 
(ibid.). Such offspring experimental systems may share materials, techniques, 
skills, personnel, theoretical commitments, data, methods, equipment, and so 
forth, but also may diverge from each other to make such sharing less possible 
or necessary.  
An experimental system is ‘successful’ if it continues to (differentially) 
reproduce, but also if its practices, materials, objects and empirical data are 
transmitted to become part of other experimental systems, either by 
conjuncture, hybridization, or bifurcation.5 When this happens, they may not 
simply slot into a pre-existing system, but in substituting for another element, or 
simply being added to a system, it can itself “reconfigure that very system – 
                                                          
5
 Rheinberger uses the term reproduction “to indicate that experimentation has to be seen as an 
ongoing and uninterrupted chain of events through which the material conditions for continuing this 
very experimental process are maintained” (Rheinberger, 1997: 75). 
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sometimes beyond recognition”, a process known as “supplementation” 
(Rheinberger, 1997: 4).6  
What relevance does all this hold for Wilson, normal development, and 
experimental embryology? First of all, it provides us with a handle for getting to 
grips with the messy uncertainties of a nascent programme of 
experimentalisation. Rheinberger’s point is that while certain experimental 
systems (and, indeed, model systems) have their “own time” and ageing 
process, even well-established fields are messy. The experimental systems 
may be “future-generating machines” (Rheinberger, 1997), but no-one is quite 
sure of that future at the time. If they were, it would not be research. Peripheral 
results, annoyances, or ‘noise’ could transfer to the centre of investigation. The 
surplus of possibilities presented at any one stage could lead down many 
different paths, with time and resources dictating that only a few might be 
pursued with vigour. Contingency and uncertainty abound.  
Second, the insights about the fates of experimental systems, the transmission 
of concepts, materials, objects, conditions and processes between them, gives 
us a way of assessing the fate and significance of Wilson’s own experimental 
system, both for experimental embryology as the 19th turned into the 20th 
century, but also for Wilson’s own research trajectory and focus. In the course 
of this thesis I will therefore outline the role of normal development within 
experimental systems, using Rheinberger’s experimental systems approach.  
An experimental system does not provide a stable platform for the progressive 
delineation of an epistemic object by chance, or by design from scratch. 
Rheinberger refers to the production of epistemic objects in “complex, tinkered, 
and hybrid settings of emergence, change, and obsolescence” (Rheinberger, 
1997: 21). The totality of the technical conditions (the technical assemblage) are 
constantly modified, added to, and subtracted from, and the relations between 
technical conditions and their spatial and temporal deployment may alter. Often, 
the nature and role of a technical condition depends on its context within the 
assemblage, and its relation with other elements. In many cases, technical 
conditions are elements of an experimental system which include objects and/or 
                                                          
6
 A term Rheinberger borrowed from Jacques Derrida. 
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processes outside of the immediate experimental situation or the technical 
assemblage framing a given epistemic object. Normal development as a 
technical condition is a good example of this, as it comprises of elements such 
as normal stages, specially-bred strains of organisms, the tacit and embodied 
knowledge of experimenters, and the theoretical and normative background to 
not only that experimental system, but a whole discipline. The need for a mutual 
adaptation of the parts of the technical assemblage is required for two reasons: 
to provide a sufficiently well-constituted platform for the investigation of the 
epistemic object, and also because of the interrelatedness, interaction, and 
sometimes cross-over and merging between the parts.  
1.3. Assessment of causal factors in development 
James Woodward has characterised an manipulationist or interventionist 
framework of causation (Woodward, 2003) and then used this as a basis to 
identify the attributes of a causal explanation in the biological sciences 
(Woodward, 2010). These allow us to make judgements about the nature of any 
particular causal explanation.  
Woodward identified stability, proportionality, and specificity as three 
interrelated attributes of causal relationships. Stability is the criterion that 
depends on a “relationship of counterfactual dependence” holding against a 
range of changes in background conditions. A causal relationship can therefore 
be more or less stable depending on the amount of changes to background 
conditions that can occur and the relationship still hold (Woodward, 2010: 292). 
Woodward alternatively labels stability the “non-contingency of association” to 
recognise this. He identifies that more stable relationships are generally more 
proximate relationships, as there are less intermediate links in the causal chain, 
which themselves have their own range of background circumstances in which 
they are associated with the effect of interest. In many instances, this will mean 
that the range of background conditions in which the more upstream factor is 
causally associated with a particular outcome is narrowed, and therefore it can 
be deemed to be less stable (Woodward, 2010: 294).  
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Proportionality captures situations where the level of explanation or causal 
account is appropriate to a given explanandum. That is, it is not too broad and 
general, or too narrow and particular. Any posited causes must fit with their 
effects. In Woodward’s interventionist account, this means that the cause is 
characterised in such a way that alternative states of it are associated with 
changes to the effect, and the conditions which result in changes in the way in 
which the alternative effects are produced are characterised (Woodward, 2010: 
298).  
Woodward identifies two notions of causal specificity in the biological sciences. 
The first is that a cause is specific if it has a fine-grained influence on the effect, 
the second “that a causal relationship is specific to the extent that a single (type 
of) cause produces only a single (type of) effect, and to the extent that each 
single type of effect is produced only by a (type of) single cause” (Woodward, 
2010: 308).  On the first notion, if many different states of a putative cause are 
associated with many different states of an effect of interest, that cause can be 
judged to be specific than a second putative cause which has many different 
states associated with just two different states of an effect. Woodward makes 
an analogy with a radio – the less specific cause of the programme we hear is 
the on/off switch, which can only turn on or off the particular programme we 
hear, and the more specific cause is the dial, which allows us to change the 
programme by turning it (provided the radio is switched on) (Woodward, 2010: 
307).  
This principle has formed the basis for arguments concerning the causal role of 
DNA in organisms. This debate centres on the question of whether DNA has a 
causal specificity not exhibited elsewhere inside or outside the organism. For 
example, C. Kenneth Waters has used Woodward’s analysis of specificity to 
argue that while DNA is causally specific in generating RNA sequences, other 
non-DNA factors such as RNA polymerase are not (Waters, 2007). Changes in 
the sequence of nucleotides in a stretch of DNA are associated with changes in 
the sequence of nucleotides in RNA. Changes in the amount of RNA 
polymerase (the enzyme which transcribes the DNA) are not. In the absence of 
RNA polymerase, there are simply no RNA molecules transcribed. If there is a 
sufficient quantity of the enzyme, the RNA molecule thus produced will reflect 
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the DNA transcribed. The RNA polymerase therefore functions as more of a 
switch than a dial. Countering this, Griffiths and Stotz, who also accept 
Woodward’s framework, have argued that Waters’ account only applies to the 
Precursor-mRNA, the RNA transcript of DNA. They observe that processes of 
post-transcriptional modification such as splicing may produce mature mRNA 
quite different to the Precursor-mRNA. It is this mature mRNA which exits the 
nucleus for the ribosome, to be transcribed in the process of polypeptide (and 
after that, protein) formation. When the effect is taken to be the protein 
produced, Griffiths and Stotz argue that not only DNA, but other extra-DNA 
factors, are causally specific, or as they term it, “specific actual difference 
maker[s]” [italics in original] (Griffiths and Stotz, 2013).  
Woodward frames the second sense of specificity by asking whether it is “the 
case that within the specified range of kinds of effects, a particular kind of cause 
produces only one kind of effect from that range and is it the case that for a 
given effect, it is (capable of being) caused only by a single kind of cause within 
some pre-specified set of alternatives?” (Woodward, 2010: 311). He answers 
this by stating that “C will be a more (rather than less) specific cause (in the one 
to one sense) to the extent that it causes only a few different kinds of effects 
within a pre-specified range” [italics in original] (ibid.). The reference to a “pre-
specified range” is Woodward’s way of getting around the objection that as in 
the biological sciences many-many causation (rather than one-one causation) 
seems to prevail as a rule, this notion of specificity is not particularly useful for 
considering causation in biology. Woodward suggests that this objection can be 
overcome if for a “given candidate cause, we consider only possible kinds of 
effects within some limited set or range of alternatives, rather than all possible 
effects to which the cause may contribute…[and similarly,] for the causes of 
particular kinds of effects: we consider only whether there are alternative 
possible causes that fall within some pre-specified class all of which can 
produce the effect of interest” (ibid.).  
The three attributes are interlinked in various ways. For example, the need to be 
proportional can in many circumstances demand that the association one draws 
is also stable, by ensuring that it is more proximate than distal. For example, in 
the effects of changes to a particular gene, some may be directly related to 
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changes in the gene, and therefore proportional and stable, others may be more 
downstream or secondary effects, and therefore less proportional and stable. 
However, Woodward acknowledges that, in some cases, satisfying the criterion 
of proportionality is independent of satisfying the criterion of stability 
(Woodward, 2010: 299). 
A cause that is specific in the first sense identified by Woodward, that it has 
fine-grained control over the effect, is linked by him to proportionality: “To the 
extent that…there are states of E that cannot be reached by realizing states of 
C, there will be a failure of proportionality.” [italics in original] (Woodward, 2010: 
306). If the proposed cause acts more like an on-off switch than a dial, the 
proposed cause will also be viewed as too poor a fit, too coarse-grained, to 
match the level of explanation required. 
Connections are therefore present between the three criteria. But as well as 
their more logical interrelation, one must also acknowledge that they are not 
considered separately when a potential cause or causes are considered. 
Together they form part of the more or less intuitive apparatus with which 
biologists (and non-biologists considering biological work or systems) approach 
a particular proposed causal mechanism, or the design of experiments, or a 
wider programme of work to examine the causal mechanisms at play in a 
particular biological system of interest., with a view to assessing the ways in 
which such criteria are (implicitly, or explicitly in different ways from that in 
which Woodward detailed them) conceived and employed in the generation of 
questions, experimental situations, observations, interpretations, and 
communication of new biological knowledge.   
The criteria of specificity, proportionality, and stability link explanatory concerns 
with methodological and epistemic practices. Furthermore, they are not interest-
neutral. As I shall demonstrate in chapter 7, assessing how stable, proportional 
or specific a given causal relationship is depends on a prior determination of 
background conditions and subject-related judgements of what is ‘normal’.7  
One might add that pragmatic issues concerning what background conditions 
can be measured and/or controlled may also lead to the specification of which 
                                                          
7
 To this we might also add community standards and the backgrounds of the experimenters. 
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background conditions should be employed in assessing the stability of the 
causal relationship. This is easiest to envisage in experimental psychology 
where experimenters cannot control or even know precisely what their 
experimental subjects are doing when outside the laboratory context. But it is 
also manifested even where the subjects aren’t human, and are confined to the 
laboratory.  
One example might be that the organisms used in experimental laboratory 
studies must be brought into the laboratory from ‘the wild’, and are not capable 
of being bred and standardised by specialist breeders or the laboratory itself. 
Sacoglossans, also known as ‘sap-sucking sea slugs’, are one such creature. 
They are the only known animal to exhibit a behaviour known as ‘kleptoplasty’, 
in which they ‘steal’ and subsequently use the chloroplasts from the algae they 
eat. To study them, researchers must steal them from the sea, as they are 
incapable of raising them in the laboratory. The collected sacoglossans are 
placed in controlled, artificial conditions as soon as possible, but researchers 
have little knowledge of the backgrounds of their samples, and it is usually even 
not possible to discover their ages. The only background conditions that can be 
specified here are the ones which the researchers know about, from having 
controlled them in the laboratory (Rumpho et al, 2007: 461). This is also a 
problem for the organism which Wilson works with, the marine invertebrate 
Amphioxus, in the experiment described in chapter 4.  
Even where organisms or parts of them are not plucked directly from nature, but 
are the result of standardisation and control, factors that may remain unknown 
and unspecified might cause variation between ostensibly identical organisms 
kept in ostensibly the same conditions. The acknowledgement of this fact leads 
experimenters to either ignore the variation, attribute it to error, and to try and 
discern the source of it to extend the level of control. To a complete extent this 
is not possible (Carlson Jones and German, 2005: 83). Two organisms cannot 
have identical life histories, or even the same position in space. 
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1.4. Conclusion 
I have outlined the key elements of the analytical framework with which I will 
approach the role of normal development in experimental systems, the topic 
which will constitute the bulk of the rest of this thesis.  
Rheinberger’s account offers us a dynamic practice-oriented way of framing the 
progress (with no normative weight attached to that term) of experimental 
research. This allows me to conceive of the role of normal development as a 
technical condition in experimental systems, both historically (in my late 
nineteenth-century case study) and in drawing out possible implications for 
modern experimental systems in developmental biology. Implicit in any 
experimental system is the generation of background conditions. My aim will be 
to link the experimental systems approach with some of the insights I have 
drawn from Woodward, to elucidate the intertwined ongoing relationships 
between changes in practice, and changes in ontological conceptions of 
development, once again using normal development as a touchstone. 
The strength of Woodward’s account is that it provides us with a way of 
conceiving how an historical and philosophical analysis of scientific practice can 
illuminate questions of a seemingly pure philosophical nature – that of 
causation. How Woodward’s attributes of causes are assessed is dependent on 
context, the questions asked by scientists, and the pragmatics of their work. He 
would perhaps demur from the characterisation, but Woodward’s assessment of 
the attributes which can be used to weigh different proposals of causal factors 
might even allow us to construct an historical epistemology of causal attribution.  
Woodward’s framework has not gone unchallenged, but it is an influential 
account which has been used as the basis for debates between, for example, 
those who promote a view of development in which the genome has “causal 
primacy” (e.g. Waters, 2007) and those who argue for a perspective based on 
“causal parity” (e.g. Oyama 2000a, Griffiths and Stotz 2013).8 Some 
philosophers have argued that it is more fruitful to concentrate on knowledge of 
mechanisms rather than causes (Darden, 2013). However, focusing on 
                                                          
8
 Regarding challenges to Woodward, see the previously cited sources for a more critical view of 
Woodward, and Saatsi and Pexton 2013 for a reappraisal. 
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causation serves my purposes better than focusing on mechanisms. Firstly, as 
the discussion of Woodward’s work will shortly illustrate, the attribution of 
causation by biologists is not a simple affair, and as the rest of my thesis will 
demonstrate, it is rich with complexity, judgement, and historical context. It is 
bound up with practice. Secondly, as will become clear, scientists in the period I 
focus on were not necessarily seeking mechanisms (in the modern sense). 
They were attempting to discern what kinds of causes were valid, 
experimentally accessible and explanatorily relevant; to find out exactly which 
causes were responsible for the effects they observed and created. The words 
mechanism and mechanical were used, but it is through discussing the use of 
these words in terms of causality that we will best discern what exactly they 
meant, and what exactly mattered about that. Thirdly, and related to the second 
point, the term mechanism has a complex history with different and intertwined 
meanings diachronically and synchronically, sometimes even in a single 
person’s work. Using the term ‘mechanism’ and the philosophical framework 
associated with it would for these three reasons be more confusing than clear.9 
Woodward’s approach is more than adequate to the task of allowing me to 
highlight how scientists have used different criteria to assess the relative 
strength of proposed causes, and how this relates to the experimental systems 
they are involved in. 
A fruitful leavening of Rheinberger and Woodward’s approaches with the 
insights of other philosophers (of science) will enable me to draw this out of the 
historical examples, and suggest implications for modern biological practice and 
theory. I begin this in the next chapter, when I discuss the history of embryology 
(with several nods towards morphology) throughout the nineteenth-century, the 
latter half of which was consumed with precisely a debate over the type of 
causation that was worth invoking and exploring.  
  
                                                          
9
 However, where necessary, I have described certain causes that are invoked by biologists as 
mechanistic causes, as this best reflects the type of cause being appealed to. Here, causation rather 
than mechanism is still the primary focus. 
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Chapter 2 – The role of embryology in nineteenth-century biology 
2.1. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to establish the historical context in which the 
following chapters are embedded, and also to provide an indication of the 
historical roots of the problems which still persist today of actually investigating 
the processes of development.10 This also establishes a context for chapters 3 
and 4, but also the more conceptual issues concerning embryological practice 
that are covered in subsequent chapters.  
In this chapter I provide an account of the history of morphology and 
embryology in the nineteenth-century, and their interaction in particular. I outline 
key concepts and debates, such as the definition of homology and the 
significance of the embryonic germ-layers. Both of these would become 
entwined in the ‘embryological criterion of homology’, which motivated the work 
conducted by Edmund Wilson which I outline in chapter 3. The science of 
embryology was therefore recruited in the search for a way to produce a Natural 
System, a way of classifying and ordering species and collections of species 
that was based on real (genealogical and phylogenetic) affinities and 
relationships, not artificial ones based on the arbitrary or pragmatic choice of 
one parameter or criterion. The advent of Darwinism raised the prospect – soon 
capitalised on – that embryology could provide a means to help classify the 
natural world along the new Darwinian lines. In turn, it was hoped by some that 
the new outlook on life could inform a new way of looking at organismal 
development, and the causes of the production of organic form. Almost from the 
outset, such projects invited criticism, and alternative ways of investigating and 
interpreting organismal development and its relationship to evolutionary 
processes. 
The debates within evolutionary morphology and embryology concerning the 
relationship between ontogeny, the observed process of development, and 
phylogeny, the inferred genealogy and relations of species, involved 
                                                          
10
 See Caron (1988) for an examination of some of the wider debates concerning the changes occurring 
in biology in the late nineteenth century. 
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methodological and epistemic grounds of disagreement and dissent as well as 
empirical ones. In chapter 3 I deal with the historical debates concerning the 
overshadowing of evolutionary morphology and embryology by experimental 
approaches. In this chapter, I outline the nature of the experimentalist 
programme proposed towards the end of the nineteenth-century by Wilhelm 
Roux, a prominent German embryologist, and discuss how this related to the 
evolutionary morphology that was being left behind. The factors which drove 
Roux to develop new experimental systems also drove him to partition putative 
causes. My historiographical position, which will be fleshed out in the third 
chapter, emphasises continuities that can be drawn from evolutionary 
morphology to experimental embryology.11  
The discussion of new ways in which embryological research was conducted 
necessitates a focus on the challenges that scientists face when working with 
embryos and developmental processes. I discuss various strategies that 
scientists have used, such as the comparative method, staging, and the use of 
model organisms. I relate these methods to the crucial practices (and 
processes) of abstraction as a way of managing the variation exhibited by 
developing organisms. 
2.2. Morphology and embryology in the nineteenth-century 
The study of embryos dates back thousands of years.12 Joseph Needham’s 
classic account of the history of embryology traces concerns with eggs, 
generation and the production of adult form back to ancient Egypt (Needham, 
1959). Aristotle was therefore not the first to investigate embryos, but he 
outlined his observations and insights in a particularly systematic way, and so is 
of considerable interest to the story of embryology. Aristotle will be examined 
shortly, and also re-visited later in the thesis. There is a rich subsequent history 
of natural philosophical and natural historical investigation and thinking on 
embryos between Aristotle’s time and the nineteenth-century (Gasking, 1967; 
                                                          
11
 These continuities do not, however, imply that change was gradual. It is possible to accept many of 
the points from different sides of the debate concerning the ‘revolt from morphology’ if one considers 
the differences between the dichotomies of continuity/discontinuity and evolution/revolution.  
12
 While the term ‘embryo’ refers to a specific stage of early development, embryology has 
encompassed the study of that and other developmental stages, such as foetal and larval stages. 
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Needham, 1959; Oppenheimer, 1967; Roe, 1981; Roger, [1963] 1997). 
However, what concerns us here is the state of embryology at the beginning of 
the nineteenth-century.  
While important work had been done by observers and empirical workers such 
as Marcello Malpighi (1628-1694), William Harvey (1578-1657), Albrecht von 
Haller (1708-1777) and Caspar Friedrich Wolff (1735-1794), the early stages of 
development were still shrouded in mystery. The mammalian egg had not been 
located, and the nature and function of the sperm was in question.13 The conflict 
between theories of preformation or pre-existence and epigenesis was sparked 
in the seventeenth-century, and prominent biologists such as Edmund Wilson 
(1896) and Oskar Hertwig (1849-1922) (1896) still discussed it at the end of the 
nineteenth-century. The basic divide between the two doctrines was that 
theories of preformation and pre-existence posited that the form of the organism 
is substantially present from the ‘start’, whereas theories of epigenesis 
proposed that the parts of the organism progressively form over time, and are 
not present at the ‘start’.14 However, despite its place in late-nineteenth century 
discussions, the conflict did not assume the centrality or importance it enjoyed 
before the nineteenth-century.15 As the eighteenth-century drew to a close, 
there were mounting empirical and theoretical problems with theories of 
preformation and pre-existence (Roger, [1963] 1997: 308-366). At the same 
time, the dominant Newtonian metaphysics was conducive to opposing 
epigenetic theories, by allowing natural philosophers to posit ‘forces’ which 
would help explain the progressive formation of the parts and whole of the 
embryo from homogeneous undifferentiated material.  
The discoveries of the first half of the nineteenth-century are often presented as 
a “triumph of epigenesis” (Coleman, 1977: 43), the destruction of theories of 
preformation and pre-existence, and, furthermore, a transformation of the 
                                                          
13
 If indeed it had any function at all. The full name of ‘spermazooan’ betrays the theory held by some 
that the sperm were parasites present in the semen, and not relevant for procreation (Pinto-Correia, 
1997: 195-196). 
14
 For rich historical discussions of preformation/pre-existence and epigenesis before the nineteenth-
century, see in particular Bowler (1971), Detlefsen (2006), Gasking (1967), Roe (1981), Roger ([1963] 
1997) and van Speybroek et al (2002). 
15
 Oscar Hertwig may have boldly pronounced the debate to be the “biological problem of to-day” 
(Hertwig, 1896), but it served more as an interpretive frame to discuss the real biological problems he 
and his contemporaries were facing.  
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problems faced by biologists from explaining generation to explaining 
reproduction and individual development. Karl Ernst von Baer (1792-1876) 
observed “that younger embryos are coarser in outline than older ones and 
simply do not exist in miniature below the resolving power of the common 
microscope of the day”, and some historians have claimed this to be “fatal to the 
doctrine of preformation” (Churchill, 1991: 10). It was increasingly clear that 
form was produced during development, through unknown but surely existent 
processes. Therefore, the task was to observe, describe and explain these 
processes.16  Scientists set about this with copious observation and description, 
the aim being to identify “general descriptive or phenomenological laws” 
(Gasking, 1967: 151).  This was the birth of comparative and descriptive 
embryology, which reached its apogee in the work of von Baer.17  Crucially, von 
Baer’s investigations started with the fertilised egg and its subsequent 
development, evidence of very different concerns to the theorists of generation.  
Modern embryology, if we may speak in such terms, began when the process of 
interest to investigators became how the individual organism got to point B from 
point A, when point A did not precede its own coming into being by the 
fertilisation (or, in the case of parthenogenesis, activation) of an egg.18 
Morphology is a far younger pursuit. While admirable anatomical work was 
conducted on various species in the early modern period, this was generally of 
a natural historical or systematic nature (Russell, 1916: 22). It was only in the 
closing decades of the eighteenth-century that detailed observation, comparison 
and interpretation of features of different organisms was to be conducted for 
different – morphological – purposes (Bowler, 1996: 46; Russell, 1916: 45-51). 
It was 1817 before the term ‘morphology’ was used in print, and the late 1840s 
and 1850s before it gained wider currency among scholars (Nyhart, 1995: 36). 
                                                          
16
 Some historians have emphasised the role of Naturphilosophie in freeing scientists from the burden of 
the eighteenth-century's failed attempts to solve the problem of generation, by taking (epigenetic) 
development as a given, fundamental property of the Universe and proceeding on that basis (Lenoir, 
1989; Look, 2006).   
17
 Though it must be stressed that von Baer was a Naturphilosoph in the same way William Harvey was 
an Aristotelian – taking much methodological and theoretical inspiration, without rigidly adhering to 
theoretical content. 
18
 This characterisation of the process of interest owes something to Griesemer’s identification of 
development and heredity as the same process, investigated from different directions (Griesemer, 
2007). 
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Morphology is the science of organic form.19 In the study of living organisms, 
morphology can be approached in two different ways. In one sense, it entails 
studying living organisms in terms of their form. This opposes morphology to 
physiology, which investigates living organisms (and parts of them) in terms of 
function. But in another sense, organic form is the object of investigation in 
itself. This sense does not preclude functional approaches, which may be fruitful 
in understanding the development or presence of certain forms (see Winther, 
2006 for an account of different approaches in morphology, focusing on the 
twentieth-century). 
The early years of morphology established two key themes that dominated 
debates throughout the nineteenth-century. In modified forms they continue to 
pervade morphology today. These are the concept of a ‘type’ and associated 
terms, and the tension between functional and non-functional (structural) 
explanations of form.20 
The ‘type’ is a fundamental kind of form, an abstract basic plan, archetype or 
‘idea’. All organisms belonging to the class which is characterised by this basic 
‘type’ possess this basic plan. The zoologist Georges Cuvier (1769-1832) 
identified four, as did the later pioneer of ‘modern’ embryology von Baer.21 
Cuvier, like von Baer, based his ‘types’ on years of careful observation, 
recording, drawing, interpretation and comparison of specimens. These acts 
served to engrave the particular details of the specimens into Cuvier’s mind, 
and as Eigen (1997) observes, “Once words or images are graven in the mind, 
no matter what their origin, they inevitably shape all subsequent observations. 
‘Type’ was the name Cuvier gave to such molds of perception and 
interpretation” (Eigen, 1997: 181). However, Cuvier was immersed in the works 
                                                          
19
 At its inception, it was conceived by Goethe as a “science of the necessary and primordial forms of 
living bodies and their transformations”, which included the study of form, formation, and 
transformation of organic beings (and, initially, minerals) (Steigerwald, 2002: 295-296). 
20
 The term structural can be used to apply to formal approaches and explanations in general. However, 
it can also mean non-functional explanations of form. Due to this confusion, I will continue to use the 
terms ‘form’ and ‘formal’, despite their connotations. 
21
 Cuvier’s were: “Vertebrates, Molluscs, Articulates, and Radiates” (Russell, 1916: 41), while von Baer’s 
were peripheral/radiate, longitudinal, massive/molluscan and vertebrate (Russell, 1916: 123). It is worth 
noting that von Baer preferred the term ‘scheme’ to archetype or type, given the Platonic connotations 
of the latter terms (Brauckmann, 2011: 387). A key difference between Cuvier and von Baer was that 
while Cuvier thought each type was a distinctive mode of functional organisation, von Baer believed 
each type to be a distinctive mode of structural organisation (Amundson, 2005: 42). 
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of Linnaeus and Buffon, so his ‘molds of perception and interpretation’ had 
some structure prior to, and alongside, his own observation and interpretation.22 
Furthermore, his method in discerning types was not completely unconstrained. 
Indeed, he came to develop a firm, explicit, methodological basis for his work 
(Eigen, 1997: 199). But Cuvier’s scientific practice neatly demonstrates the 
significance of the construction of expectations, not least expectations of type, 
by accumulated observation and interpretation of organisms. 
A later morphologist, Richard Owen (1804-1892), famously produced a diagram 
depicting what he deemed to be the ‘archetype’ of the vertebrate skeleton, 
which is reproduced in Figure 1 below. The diagram does not depict an actual 
skeleton in an actual vertebrate species. It represents instead the structure – 
the skeletal elements and their arrangement – that Owen believed to be 
common to, and underlying the structure of, vertebrates. Owen defined 
‘archetype’ as “that ideal original or fundamental pattern on which a natural 
group of animals or system of organs has been constructed, and to 
modifications of which the various forms of such animals or organs may be 
referred” (Owen, 1848; quoted in Rupke, 1993: 235). Vertebrates were 
produced by addition to the archetype, and the ‘higher’ the species, the greater 
the departure from the basic scheme (Rupke, 1993: 243). 
                                                          
22
 Though, as Eigen points out, for Cuvier, “Observation was inseparable from interpretation and 
criticism” (Eigen, 1997: 187) so his own findings therefore necessitated engagement with the works of 
the greats preceding him, as well as other workers of his own and previous eras. As his work matured, 
and the depth and breadth of his knowledge, appreciation and interpretation of living forms expanded, 
the “earlier process of emulating and correcting his masters gave way to producing his own standards of 
judgment in the form of the types” (Eigen, 1997: 199).  
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Figure 1 – Richard Owen's archetype of the vertebrate skeleton, originally 
published in 1848's 'On the Archetype and Homologies of the Vertebrate 
Skeleton'. Source: http://www.ucmp.berkeley.edu/history/owen.html Last 
accessed 13.05.2015 
 
An archetype is a fundamental (ideal) plan, of geometrical relations of parts, 
which is manifested in all organisms within a given type.  Differences between 
taxa within the scope of the plan were said to be the result of different 
modifications of the same underlying plan (Russell, 1916: 52).23 Morphological 
types were and are representations of unities above the level of the species, 
never at the level of the species (Amundson, 2005: 81).  
The tension between functional and structural morphologists centred on 
disagreements about the relative role of structural and functional causes of the 
resemblance of form.24 The debate centred on the relative importance of 
structural constraint (due to manifesting a ‘type’) and adaptive modification. This 
adaptive modification was not merely a functional adaptation to external 
(environmental) conditions, but an internal co-adaptation of parts and organs 
(what Cuvier termed the “conditions of existence”). The debate was relevant for 
classification, as it went to the heart of how morphologists could compare 
organisms, and parts of them, with a view to establishing greater or lesser 
                                                          
23
 There is a stronger claim, of a unity across or between types, of the sort made by É. Geoffroy St. 
Hilaire, in contrast to the weaker doctrine of unity within a type or archetype that I deal with here 
(Grene, 2001: 190).  
24
 The classic example is the debate between Cuvier and É. Geoffroy St. Hilaire (see Appel, 1987) 
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resemblances or similarities (the levels of affinity, we might say) between them. 
The task of discerning relevant relationships and affinities between organisms 
and their parts was central to the larger task of how one could (begin to) 
construct a ‘natural system’ to classify nature, as opposed to the artificial 
systems which already existed.25 The search for a natural system provided the 
impetus for much biological work, especially in morphology and embryology, in 
the early nineteenth-century (Di Gregorio, 1982).26  
2.2.1. Defining homology 
All of the key concepts just outlined relate to, rely on, and inform, the crucial 
notion of homology, which was central to the search for a natural system. The 
concept of homology was a reformulation of the prior concept of affinity, 
meaning a ‘real’ rather than merely superficial or phenomological relationship. 
The Oxford English Dictionary cites the first usage of the word ‘homology’ to 
1656, when it was used to mean “an agreement” (OED, [1989] 2015a).27 Its 
appearance in the biological sciences came only in the 1830s (ibid.). However, 
the practice of seeking and proposing homologies is ancient. Drawing on his 
inference of a unity of plan for different types or classes of animal, Aristotle 
detected the sameness of particular parts in animals of the same type. He went 
deeper in attempting to also distinguish “the essential resemblance underlying 
the differences in certain parts” (Russell, 1916: 8; see also Rieppel, 1988 for a 
historical account of the concept of homology).  
Richard Owen provided a classical distinction between homologies and 
analogies, and also analysed the concept of homology into three types.28 In 
                                                          
25
 The distinction between artificial and natural systems, at least in the sense in which it came to be 
understood in the nineteenth-century, originated in the work of Linnaeus. He rejected artificial systems 
– characterised by distinction – based on procedures of logical division in which successive divisions 
were not deduced from prior divisions. Instead he sought to construct systems in which genera were 
described and grouped following an inductive procedure to ascertain relations based on commonalities 
of morphology (Müller-Wille, 2013).   
26
 There were diverse reasons why the search for a natural system was deemed to be of importance, 
including the presumed stability of such a system (for the purposes of communication and exchange; 
Müller-Wille, 2013: 315-316), the potentially practical consequences of knowing what species are 
closely related to a species of economic value (Müller-Wille and Charmantier, 2012), and the natural 
theological desire to uncover and revel in the order of God’s creation (Di Gregorio, 1982). 
27
 Ironic, given the lack of agreement by biologists on exactly what homology is (Hall, 1999: 1-2). 
28
 However, Owen believed that homologies and analogies “were not mutually exclusive” (Panchen, 
1999: 16). 
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1840 Owen defined homologies as “fundamental similarities which underlie 
superficial adaptive modifications” (Owen, quoted in Bowler, 1996: 46). An 
analogy was defined as a similarity based on those superficial adaptive 
modifications. Owen was a structuralist, and for him homology was based on 
structure, analogy on the functional modifications of a structural plan 
(Amundson, 2005: 83). He proposed that two forces operated during embryonic 
development to produce the individual organism, the structural and the 
adaptive. The interplay of these forces was supposed to account for the general 
adherence to an overall (structural) archetype, while modifying elements of it to 
produce variation and diversity within and between organisms (Amundson, 
2005: 87-88). Understanding the processes of embryonic development was 
therefore central to understand the origin of the diversity of species (ibid.). We 
might note here the proposed role of two forces which have different sources – 
the structural being a historical cause of certain aspects of an organism’s 
development, the adaptive a more proximate, ontogenetic and physiological 
cause of certain aspects of development.    
Today we would include as superficial adaptive modifications examples of 
convergent evolution, where different elements of the body plan are used to 
produce structures performing the same or similar functions. A fundamental 
similarity could, on the other hand, underlie diversity of appearance and 
function. An example of this, the pentadactyl forelimbs of vertebrates, can be 
seen below (Bowler, 1996: 46-48). The task of the morphologist was to sort out 
the homologies from the analogies to aid the task of classification.29 Morphology 
acted as a handmaiden for classification in the pre-Darwinian era, but also was 
to do so post-Darwin. 
The three main types of homology Owen identified were special, general, and 
serial (Rupke, 2009: 113; Russell, 1916: 108-109).30  The division of homology 
into three kinds enabled (but did not entail) the separation of an idealistic 
conception of homology (the general, which is the relation to a fundamental 
type) and the empirical conceptions (serial and special). This separation was 
                                                          
29
 And consequently, “The main purpose of training in morphology was to develop the intuitive sense of 
which relationships are genuine homologies” (Bowler, 1996: 46).   
30
 To which we could add a fourth, lateral homology, which is defined as “the relation of corresponding 
parts on the two sides of the body” (OED, [1989] 2015a)  
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not present in the French morphologist Étienne Geoffroy St. Hilaire’s previously 
influential conception of homology (Jardine, 1967: 126).  
A relation of general homology “is that in which a part or series of parts stands 
to the fundamental or general type, and its enunciation involves and implies a 
knowledge of the type on which a natural group of animals, the vertebrate for 
example, is constructed” (Owen, 1848: 7).  
A serial homology is a repeating part within an organism, such as the vertebrae 
of the spine. The repeating part need not assume the exact same form or 
function, but could be modified. An example of this kind of serial homology is 
found in crustaceans. Crustaceans have segmented bodies. On each segment 
is a pair of ‘biramous’ (two-branched) appendages. Within the same organism, 
these appendages take very different forms, and perform different functions 
(see Figure 2 for an example of this). 
 
Figure 2 – Serial homology of biramous appendages in a stomatopod (a mantis 
shrimp).  L-R appendages: antennule (sensory), antenna (sensory), mandible (for 
crushing/grinding food), first and second maxillae (for chewing and shredding 
food), first through fifth maxillipeds (used to manipulate food), 3 walking legs, 5 
pleopods with pinkish gills (swimming legs), and a uropod (tail). Source: 
http://www.ucmp.berkeley.edu/arthropoda/crustacea/appendages.html Last 
accessed 13.05.15 
 
A special homology is the same organ or part found in different organisms. 
Owen, in 1843, defined a special homology as “the correspondency of a part or 
organ, determined by its relative position and connections, with a part or 
organism in a different animal” (Owen, 1843, quoted in Russell, 1916: 108). 
This differs from the general homology in being a relation between parts of two 
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(or more) organisms, rather than being a relation between a part or parts of an 
organism and a ‘type’. An example of special homology is the vertebrate 
forelimb, with its five digits (see Figure 3).  
 
Figure 3 – Special homology: the pendactyl forelimbs of vertebrates. Note that 
this special homology is one where the organ or part, despite being 
homologous, has evolved very different functions. Source: 
http://facstaff.cbu.edu/~seisen/Darwin.htm Last accessed 15.05.2015 
 
The identification of such homologies was problematic for morphologists. How 
could a true homology be distinguished from a mere superficial resemblance or 
analogy? The work of morphology, insofar as it was about the discovery of 
archetypes, needed a robust practical basis for the identification and justification 
of homologies. What was to be this basis? 
In the late eighteenth-century, morphologists compared the anatomical 
structure, and relations between parts, of adult organisms. The search for 
homologies between different organisms was not simply a case of looking to 
see which structures looked like one another. Functional adaptations could 
make structures look very similar, what we now call convergence. Instead, the 
relations of structures to each other would provide the criterion for establishing 
homologies. Étienne Geoffroy St. Hilaire (1772-1844) formulated and used the 
“principle of connections” which supposed that functional changes could do 
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many things to an organ, but they could not alter its structural relations to other 
parts (Rieppel, 1988: 39-40; Russell, 1916: 53 and 63).31 
Étienne Geoffroy St. Hilaire is significant also for proposing an idea which was 
to develop in the hands of his protégée Étienne Serres and Johann Friedrich 
Meckel into the ‘law of parallelism’, that ‘higher’ animals repeat in their own 
embryonic development the adult stages of ‘lower’ animals (Rieppel, 1988: 70-
72; Russell, 1916: 70). This idea faded towards the middle of the nineteenth-
century. Russell claims that it was grievously wounded by the attacks made 
upon it by von Baer (Russell, 1916: 120-123), a view echoed by others 
(Amundson, 2005), but other accounts have downplayed the effects of von 
Baer’s rejection of the ‘law’ (Ruse, 1999). Regardless of the reasons for the 
decline, ideas related to parallelism emerged again and gained adherents after 
the publication of Darwin’s work in 1859. The most notable was Ernst Haeckel’s 
biogenetic law. 
The final contribution we may note from Geoffroy St. Hilaire is another 
consequence of his distrust in the method of comparing the form of (rather than 
the connections between) particular organs in order to ascertain homologies. 
Instead, he believed that the question of whether a particular organ is 
homologous between two different species could be determined by looking at 
whether the “materials of organisation” (the morphological units or building 
blocks) from which the organ is formed are homologous between species. This 
led Geoffroy St. Hilaire to study not the adult form, but the embryonic 
development of organisms, where the origin of such building blocks could be 
discerned, before their transformation during development (Appel, 1987: 85; 
Russell, 1916: 71-72).32 
Geoffroy St. Hilaire’s work established a key theme that dominated 
morphological theory and practice throughout the nineteenth-century: the 
                                                          
31
 However, Geoffroy St. Hilaire recognised that this was not always the case, and introduced the 
principle of ‘metastasis’ to account for when this did not occur and the principle of connections was 
found wanting (Russell, 1916: 55-56). A metastasis was a movement of a part from its ‘type’ place for 
functional reasons. This concept was used to ‘save’ Geoffroy St. Hilaire’s idea by accounting for 
seemingly completely different bones found in fish compared to other vertebrates (Russell, 1916: 55-
56). 
32
 Goethe had also, independently, looked to embryos to find homologies that the process of 
development might otherwise obscure (Russell, 1916: 72). 
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debate on the criterion of homology – should it be comparative adult anatomy, 
or comparative embryology?    
Comparing adult anatomy was certainly easier than comparing embryological 
structure. And yet, towards the middle of the nineteenth-century, the 
embryological criterion of homology became increasingly popular and important 
(Hall, 2000; Lenoir, 1989; Russell, 1916: 136-141). One reason for this 
development was the discovery of the germ-layers in embryos, and the 
proposed significance of this discovery for the demonstration and justification of 
homologies. If a proposed homology based on the evidence of adult anatomies 
was called into question, the discovery of a common embryological origin from 
the same germ-layer or part derived from a germ-layer (or not) would add 
greater weight (or undermine) the proposal. 
The organisation of the early embryo into specific layers was recognised in the 
early-nineteenth-century. The 1817 description by Christian Pander (1794-
1865) of the three layers he discovered in the chicken embryo (see Figure 4) 
was soon generalised to all vertebrates by his friend, Karl Ernst von Baer 
(Oppenheimer, 1967: 259).  The establishment of primary germ layers in the 
embryo was a key empirical foundation for the science of embryology 
(Oppenheimer, 1967: 141; Russell, 1916: 115-118). Von Baer conceived of the 
formation of the germ layers as the first differentiation that occurred in the 
embryo.33 After the formation of the germ layers, within each layer there would 
subsequently be formation of tissues, and then formation of organs.  
                                                          
33
 Though for von Baer, the term ‘embryo’ did not encompass the very earliest stages of development 
(Sander and Schmidt-Ott, 2004: 71). Indeed, von Baer wonders “whether by going further and further 
back [in development], we may not eventually attain a stage in which the embryos of the Vertebrata 
agree with those of the Invertebrata” (von Baer, Huxley trans., [1828] 1853: 212). At the beginning of 
development, then, the organism is merely an animal. It is with the establishment of four main types of 
development – radiate, spiral, symmetrical and doubly symmetrical – that the embryo is formed and the 
Type established (von Baer, Huxley trans., [1828] 1853: 215-216).  These correspond to the different 
ways in which the fertilised egg is divided without overall growth (the process of cleavage) in the very 
earliest stages of development. Von Baer sees great significance in this, declaring “that every organic 
form, as regards its type becomes by the mode of its formation [the particular form of cleavage that 
takes place—JL] that which it eventually is. The scheme of development is nothing but the becoming 
type, and the type is the result of the scheme of formation. For that reason the type can only be wholly 
understood by learning the mode of its development. This introduces differences into the germs, which 
at first are alike in all essential points. Different conditions or formative powers must act upon the germ 
in order to produce this multiplicity” (von Baer, Huxley trans., [1828] 1853: 232). 
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Figure 4 – Pander's 1818 idealised diagram of the early development of the chick. 
In the middle of the diagram, four figures can be made out. Pander's figure 1 
shows just one layer, figures 2, 3 and 4 (depicting later stages than figure 1) 
show the three layers he observed. Source: Brauckmann, 2011. 
 
The existence of these ‘germ-layers’ has not been in doubt since that time, and 
continues to form a key foundation of modern embryology.  Modern 
developmental biology recognises the existence of germ-layers in all metazoans 
(multi-cellular animals), with the exception of sponges. Jellyfish (Cnidaria) and 
comb jellies (Ctenophora) exhibit two germ-layers, and are thus termed 
diploblastic (Gilbert, 2006: 43). The rest of the metazoans, including vertebrates 
and creatures such as the marine chordate invertebrate Amphioxus, sea-
urchins, starfish, insects, worms, sea squirts and other wildly differing 
organisms, exhibit three germ-layers, and are thus termed triploblastic (ibid.).  
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Diploblastic organisms possess an ectoderm and an endoderm, while 
triploblastic organisms possess a mesoderm in addition to these. The ectoderm 
contains the cells that go on to form the epidermis and the nervous system; the 
endoderm, the lining of the digestive tract, respiratory tract (including the lungs) 
and endocrine glands; the mesoderm, the heart, blood, kidneys, gonads, 
muscles, bones and connective tissue (Gilbert, 2006: 8) (see Figure 5 below).34 
 
Figure 5 – Diagram depicting germ layers and the organs produced in them. 
Source: Wolpert and Tickle, 2011: 16. 
 
The significance of these germ-layers, their nature and the role they play in the 
development of individual organisms, was a matter of considerable debate in 
the nineteenth-century.35 Some of the key points of contention were whether the 
mesoderm was a germ-layer, whether the germ-layers were universal (and 
homologous), their significance for understanding phylogeny and evolution, and 
what the role and fate was of the germ-layers in organismal development 
(Oppenheimer, 1967: 256-277). The latter problem came to be associated with 
debates concerning the cause of differentiation in the developing organism, the 
fates of cells (in germ-layers, for example) and their descendants, the role of 
context in development, and related questions. 
                                                          
34
 At least, that is the textbook story. The reality, as always in biology, is a little more complex and laden 
with exceptions.  
35
 For more detailed accounts of the history of germ-layer theory, see Oppenheimer (1967: 256-277) and 
Russell (1916: 115-120, 208-212, 288-299). 
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The reason why many of these questions were deemed to be important lay in 
the significance that germ-layers were thought to hold for the embryological 
investigation of homologies. Before the development of more reliable 
microscopes in the second half of the nineteenth-century, germ-layer formation 
was the earliest stage of embryogenesis that could be clearly observed.36 
Furthermore, it was significant because adult structures could be traced back to 
the germ-layer and its products (such as particular parts of the germ-layer and 
tissues). If a particular adult structure in two different species could be traced 
back to the same embryological origin and derivation it could be deemed 
homologous. If it could not, it would be deemed to be a mere superficial 
(functional) adaptation and labelled as analogous. It was believed that common 
embryological origin would indicate a more fundamental or deeper level of 
similarity. 
The landmark Croonian Lecture delivered by T. H. Huxley (1825-1895) in 1858 
gives us an indication of the role embryology played in morphological theory 
and practice, but also the state of morphology on the eve of the publication of 
On the Origin of Species. Entitled ‘On the Theory of the Vertebrate Skull’, it 
dealt with the theory that the skull was a modified vertebra. Huxley identified 
that “the phrase “Theory of the Skull” is ordinarily employed to denote the 
answers to two very different questions; the first, Are all vertebrate skulls 
constructed upon one and the same plan?—the second, Is such plan, 
supposing it to exist, identical with that of the vertebral column?” (Huxley, 1858: 
384). He noted that “As there are two problems, so there are two methods of 
obtaining their solution. Employing the one, the observer compares together a 
long series of the skulls and vertebral columns of adult Vertebrata, determining, 
in this way, the corresponding parts of those which are most widely dissimilar, 
by the interpolation of transitional gradations of structure. Using the other 
method, the investigator traces back skull and vertebral column to their earliest 
embryonic states, and determines the identity of parts by their developmental 
relations” (ibid.). While acknowledging that each method has its role for the 
                                                          
36
 The Pander diagram reproduced in Figure 4 shows this, but also von Baer’s observations using low-
powered lenses which found that the embryo “develops first by the primary separation into layers” 
(Brauckmann, 2011: 387). Von Baer preferred a low magnification because he believed “that a higher 
one would have obscured the minute differences of texture and would have attenuated the contrast 
too” (ibid.). 
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particular problem it is used to explore, he argued “that to one, and to one only, 
can the ultimate appeal be made, in the discussion of morphological questions. 
For seeing that living organisms not only are, but become, and that all their 
parts pass through a series of states before they reach their adult condition, it 
necessarily follows that it is impossible to say, that two parts are homologous or 
have the same morphological relations to the rest of the organism, unless we 
know, not only that there is no essential difference in these relations in the adult 
condition, but that there is no essential difference in the course by which they 
arrive at that condition. The study of the gradations of structure presented by a 
series of living beings may have the utmost value in suggesting homologies, but 
the study of development alone can finally demonstrate them” (Huxley, 1858: 
384-385).  
Huxley therefore concluded that, while the inspection of comparative adult 
anatomy may be extremely useful in suggesting possible homologies, only 
comparative embryology could definitively establish them. One could say that 
Huxley’s position was that anatomy proposes, while embryology disposes. 
Furthermore, embryology allowed Huxley to establish a unity of plan of all 
vertebrate skulls, a task which comparative anatomy was unable to fulfil 
(Russell, 1916: 160). The early development of a variety of forms revealed an 
“embryological archetype” (Russell, 1916: 161). 
Despite the debates over the relative merits of homologies established through 
comparative embryology or comparative adult anatomy, embryology had by the 
late-1850s been established as an important part of morphological research. 
Both morphology and embryology were about to be transformed by the advent 
of Darwinism, and the new popularity of evolutionary theories.37  
2.2.2. The impact of Darwinism 
Darwin’s theory of descent with modification was supported by morphological 
and embryological evidence (Amundson, 2005: 96-98; Ruse, 1999: 196-197). 
                                                          
37
 I stress that this was a new popularity, and that the significant function of Darwinism at this point in 
time was to popularise, and make scientifically respectable, the notion that species had a history and 
that they had genealogical relationships as well as (or perhaps instead of) relations of or to a type. See 
Bowler (1996) for an account of precisely how Darwinism transformed morphology. 
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Darwin, while not a morphologist, did reflect on the ways that his theory might 
change morphological thinking and practice.  
For example, rather than reflecting modifications of an ideal archetype (idealistic 
morphology), relationships between different species could be recast as the 
result of differential modification of real ancestors (evolutionary morphology).38 
Darwin asked us to “suppose that the ancient progenitor, the archetype as it 
may be called, of all mammals, had its limbs constructed on the existing general 
pattern, for whatever purpose they served, we can at once perceive the plain 
signification of the homologous construction of the limbs throughout the whole 
class” (Darwin, [1859] 1985: 416). The archetype and unity of plan could 
therefore be reinterpreted as the consequence of descent from a common 
ancestral form, rather than membership of a common type exhibiting a 
particular archetype (Russell, 1916: 235). However, in so doing, Darwin 
changed the explanatory function of the unity of type. Rather than being invoked 
to explain the origin of form, it was now invoked to explain the change in form 
(Amundson, 2005: 104-106). In the former case, the ontogeny of form was 
central, and this was where embryology could be of service to morphology. In 
the latter case phylogeny was crucial and the investigation of embryonic 
development would only be valuable insofar as it contributed to an 
understanding of phylogeny.   
In moving away from a typological conception of species and typological and 
idealistic conceptions of organisms and their relations with other organisms in 
general, Darwinism transformed how variation was dealt with by biologists. The 
typological conception of species (and higher-level taxa) conceived of variations 
(away from the ideal type) as ‘accidental’ deviations constituting “an obstacle to 
clear understanding, rather than an object of study” (Gliboff, 2007:274). Darwin 
turned this on its head. Rather than variation being the exception to the rule, 
variation (and its constant production and maintenance both within and between 
species) was the rule. Quite why this was so became an active research 
                                                          
38
 This shift was not so dramatic for morphologists like Carl Gegenbaur (1826-1903), who had already 
conceived within the framework of idealistic morphology relations between the different (seven, later 
nine, in Gegenbaur’s case) types before being convinced of the theory of descent with modification 
(Coleman, 1976). These relations, and the accompanying diagrams illustrating them, could therefore be 
reinterpreted, but only slightly modified, in the light of Darwinism (ibid.). 
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question post-Darwin.39 Variation as the object of research could draw in many 
different approaches and many different disciplines, owing to its manifoldness 
as a concept and its central importance to many distinct problems and avenues 
of research.  In recent years, typological approaches have been revisited by 
historians and philosophers, and in chapter 6 I deal with these revisions of the 
picture I have briefly painted here. Additionally, it is not necessarily the case 
that Darwinism undercut the possibility of or the search for typologies, as the 
evolutionary typology practised by the likes of Gegenbaur and Haeckel 
demonstrated (Di Gregorio, 1995).  
As well as changes in the understanding of variation, after Darwin the concepts 
of homology and analogy could be reformulated to take account of genealogical 
relationships. Homology was recast in terms of genealogy, and explained in 
terms of derivation from a common ancestor, rather than derivation from an 
archetype or ideal form (Ruse, 1999: 196; Russell, 1916: 247).40 Analogous 
traits were therefore now recast as similarities that were not derived from a 
common ancestor. However, the task of the evolutionary morphologist, like the 
idealist morphologist, was still “to study modern forms and try to determine 
which were the ancestral characters” and which were ‘superficial’ adaptations 
(Bowler, 1996: 55). 
Darwin noticed that embryos of different species resemble each other more 
than the adult forms do. Darwin attributed this to the fact that adaptive 
modifications occur later in life, and are inherited by offspring at that same later 
stage (Gould, 1977: 71; Russell, 1916: 237). However, Darwin did not only 
recount the similarity of embryos of different animals. He also observed the 
divergence from this “when an animal during any part of its embryonic career is 
active, and has to provide for itself.” As a consequence of the resulting “special 
adaptations, the similarity of the larvae or active embryos of allied animals is 
                                                          
39
 Generally speaking. There were some scientists, such as H. G. Bronn (1800-1862), who were 
concerned with explaining variation before Darwin (see Gliboff, 2007). Darwin himself proposed a 
number of ways in which heritable variation could be generated – indirect external (the environment 
acting on the reproductive organs of the parents, the change not appearing until the following 
generation); direct external (the environment changing the organism, the change being passed on to the 
next generation by a gemmule or gemmules); and hybridisation. All three were dependent on 
inducement by external (environmental) changes (Winther, 2000: 430-432).  
40
 However, an additional problem arose when homology was used as evidence for common descent, 
despite common descent now being used as a criterion for homology. I will discuss this problem in the 
next section. 
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sometimes much obscured” (Darwin, [1859] 1985: 420). Darwin’s comments 
concerning the relevance of embryos for classification were picked up by the 
generation of morphologists spearheaded by T. H. Huxley, F. M. Balfour (1851-
1882), E. Ray Lankester (1847-1929), Ernst Haeckel (1834-1919) and Carl 
Gegenbaur (Russell, 1916: 247). The implications were heavily explored and 
debated, and led to considerable work in comparative embryology, and from 
that into different ways of investigating embryos towards the last few decades of 
the nineteenth-century.   
The incompleteness of the fossil record was a problem for Darwin, and it was 
also a problem for morphologists looking to classify species on the basis of 
degree of relatedness (Bowler, 1996: 84). Any new line of evidence which 
would allow biologists to make inferences concerning ancestral species would 
therefore have been extremely welcome. One possibility was that if embryos 
were less modified (by evolution) than adult forms, they would reveal the 
‘archetype’ better. The pre-Darwinian conception of archetype was now 
reformulated in an evolutionary way as an embryological archetype or 
fundamental plan, and could therefore potentially provide indications about the 
structure of ancestral forms (Russell, 1916: 237). 
The embryological criterion of homology was given considerable impetus by 
Darwin’s work, and seemed to provide a way to peer into the past. This window 
into the history of evolution could be used to infer phylogenetic relationships 
based on homologies revealing a common ancestor. It could also be used to 
infer the nature of that common ancestral form itself. When it was realised that 
embryology could lend itself in these ways to morphological and classificatory 
work, a boom in phylogenetic speculation ensued. Some of this was rigorous, 
some more fanciful. Before exploring this, we need to return to the study of 
germ-layers, and their significance for morphology. 
In the late-1860s, the Russian embryologist Alexander Kovalevsky noticed that 
invertebrate embryos possessed the same primary germ-layers as vertebrates, 
and that the notochord (a flexible rod-like structure which forms in the embryos 
of all chordates, and exists in some adult forms) in the invertebrate ascidians 
(sea squirts) was specifically homologous to the notochord in Amphioxus and 
vertebrates. He found that in all of them the notochord formed from folds in the 
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ectoderm (Mikhailov and Gilbert, 2002; Russell, 1916: 271).41 He reached this 
conclusion with an embryological comparison of the germ-layer origin of the 
notochord in these different species, thus establishing “a new way of detecting 
homologies between organs in different forms” (Bowler, 1996: 148). This 
seemed to make it possible, however different the adult structures are, “to see a 
common origin for organs in their mode of formation at this early stage” (ibid.).  
The significance of any such homologies was fiercely contested by prominent 
embryologists.42 However, despite contradictory claims, Kovalevsky’s findings 
were picked up enthusiastically by biologists of an evolutionary disposition 
(Oppenheimer, 1967: 266-269; see also Raff and Love, 2004). Among them 
were T. H. Huxley and Ernst Haeckel.  
Haeckel was one of Darwin’s fiercest advocates.43 Haeckel combined the germ-
layer theory, his own interpretation of Darwinism and the old law of parallelism, 
into a new doctrine – the biogenetic law.44 The first stage of this was the idea 
that in the development (or ontogeny) of so-called ‘higher’ organisms, the 
evolutionary history of the organism (phylogeny) was repeated, or 
recapitulated.45 Ontogeny could therefore, for adherents of this approach, serve 
as a record of evolutionary history. Embryos of ‘higher organisms’ (like humans) 
would resemble the adults of ‘lower organisms’ (like fish).46 This, in turn, 
provided a theory of ontogeny by historical causation, as opposed to more 
‘proximate’ mechanistic causes of the production of form.  
                                                          
41
 There were other observations and descriptions in the series of papers Kovalevsky (also spelled in the 
Polish form Kowalewski) published from the mid-1860s to the early 1870s on these matters. This is 
simply one important and instructive example. 
42
 For example, Alfred Mathieu Giard, who argued “that homology does not necessarily mean an 
immediate common origin or close relationship” (Russell, 1916: 273).  
43
 Richards (2008) argues that not only was Haeckel in his popularisations of Darwinism more faithful to 
Darwin’s own thinking than is commonly supposed by historians, but that his own work productively and 
creatively extended Darwinism in ways not all of which were to become discredited. This is not an 
uncontroversial position, cf. Ruse (2004).  
44
 Richards (1992) has constructed a comprehensive and convincing argument that – contrary to the 
claims of other historians who put an ocean between Haeckel and Darwin – Darwin was indeed also a 
recapitulationist, and also a Progressionist (like Haeckel), conceiving of an overall progression over the 
course of evolutionary history, driven by external forces acting on populations, rather than internal 
forces acting within individuals (the Lamarckian version of Progressionism) (see Richards, 1992, esp. pp. 
111-166).  
45
 Haeckel actually invented, amongst many other words, the terms ‘ontogeny’ and ‘phylogeny’. 
46
 As Richards (2008) points out, it was Haeckel’s concern to establish different kinds of biological 
individuality, and the relations between these different kinds that provided the background to this claim 
(Richards, 2008: 132-133). 
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From this, Haeckel proposed that the examination of ontogeny would provide a 
guide to phylogeny. Despite acknowledging that ontogeny contracts the 
phylogeny by sometimes taking short-cuts through it (so not all adult stages in 
the evolutionary history of the organism were passed through during 
development, but ontogeny was an edited version of phylogeny), he proceeded 
along this line of reasoning with little caution. He constructed phylogenetic trees 
based on the different stages of embryonic development and from those stages 
posited hypothetical ancestral forms.47  
One of the most notorious hypothetical forms, proposed in 1874, was the 
Gastraea, which was supposed to be the ancestral form of all metazoans.48 The 
gastrula is an early stage of development in the vast majority of animals (see 
Figure 6). Haeckel claimed, crucially, that the gastrula was homologous across 
all forms (Nyhart, 1995: 190-191). All organisms possessing a gastrula had a 
unique common ancestral form, and this was the Gastraea. The Gastraea was 
supposed to be an organism which actually was a gastrula (see Figure 7 for a 
representation of Haeckel’s stages of development). The gastrula is a 
significant phase in development, as it is during gastrulation (or sometimes just 
after) that the germ-layers form. A methodological consequence of this view is 
that it was deemed pointless to study earlier stages of development than this. 
For those pursuing what has been called (e.g. by Baxter, 1977) the ‘germ-layer 
doctrine’ (these ideas, or slightly watered-down versions), it was the gastrula 
and the fate of the germ-layers and their products that were crucial – a basic, 
fixed point one might say – for morphological study and phylogenetic inference.  
                                                          
47
 This is not unreasonable, and modern evolutionary developmental biologists have done this, albeit 
working from a far broader and deeper empirical base, and not extrapolating quite so far away from it. 
48
 Other hypothesised forms corresponded to other stages of ontogeny, such as the Synamoeba, which 
was a proposed ancestral adult form of the embryonic stage known as the morula. 
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Figure 6 – Diagram of the stages of development leading up to, and including, 
gastrulation. The embryo on the bottom right of the diagram is at the gastrula 
stage. Source: Gilbert, 2010: 7. 
 
Figure 7 – Haeckel's five early stages of development, and supposed ancestral 
forms. The bottom is the gastrula/Gastraea. Source:  Russell, 1916: 292. 
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The root of the popularity of the biogenetic law lay in the ease of understanding 
it “in the simple mechanical terms of the reigning positivistic and deterministic 
science” (Churchill, 2007: 70).49 It also offered the possibility of a combined 
approach to the problems of development, inheritance and taxonomy which 
didn’t threaten to fundamentally disrupt any existing disciplines, but merely to 
‘Darwinise’ them, and in so doing establish stronger links between them 
(Rasmussen, 1991: 72).  Its demise was replaced not by a different unifying 
theory, but by a fragmentation of those problems to be treated by different 
approaches (Rasmussen, 1991: 51-52).   
Haeckel had problems accounting for the proposed third germ-layer, the 
mesoderm (Nyhart, 1995: 192). He was also forced to acknowledge that the 
ontogenetic record of phylogeny was not perfect, that the ‘true’ record of 
phylogeny (dubbed ‘palingenesis’) was ‘falsified’ by adaptations (labelled 
‘cenogenesis’). Whether the germ-layer doctrine held or not depended upon the 
perceived relative significance of palingenesis and cenogenesis, and also the 
homology across the metazoans of the gastrula. 
On the former point, in his history of the relationship between ontogeny and 
phylogeny in biology, Stephen Jay Gould observed that given the seemingly 
limitless number of observations that could be made and interpreted as 
‘palingenetic’ or ‘cenogenetic’, there was no real way in which empirical results 
could have led to the downfall of the germ-layer doctrine. Exceptions were 
acknowledged, and seemingly damaging results accommodated within the 
system (Gould, 1977: 168-169).50 Gould argues that the downfall of this method 
of phylogenetic speculation, which had occurred in practice if not in theory by 
the end of the nineteenth-century, lay in its eclipse by experimental biology.51  
Gould argued that young researchers flocked from stale and sterile descriptive, 
comparative, phylogenetic research (dominated by the germ-layer doctrine) to 
                                                          
49
 Excellent accounts can be found in Churchill (2007), Rasmussen (1991), Richards (2008) and Russell 
(1916). 
50
 All that was needed in many cases was to label any problem a cenogenetic modification, and to assert 
that despite the presence of these, they were far outnumbered by palingenetic processes which 
preserved in the embryo the true record of evolutionary history.  
51
 Not that it died out at the end of the nineteenth century. Gould in fact argues that it would only be 
destroyed in theory by the rise of Mendelian genetics (Gould, 1977: 202-206). Furthermore, Churchill 
(2007: 61-70) observes that, in a weak and diluted form, it still functioned as a useful heuristic, and 
hostile rebuttals into the 1930s indicate some continuing manifestations of the ‘strong’ form. 
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the more exciting and dynamic experimental embryology, which opened up a 
rich seam of research problems and questions, and seemingly the means by 
which to attack them (Gould, 1977: 186-202). In this view the germ-layer 
doctrine and its associated research programme were rejected as irrelevant and 
uninteresting, rather than incorrect. This view was influenced by the so-called 
‘revolt from morphology’ thesis, the implications of which will be explored in the 
following chapter.  
2.2.3. Methodological changes 
As the 1870s progressed, two contradictory movements became established in 
the biological sciences. On the one hand, there was the zenith of Haeckelian 
evolutionary morphology. On the other, there was the advent of a new way of 
conducting research in biology, and more specifically morphology. This was 
inspired by physiology, more precisely the physiology exemplified and promoted 
by Claude Bernard (1813-1878).  
It is not the content of physiology that interests us here, but the methodology.  
In the beginning of the nineteenth-century, Xavier Bichat (1771-1802) 
established the basis for an analytical science of physiology, by establishing 
‘fundamental units’ into which the organism could be analysed. For Bichat the 
‘fundamental units’ were tissues. The advent of cell theory advanced the 
potential for analysis beyond the level of tissues. The idea of functional 
localisation, and the increasing success of the physical sciences in not just 
producing new knowledge but in producing knowledge useful for industrial 
production, led to the ideal of an analytical science based on physico-chemical 
explanations for physiological states and processes.  
Bernard emphasised the importance of the analytical experiment and the need 
to establish the determinate causes of physiological phenomena of interest 
(Bernard, [1865] 1957). This was to be the work of the laboratory, of rigorously 
controlled conditions and variables. Only one variable was to be altered, and 
this was to provide a window into the phenomenon.52  Such ideals deeply 
                                                          
52
 The fact that Bernard’s ideal matches up so neatly with the ideals of scientific investigation (as 
popularly understood) shows us not merely the success of such methods, but Bernard’s success in 
advocating them. He was less successful in his disdain of statistical methods (see Morabia, 2006). 
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influenced Wilhelm His (1831-1904) and Wilhelm Roux, two embryologists who 
pursued, in different ways, the ideal of establishing a science of developmental 
mechanics. In the USA it was His who had more influence, particularly on 
Wilson’s collaborator Charles Otis Whitman (1842-1910) (Maienschein, 1986). 
Roux’s programme of Entwickelungsmechanik, based on prior mental analysis 
of an organism followed by experimental intervention, was to be taken up by his 
fellow German Hans Driesch. To say it led the men in different directions would 
be an understatement.  
Roux envisaged a hierarchy of methods. The naturalistic methodology, of not 
interfering experimentally in or on the organism, but instead observing and 
comparing observations, was at the lower end, the higher end being 
experimental analysis. For Roux, a science first masters the descriptive method, 
which performs the important task of determining “in a definitive way the 
patterns of normal development against which experiments would have to be 
measured” (Churchill, 1973: 170). The next step on the methodological ladder is 
the comparative method, which enables the scientist to make worthwhile 
inferences. Then, higher still, is the descriptive experiment. This involves a 
significant degree of manipulation of the experimental object, but one that falls 
short of providing a causal analysis of development. This could be provided by 
the analytical experiment, which involves rigorous and artificial control of 
conditions and factors, and the manipulation of just one factor to ascertain its 
possible role. This, Roux believed, would contribute towards providing a causal-
mechanical account of development (Churchill, 1973: 171-172). 
Roux did not completely disparage these lower methods, which he believed a 
science must pass through in order to reach the heights then being achieved by 
the physical sciences. But they were regarded as necessary drudge work, an 
apprenticeship.  
Roux was not an experimentalist noted for his experimental skill.53 He can 
perhaps be seen more as a theorist than an experimentalist, but he was 
responsible for one significant experiment of his own. In 1888, he used a hot 
                                                          
53
 Indeed, Churchill (1973) compares him unfavourably in this respect to the French biologist Laurent 
Chabry (1855-1894), who demonstrated tremendous technical abilities in his tragically short career. 
Ironically, Chabry was very much in the French teratological tradition which made use of ‘natural 
experiments’, in stark contrast to Roux’s mantra of analysis and active intervention.  
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needle to kill one of the cells in a frog embryo at the two-cell stage of 
development. The purpose of this experiment was to test Weismann’s 
hypothesis of qualitative division of germ-plasm at cell division (Maienschein, 
1991a: 49). If Weismann’s hypothesis was correct, Roux would have expected 
the result of further development to be a half-embryo, corresponding to the half 
derived from one of the two cells, the survivor. This is because each of the cells 
at the two-cell stage would only have half of the germ-plasm. This is exactly 
what Roux found in his experiment (Maienschein, 1991a: 50). How he 
interpreted this became known as the ‘Roux-Weismann hypothesis’ or the 
‘mosaic theory of development’. The mosaic theory postulated that the 
hereditary determining material is parcelled out to different cells as cell-division 
and development proceeds (Maienschein, 1991a: 49). The organism then was 
thought to be like a mosaic, in the sense that the different cells would have 
different parts of the germ-plasm in them. The fate of a cell and its descendants 
was therefore deemed to be independent of context. Roux’s experiment 
suggested that this highly deterministic model of development could be seen in 
the earliest stages of development (Maienschein, 1991a: 50-51).  
Inspired by Roux’s experiment and the goal of establishing a causal-mechanical 
embryology in general, Hans Driesch decided to repeat the experiment with sea 
urchins (Maienschein, 1991a: 51). Rather than killing one of the cells with a hot 
needle, he violently shook them apart. Instead of the result which he had 
expected to get – a confirmation of mosaic theory – he got quite the opposite. 
Each of the cells went on to form a whole sea urchin, albeit smaller than normal. 
The same result sometimes occurred when he shook apart the embryo at the 
four-cell and eight-cell stages (Maienschein, 1991a: 52). This led to the 
formulation of what has been called the regulative theory of development. In the 
regulative theory, the developing embryo was considered to be a self-regulating 
whole, and the fate of an individual cell within that whole determined by its 
location. The fate of a cell and its descendants was therefore believed to be 
highly contextual. These two opposing theories provoked much embryological 
work in the 1890s, including Edmund Wilson’s. 
Roux’s programme for an experimental embryology had its roots in the 
concerns of evolutionary morphology, more than he cared to admit. The key 
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step he made was to emphasise the importance of understand the direct, 
proximate, causes of the different forms compared by morphologists. Towards 
this end, he developed a methodology which aimed to distinguish between 
aspects of form which have their origin in inherited factors (historical causes) 
and those which are due to adaptations, proximate or mechanical causes.  The 
drive towards causal analysis and experimentation was therefore derived, in 
part, from the problematic established by Haeckel’s biogenetic law – which type 
of cause was more prevalent and relevant, in the origination, reproduction and 
evolution of form and forms (Nyhart, 1995: 286-287). The example of the early 
experimental embryologists demonstrates a link between the establishment of a 
technical infrastructure to frame new epistemic objects and the need to 
simultaneously develop an analytical and conceptual framework concerning the 
nature of causation in the system of interest (including identifying candidate 
causes and types of cause). Without this, the isolation and manipulation of 
putative causes of interest could not occur, and results could not be clearly 
interpreted.  
In the next chapter I will explore the historiography of the shift that occurred in 
the interests and practices of embryologists in the last decades of the 
nineteenth-century, and re-interpret it in terms of attributions of causality. To 
provide a context for examining their work, however, I need to establish what 
exactly the challenges are that faced (and still face) embryologists when 
studying the objects and processes of their science. 
2.3. The nature and challenges of embryological research  
Research on embryos and developmental processes poses distinctive problems 
for biological researchers. As embryological investigation was at the heart of 
Wilson’s research and morphological research in general in the era I am 
concerned with, an exploration of those distinctive problems and challenges is 
required.  This section will outline some of these challenges, and how 
researchers, historical and modern, have tried to deal with them.  
One of the key elements of embryological morphology was its comparative 
nature. In the Darwinian context, “comparative studies allow us to make 
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inferences about the evolutionary histories of both organisms” of different 
species being compared (Sanford et al, 2002: 834) and so the comparative 
method came to constitute the foundations on which the science of evolutionary 
morphology was constructed.  Strasser and de Chadarevian (2011) have 
analysed the comparative method in biological research. For them the 
comparative approach consists of “the systematic comparison of a wide 
diversity of cases (or species in biology) that reveals regularities which are 
turned into universal claims” (Strasser and de Chadarevian, 2011: 320).  
Conducting a comparison requires the elaboration and construction of stable 
reference points between comparators. This is complicated in embryological 
comparisons because it is not merely anatomy and structure that is being 
compared, but a process; one which also exhibits functions which need to be 
stabilised and isolated as well. The complexity of the comparative study of 
development has been attributed in part to the need for such a “5-dimensional 
analysis”, incorporating not just the three spatial dimensions but also one for the 
individual course of development and one for the evolutionary history 
(Richardson et al, 2001: 280).  
Comparison of forms in development is further complicated by heterochrony 
(changes in developmental timing) and the transformation of “developmental 
characters” during key phases of development (ibid.).54  These differences can 
occur not only between species, but also, critically, within species. 
Heterochrony makes it extremely hard to determine specific stages in 
development and to identify and delimit structures and processes to serve as a 
basis of comparison.55  
Love (2008) observes that the “recognition of sameness for units and similarity 
of mechanisms in different species” necessary for such comparisons is, in fact, 
“a manifestation of the problem of homology” (Love, 2008: 231). Returning to 
the morphological research of the nineteenth-century, we can observe that the 
very thing researchers were trying to determine – homologies between 
                                                          
54
 Heterochrony was yet another coinage of the prolific Haeckel (Gould, 1977: 221). 
55
 Heterochrony within a species, which can confound or complicate the ability to determine specific 
stages, should be contrasted with the heterochrony between species, or the study of heterochrony as a 
way of drawing inference about evolutionary processes. In these latter two, heterochrony is an aid to 
investigation rather than a hindrance, even if concepts of heterochrony vary widely (Klingenberg, 1998).  
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organisms – was a precondition of the work they were themselves trying to 
perform. Morphologists were therefore faced with a ‘bootstrapping’ strategy, 
moving from and employing gross and obvious anatomical homologies, to less 
obvious homologies that could be established using finer anatomical or 
embryological investigation. 
A related problem was the use of homologies to infer phylogenetic relationships, 
which post-Darwin formed a key part of the concept of homology. However, as 
Griffiths (2007) establishes, “operational criteria used to diagnose homologies 
were developed by the highly successful comparative embryological tradition of 
the first half of the nineteenth century” (Griffiths, 2007: 647). These criteria 
constituted (and continue to constitute) a way to establish homologies, 
independent of previously established evolutionary relationships. These criteria 
of homology were (and are) “the relative position of parts in the overall layout of 
two organisms…[;] the possession of ‘special qualities’, or shared features 
which cannot be explained by the role of a part in the life of the organism…[and] 
characters that cannot be homologised by the direct application of the first two 
criteria may nevertheless be homologous if they can be connected by a series 
of intermediates in other species such that each adjacent pair of characters can 
be homologised using the first two criteria” (Griffiths, 2007: 648). Griffiths urges 
that the establishment of homologies be considered independently of the 
explanation of homologies (Griffiths, 2007: 651). To invoke common descent as 
an explanation of a homology rather than a criterion of establishing a homology, 
allows one to use a homology or homologies to securely infer evolutionary 
relationships while avoiding problems of circularity (Griffiths, 2007: 648). 
The establishment and justification of homologies was an important element in 
Wilson’s work up until the mid-1890s, and of course in morphological research 
in general in the nineteenth-century. Wilson’s attack on the embryological 
criterion of homology was significant enough to be cited in a modern discussion 
of it (Scholtz, 2005: 124). This modern work demonstrates that scientific debate 
over homology (and how it can be established) continues to this day.56 Scholtz 
draws our attention to the consequences of the independence of ontogenetic 
stages; that certain stages of development can be altered while leaving others 
                                                          
56
 The discussions in Bock and Cardew (eds.) (1999) also exemplify this. 
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unchanged (Scholtz, 2005: 127). The chief consequence is the “refutation of a 
special importance of any particular stage”, such as those found in embryonic 
development (ibid.).57 No one stage (including the adult) is privileged over any 
other in the determination of a homology. The key insight we can draw from 
Scholtz, however, is that “the homology concept is in one way or another very 
much intermingled with…concepts, perceptions, and ‘laws’ of ontogeny and 
development”, which include how evolutionarily and ontogenetically 
independent different stages of development are (Scholtz, 2005: 135).  
These issues and problems aside, the study of a process such as development 
can only be made tractable for comparative purposes by establishing definable 
and non-arbitrary stages of development. For morphological investigation, 
“development has to be considered as an orderly sequence of successive 
forms, not in its real nature as a process essentially continuous. Morphology 
has to replace the living continuity by a kinematographic succession of stages” 
(Russell, 1916: 168).58 These stages can then be used as a basis for 
comparison across (and within) species.   
Love picks up on this when he notes that “changes that occur in ontogeny are 
all physically continuous and thus the measures of time utilized must connect 
the “stages” represented” (Love, 2008: 231). Due to the intrinsic variability of 
development, chronological time (minutes and hours) is of no use.59 Instead, 
embryologists sequentially order events and states (particular structural 
arrangements in early development, for example) in a series. This tension 
between the continuous process of ontogeny and the practice of dividing 
development into discrete stages is explored further in the following chapter, in 
the discussion on Wilson’s representation of cell-lineages and the formation of 
particular relations of cells in the early embryo. 
                                                          
57
 Scholtz downplays the significance of phylotypic stages or zootypes. See Wagner (2014) for a defence 
of such concepts, which stress the significance of some relative invariance within a phylum for a defined 
period early in organismal development. Even if we were to accept the existence of a phylotypic stage, 
most ontogenetic stages can still be considered to be independent.  
58
 A kinematograph or cinematograph was an early film (motion picture) camera. An interesting analogy, 
as the apparent movement or process observed in a cinema is in fact built up from myriad stages 
(frames) succeeding each other in quick succession. 
59
 Though chronological staging is actually used in zebrafish.  
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In the early days of comparative embryology such staging (or the establishment 
of a series) was not standardised, and was constructed to work with a specific 
problem and method of comparison (Hopwood, 2007: 2-3). The impetus 
towards a standardisation of the normal stages would wait until the 1890s, when 
embryologists Albert Oppel and Franz Keibel pressed for and constructed 
normal plates and tables. These were intended to serve as a basis for 
systematic comparative investigation into the relationship between ontogeny 
and phylogeny, and ultimately to test the biogenetic law (Hopwood, 2007: 7-8).  
What is the consequence of such staging? The pre-Darwinian comparative 
embryologists who conducted work on chicken embryos had such a large 
amount of samples that it “allowed abstraction from individual specimens and 
even some consideration of normal variation” (Hopwood, 2007: 3).  Such 
abstraction and cognitive transformation of the observations to interpretations 
and representations to identify almost or actual transcendental types, was 
reinforced by the dominant ‘truth-to-nature’ mode of presenting biological 
findings (ibid.).60  
Love observes that “developmental stages compose a ‘periodization’ that 
intentionally ignores variation associated with phenotypic plasticity” (Love, 2010: 
681). Such periodization relies on idealisations which “involve ignoring types of 
known variation” in order “to depict a non-abstract typical case for various 
descriptive and explanatory purposes” (Love, 2010: 682). Such idealisations 
have their advantages, but they tend to persist rather than be undermined by 
subsequent observations and comparisons with them (ibid.), and the 
consequences of abstracting away variation can be a channelling of scientific 
observation and interpretation, to the exclusion of potentially relevant 
phenomena (Love, 2010: 684). 
Two terms have been introduced here which require some clarification: 
idealisation and abstraction. Idealisations and abstractions are both 
simplifications, but can be distinguished by the result of the simplification. In the 
case of idealisation, it is a simplification which takes the form of a 
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 Daston and Galison (2010) identify ‘truth-to-nature’, that is, idealised representations of the 
perceived reality behind appearances, rather than naturalistic depictions, as the dominant mode of 
representation in natural historical and biological work before the closing decades of the nineteenth-
century. 
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misrepresentation, the “assertion of a falsehood” (Jones, 2005: 175). The 
“concrete object” or objects of interest must be changed in some way, “we 
mentally rearrange some of its inconvenient features” (Cartwright, 1989: 187). 
Abstraction, on the other hand, is a simplification which takes the form of an 
omission (Jones, 2005: 175), or a subtraction (Cartwright, 1989: 187), but not a 
misrepresentation (Jones, 2005: 175). Cartwright (1989), and following her, 
Jones (2005), argue that abstraction and idealisation are mutually exclusive.61  
So is the stripping away of variation to produce normal stages of a normal 
development of a particular organism a strategy of idealisation or abstraction? If 
we consider normal stages, are they constructed by abstraction or idealisation? 
On the one hand, variation is, as Love puts it, “abstracted away” (Love, 2010: 
684). It is subtracted, it is omitted. But it can only be said to be an abstraction if 
the omission does not constitute a misrepresentation. Whether normal stages 
and series constitute a misrepresentation is surely a matter of the use to which 
they, as tools, are being put.62 The same normal stages could be construed as 
an idealisation in one context (one in which the variation omitted is highly 
relevant, such as evolutionary developmental biology) or abstraction in another 
(perhaps a biomedical context where a reference point of normal structure or 
function is required).  We may also want to speak of models as more or less 
idealised or abstract (Jones, 2005: 192-199), which allows us to more fruitfully 
home in on what it is in the model that makes it more or less idealised, rather 
than simply label it as idealised or abstract and leave it at that.  Already we can 
see that there are tensions between the representation of development, and the 
potential work which such representations might be used for. 
Jones (2005) suggests that rather than focus on whether a particular model is 
an abstraction or an idealisation, we can focus instead on the process of 
idealisation or abstraction, and use this to highlight what it was that the scientist 
(or scientists) conducting it prioritised, and what they saw as rightfully omitted or 
abstracted away.  In this way, we can analyse abstraction as an “epistemic 
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 But these authors differ about how they are exclusive. For instance, Cartwright (1989) believes that 
idealisation pertains to models and abstractions to laws, but Jones (2005) argues that models can 
contain both idealisations and abstractions, and so can laws. Jones goes further in stating “That is not to 
say, of course, that a given representation cannot idealize some features of a system and abstract away 
from others.” (Jones, 2005: 176). 
62
 And as tools, their representational capacity is not a key criterion of their successful deployment. 
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activity” which “emphasises the actions, choices, displacements, conceptual 
and physical transformations involved in the creation and use of biological 
models” (Leonelli, 2008: 509 and 527). From this point on, I shall refer to the 
process of omitting things from a model (such as variation) as abstraction rather 
than idealisation, as this does not imply a judgment on my part as to whether it 
forms a misrepresentation or not. Instead it allows us to focus on how the 
abstraction was conducted, and to what purpose. 
It also allows us to consider not whether a particular representation is a 
misrepresentation or not, but rather how (and why) the representation came to 
be produced. Intermediate between the phenomenon and the particular image 
used in a paper or monograph are active and selective observation, and the 
selective representation of these observations. These can be of particular 
stages, states, or even processes of development. They are constructed in 
certain ways for certain purposes, and can influence the way in which not only 
the reader but the producer of the images is induced to think about 
development or aspects of it. Such representations constitute models, which 
initially are constructed with some reference to ‘the world’ or ‘nature’ and to 
‘theory’, but which become autonomous, and take on a life of their own. In this 
way, they can function as ‘mediating instruments’ which can be used to help 
build or rebuild theories (Morgan and Morrison, 1999; in particular Morrison and 
Morgan, 1999).  This will be explored in the following chapters with particular 
reference to the representations in Wilson’s work. 
A classic example from the history of embryology of staging and arrangement 
into a series is the 1951 work of Hamburger and Hamilton, entitled ‘A Series of 
Normal Stages in the Development of the Chick Embryo’ (Hamburger and 
Hamilton, 1951). This work begins with the bold statement that: “The 
preparation of a series of normal stages of the chick embryo does not need 
justification at a time when chick embryos are not only widely used in 
descriptive and experimental embryology but are proving to be increasingly 
valuable in medical research” (Hamburger and Hamilton, 1951: 49).  
The purpose of the paper is to present the results of the embryological 
investigation of the chick in a way that will be of direct practical relevance to 
scientific investigators. The aim of the authors was “to serve the practical 
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purpose of identifying and designating embryos on the basis of external 
characters” (Hamburger and Hamilton, 1951: 50) and to that end used 
“photographs and drawings [to] show most of the diagnostic criteria” (ibid.).  
Recognising the variability of embryos, particularly in the tempo of development 
(globally or locally), they produced a series which was “independent of 
chronological age and of size of embryos” (ibid.). Different characters were 
used at different points in development to establish stages. This may be 
because a character was particularly prominent, or in one fascinating example, 
because it enabled the authors to provide the reader with little notations giving 
important information: “We have chosen intervals of three somites as “stages”; 
this makes it possible to designate embryos with intermediate numbers of 
somites by a + or – sign” (ibid.). For embryologists who need to identify the 
stages of many embryos, this is an economical way of conveying information 
about the features characteristic of particular stages.  
To cope with the acknowledged “individual variation in individual characters”, 
Hamburger and Hamilton “tried to establish average or “standard” types by 
comparing a considerable number of embryos in each stage, and…selected for 
illustrations those embryos which appeared typical” (ibid.).63 Hamburger and 
Hamilton, working with a large number of embryos, made a judgment about 
what variation to abstract away, and how to represent that for the embryological 
investigator reading the paper. The purpose of the paper was not to produce an 
exhaustive monograph on the embryology of the chick, accounting for all 
possible and actual variations exhibited, but to provide an idealised guide of 
diagnostic characters. An embryologist using this paper could use the stages 
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 The first quote in this sentence (and this whole section, in fact) highlights an important point – that 
variation is itself a varied concept. While variation always implies comparison, what is being compared 
differs according to interest. At one level of resolution, a certain amount of variation may be observed, 
which at another would display a quite different amount of variation. For example, in studying genetic 
variation, we could study two populations of humans, to see what the genetic variation is between 
them. We could also study just one population, and see what the variation is within that population. We 
could study the genetic variation between many different individuals in different human populations. 
We could measure the genetic variation between a sample of humans and a sample of another species. 
We could also measure the genetic variation within a human, either the genetic variation of the 
microbiome (and perhaps compare this with the microbiomes of other humans) or the genetic variation 
between different human cells (and then see what the variation in the variation is between different 
humans, or different populations of humans!). We should also consider the different types of variation 
we might encounter when studying development, where one stage of development may exhibit a 
variation that other stages may not.   
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and series thus established in their own work, and most crucially, the 
communication of their work and results.  The importance of stages is such, that 
“one of the earliest tasks to be mastered in one’s training as a developmental 
biologist is to learn to identify the stages of normal development using a stage 
series” (DiTeresi, 2010: 57). Referring to published canonical stage pictures of 
the frog Xenopus, Nick Hopwood recalls “internalizing these images”, which 
“became badges of membership in a community of researchers” (Hopwood, 
2005: 1). However, as we shall see in chapter 4, the early experimental 
embryologists were not trained in such a way, and thus had to rely on their 
experience and growing familiarity with an organism to conceive of its normal 
development and normal stages. 
As we have seen, the Hamburger and Hamilton paper began with a brief 
justification of the establishment of normal stages and series in the chick in 
particular. Why go to all this trouble for the chick and not a bat, or a woodlouse? 
Ankeny, in her work on the use of ‘case-based reasoning’ in developmental 
biology (Ankeny, 2012), observes that the “the chicken was clearly selected [for 
developmental work] for convenience and ease of experimentation” (Ankeny, 
2012: 647). Von Baer used it to establish principles of development, and 
modern biologists use it to examine these and other principles (ibid.). It is not 
necessarily the best organism for this purpose, but as a case it is intensely 
studied in depth “with the goal of eventually elucidating norms or baseline 
patterns against which newly observed yet similar phenomena (e.g., in other 
species) can be compared” (Ankeny, 2012: 646).64   
Cases can help ‘tame variation’ when the sheer weight of it threatens to make 
meaningful scientific work impractical, as it threatens to in developmental, and 
particularly comparative developmental, biology (Ankeny, 2012: 652). While 
Ankeny acknowledges that the ‘choice’ (or perhaps a term with fewer 
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 In the case of the frog Xenopus laevis, which Ankeny examines, the process of metamorphosis which it 
exhibits is established as the example to which all other examples of metamorphosis can be compared. 
It even serves as the basis for establishing exactly what metamorphosis is, to identify whether certain 
processes in other organisms are in fact metamorphic. This brings to mind the early morphological 
innovation of Étienne Geoffroy St. Hilaire. Rather than accepting Man as the universal case, and 
comparing the structure of other organisms to human structure, he supposed that there were ideal 
perfect forms of organs and organ systems, and that for different organs, the most well-developed 
examples will be found in different species. For each organ or organ-system a series or scale of 
increasing perfection could be constructed, with one species possessing the nearest to ‘perfect’ 
manifestation of that organ to which the others could be compared (Russell, 1916: 54). 
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connotations of conscious decision-making) of an organism as a case can be 
due to the “similarity provided by the organism in question in relation to the 
process or issue under examination” (ibid.), factors such as “historic primacy or 
importance,…experimental tractability, [and] manipulability” are also critical 
(ibid.).  
In the context of late nineteenth-century embryological work, understanding 
organisms as cases makes more sense than considering them as model 
organisms. Model organisms are highly constructed and standardised (Ankeny 
and Leonelli, 2011: 316), and are associated with the concentration of practical 
biological work on a small, narrow range of organisms.65 Model organisms in 
this sense were not used in the embryological work in the late-nineteenth-
century that I am focusing on. In late-nineteenth century embryology, instead of 
life-long commitment to one organism (with associated resources and 
community), there was a far more opportunistic approach to the selection and 
use of organisms, as we shall see when Wilson’s research is examined in more 
depth.  
Bolker (1995) adds to “Historical accident and availability” some biological 
characteristics influencing the adoption and selection of model organisms. 
These include “rapid development and short generation time” (Bolker, 1995: 
451), insensitivity to environmental conditions to ensure “minimal variation 
between individuals and between batches of embryos” (Bolker, 1995: 452), and 
“short generation times” (ibid.).  
Bolker claims that the consequences of extrapolating from work conducted with 
organisms exhibiting such characteristics are that “we lack knowledge of the 
existing diversity in developmental patterns and processes” (Bolker, 1995: 453) 
and that this “ignorance of developmental variability and diversity leads to an 
overly deterministic view of development, and to a concomitant narrowing of 
focus to proximate, internal mechanisms” (ibid.). The problem identified here is 
the generalisation of results based on organisms that were not selected for 
particular purposes (such as the illustration of cases) but for practical and 
economic reasons.    
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 Whether this association is necessary or contingent, I couldn’t say. 
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After discussing this, she notes that “Phylogeny is rarely or never a factor in the 
choice of model systems” (ibid.). This may be true to a significant extent in the 
present-day, but in nineteenth-century morphology, phylogeny was a significant 
factor in determining the choice of an organism to use as a basis for 
comparison, or as a case.66 Organisms were chosen in part on the basis of their 
phylogenetic position because it was the problems of phylogeny, or more 
precisely the relations of ontogeny and phylogeny, that was the object of 
investigation.  
2.4. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I identified the concrete challenges facing embryologists and 
morphologists, which derived from the problems that were deemed to be 
paramount throughout the middle and latter decades of the nineteenth-century. 
After the publication of On the Origin of Species, a key problem was identifying 
and demonstrating evolutionary and genealogical relationships between 
different species. This led to a debate about the proper criterion (or criteria) that 
should be used to distinguish homologies from non-homologies, as these were 
in turn used to justify claims concerning common ancestry. Methodologically, 
the task for nineteenth-century morphologists and embryologists was to find 
some way to make valid comparisons between specimens, and between 
species.  
Towards the end of the century, the advent of experimental methods in 
embryology, and a shift in the kinds of problems embryologists wanted to 
investigate, led to a debate about the methodology and purpose of 
embryological investigation. I will pick up on this debate in the next chapter. To 
enable me to develop the discussion, I have ended this chapter with a treatment 
of the ways in which embryologists have approached the challenges of 
investigating the complex process of organismal development. Chief amongst 
these are the processes of abstraction which allow them to divide the process of 
development into (normal) stages, to identify common features that can be used 
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 Although I am generally in agreement with Bolker on these points, she did perhaps make the point too 
strongly about phylogeny not being a factor in modern biology, as phylogeny will at least be a factor in 
choice of organism in evolutionary developmental biology, even if ease of manipulation or the 
manifestation of a mechanism of interest may be more important factors. 
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as the basis for comparisons, and to abstract away the variation between 
embryos. In chapter 6 I deal with the processes of abstraction which manage 
variation, using the concept of typological practices concerning the production 
and use of ‘normal development’. Normal development features in Wilson’s 
work in his experiments on Amphioxus in 1892 that I detail in chapter 4. 
Experimental work such as this, which aimed at identifying processes 
responsible for the production of form, involved comparisons made between 
individuals of the same species, divided into ‘normal’ and ‘manipulated’ 
treatment groups. Although Amphioxus was chosen in part due to its 
phylogenetic position and relevance for assessing theories of vertebrate origins, 
the kind of intraspecific comparison employed was of no use for phylogenetic 
purposes. Such experimental work was thus an important shift in methodology 
from the practices associated with evolutionary morphology. The shift from 
evolutionary morphology to experimental embryology, and Wilson’s role in this, 
is the focus of the next chapter.  
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Chapter 3 – From germ-layers to cell-lineage: morphology and the 
problems of development 
3.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter I set the scene regarding late nineteenth-century 
biology, in particular morphology and embryology. In the late nineteenth-
century, biologists increasingly believed that there were problems with the 
programmes of evolutionary embryology and comparative embryology. The 
challenges of embryological research I outlined in the previous chapter posed 
problems, but so did empirical results suggesting that the methods of those 
fields might not be as robust as previously thought, particularly with regard to 
ascertaining homologies, and therefore relations of descent.  
In this chapter, I relate these factors to changes in how some biologists made 
attributions of causality concerning the process of embryonic development. I will 
show how this led to a decline in investigations that aimed to discover or use 
presumed historical causes of ontogeny. Instead, there was a shift towards the 
assessment of the role and weight of different proposed causal factors – 
historical and various proximate ones – and accompanying this, changes in 
scientific practices to more adequately address the new problems and 
questions.  
I discuss the historical debates concerning some of these changes. This 
includes outlining the elaboration of, opposition to, and results of the so-called 
‘revolt from morphology’ thesis that experimental embryology arose out of a 
reaction against the supposedly stale questions of evolutionary morphology. 
This historiographical debate eventually focused on two supposedly rival 
approaches to the study of life, naturalism and experimentalism, and the 
relationship between them. 
It is in this context that I introduce Edmund Beecher Wilson, his training, early 
career and research interests. Picking up from the previous chapter’s reference 
to the decline in the germ-layer doctrine, I note Wilson’s supposed role in this as 
part of a review of some of the historical perspectives on Wilson and his work. 
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Informed by the historiographical stance I have adopted, I detail how Wilson’s 
embryological interests changed, from the problem of assessing relations of 
descent, the history of forms (and how embryology can contribute towards that), 
to the problem of identifying the (relevant kinds of) causal factors and their 
relative weight in the production of form(s). In the former set of interests, the 
production of form is interesting insofar as the way it is produced (traced back to 
structures and events in early development) in embryogenesis can be 
compared between different species. In the latter set, the production of form by 
embryogenesis is the central topic of interest, and comparison plays a different 
role. For Wilson that role was the comparison of different phenomena in 
different organisms, and using these comparisons to posit a single process to 
explain the diversity of modes of development. There was therefore a shift from 
concern with the pattern of forms observed, to a greater interest in the 
processes responsible for those patterns. In outlining Wilson’s shift in priorities 
and practices, this chapter sets the scene for future chapters where the 
outcome of this – already hinted at in the preceding sentences – will be 
assessed. 
In this chapter I provide an account of Wilson’s training and early research 
career. This was dominated by evolutionary morphological approaches, with a 
view to gaining some kind of insight into the genealogical relationships of 
particular organisms, but it provoked an interest in embryonic variation. Moving 
on from this, I analyse one key aspect of Wilson’s early career, which occurred 
at what I have demonstrated to be a vital time for embryology – with a mass of 
data generated, and rival programmes in evolutionary morphology and more 
experimental approaches – from the late 1880s to the early 1890s. In these 
years Wilson began collaborating with, amongst others, Charles Otis Whitman 
and Edwin Conklin (1863-1952), travelled to Europe and then moved to 
Columbia University, which allowed him to focus more intensely on research. 
Wilson’s embryological work shifted over the course of 1887-1891 because he 
was trying to establish a solid basis for the embryological comparison of 
different species, to be able to establish homologies between them, and gain an 
understanding of the genealogical relationships and evolutionary history of key 
groups of organisms.  A central plank of this programme, from the late 1880s 
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onwards, was the perceived need to establish whether the middle germ-layer, 
the mesoderm, was a layer independent of the other two germ-layers. 
It is the thesis of this chapter that in following such threads of research, he 
sowed the seeds of fundamental changes in the way he conducted 
embryological investigation and conceptualised development. I detail how, in 
order to establish the homology of germ-layers across species, and therefore 
the homology of the structures arising from the germ-layers later in 
development, Wilson was forced to study ever earlier stages of development. 
This prompted the adoption of a new technique – cell-lineage research – and 
work with a new organism.  As indicated in the methodological discussion in the 
introductory chapter, my approach is to reconstruct the route towards (and 
through) the cell-lineage research, tracing the internal logic of Wilson’s research 
as it proceeded from the late-1880s and into the 1890s. 
As a result of this work Wilson became increasingly fascinated with the early 
stages of development prior to the formation of the germ-layers. This took the 
form of an increasing interest in the cleavage patterns of embryos. Cleavage, 
also known as segmentation, is the process in early embryonic development by 
which the egg divides into many smaller cells, called blastomeres, without an 
overall increase in size of the embryo. Cleavage produces various forms of 
symmetry in the early embryo. Different arrangements of the cells and 
symmetries produced constitute different discernible ‘cleavage-forms’. Wilson’s 
interest was piqued by the variability displayed by the cleavage forms, and his 
findings helped to undermine the Haeckelian framework of evolutionary 
morphology.  
As a result of the challenges Wilson faced in finding new and better ways to 
frame the epistemic object – securing embryological grounds for making 
judgements concerning the homology of germ-layers and structures deriving 
from these between different species – his work threw up new questions and 
surprises concerning the nature of embryonic development, and in particular the 
causes of differentiation, determination, and production of certain cleavage-
forms. This led him to become particularly interested in assessing the relative 
strength of two possible causes, mechanical conditions and what he called a 
“hereditary tendency”.  
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Later in the chapter, I draw attention to the fact that Wilson’s growing mastery of 
embryological detail, and his talent for representation, led to ever more 
processual depictions and interpretations of his findings. Increasingly, Wilson 
became interested in the process of development. 
3.2. Evolutionary morphology and Wilson 
In 1894 Wilson delivered a lecture at the summer gathering at Woods Hole in 
Massachusetts, in which he detailed the problems with the embryological 
criterion of homology.67 One of the key elements of this was the denial that 
germ-layers are homologous in their origin across all metazoans (Wilson, 
1895a: 108-113). The zoologist (and Wilson’s friend) Frank Lillie recalled Wilson 
excitedly declaring to him in 1891: “I believe I am going to destroy the germ-
layer theory of development!” (Lillie, 1944: 124). But just a few years 
beforehand, Wilson had happily used the germ-layers as the basis for 
embryological comparative morphological investigation.68 What exactly 
happened in the late 1880s and early 1890s to change Wilson’s views on this 
matter?  
Wilson was embedded within the context of an American morphology which 
“pressed for refinements in the determination of homologous structures” 
(Benson, 1985: 174) and which grappled with the question of “whether the 
origin of the germ layer revealed the evolutionary heritage, or whether it was the 
fate of the germ layer that was more important” (ibid.). The decline in adherence 
to germ-layer doctrine, as you will see in this section, has formed a key part of 
historical debates around the so-called ‘revolt from morphology’ and the 
supposed move from naturalistic to experimentalist modes of scientific 
investigation. Before I begin my discussion of Wilson’s career, I would like 
therefore to bring in some other perspectives on Wilson, particularly as they 
                                                          
67
 Curiously, though it is now referred to as Woods Hole, it was officially known from 1877 to 1896 as 
Wood’s Holl. I retain the modern (and pre-1877) spelling 
(http://www.nefsc.noaa.gov/history/stories/whistory.html Last accessed 14.05.2015). 
68
 In 1886, Wilson co-authored a textbook which contained the following section regarding the germ-
layer theory: “Germ-layers like those of Lumbricus, and called by the same names, are found in the 
embryos of all higher animals; and it will hereafter appear that this fact has a profound meaning” 
(Sedgwick and Wilson, 1886: 150). 
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relate to the question of naturalism and experimentalism with respect to the 
development of germ-layer theory. 
Gross (1985) sees Wilson as one of the leaders of a group of American 
biologists who in the course of their careers managed to bring “the revolution 
against nineteenth century natural philosophy, and the old spirits and specters, 
to a triumphant conclusion” (Gross, 1985: 70). This view would seem to 
corroborate the ‘revolt from morphology’ thesis proposed in its most notable 
form by Garland Allen (1978). In this view, a generation of biologists trained in 
morphology and embryology such as Thomas Hunt Morgan (1866-1945) and 
Edmund Wilson “became exasperated with the aims and practices of 
morphology.” In particular, they rejected the focus on evolutionary and 
phylogenetic questions, and the descriptive and speculative methods employed 
to answer them (Allen, 1978: 18-19). However, in response to other historians 
questioning aspects of this interpretation (Benson, 1981; Maienschein, 1981), 
Allen revised his thesis to focus on the adoption of (interventionist) experimental 
methods in embryology and the rejection of naturalistic methodologies (Allen, 
1981). The debate had largely run its course by the mid-1980s, but it had the 
effect of focusing attention on exactly what had changed in those last decades 
of the nineteenth-century. What is now clear is that there was not a replacement 
of observational and descriptive morphology with a rigorous, exciting new 
experimental embryology, but a synthesis or integration of observational, 
comparative and experimental embryology. These men started as “observers 
and tracers of cell lineage, later experimenters, later synthesisers” (Gross, 
1985: 70).  
Starting off with descriptive and comparative work, Wilson moved towards 
experimental methods, and abandoned previous problems of evolutionary 
relationships. He replaced these with increasing emphasis on the problems of 
differentiation and determination of the adult from the egg, all the while moving 
in investigative focus further and further back in the course of development. 
Crucial to this evolutionary picture of Wilson’s move away from comparative 
studies of phylogenetic problems was the role of his cell-lineage studies as a 
bridge towards his new interests. These studies led Wilson to try and ascertain 
the interplay of internal and external factors in development. Starting from the 
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problem of homology, he ended up transitioning through the work which aimed 
to tackle that problem to a concern with the determination of development, and 
the sources of that determination (Maienschein, 1978, 1981).  
At the beginning of Wilson’s career he pursued “very traditional descriptive 
studies” and comparative work, and this continued until at least the mid-1880s 
(Maienschein, 1981: 99). Indeed, the evidence of Wilson’s early work from his 
published papers and presentations made at University meetings points 
unequivocally to an emphasis on phylogenetic relationships, reached by means 
of detailed, painstaking descriptive and comparative work (see Wilson, 1882a, 
1882b). On this matter, I am in agreement with Maienschein; the content of 
Wilson’s research, if not necessarily the style of work, was in line with his 
mentor, William Keith Brooks (1848-1908) (Maienschein, 1987a: 779).  
Baxter (1977: 366-367) ascribes Wilson’s (almost passive) acceptance of the 
germ-layer doctrine to this tutelage by Brooks. The method of ascertaining 
homologies by tracing back organs to the germ-layers they derived from was 
employed by Brooks, who saw any attempt to track embryological structures 
and arrangements of cells prior to the gastrula, the first stage at which the 
germ-layers are apparent, as pointless (Conklin, 1968: 115).69  
What is apparent in the changes which occurred in embryology in the late 
nineteenth-century is a shift from one regime of the attribution and assessment 
of (degrees of strength of) causality to another. The historiography that I have 
just briefly outlined indicates ways in which that might be characterised. Broadly 
speaking, there was a shift, among a certain influential subset of a generation of 
biologists, from more naturalistic research to more experimentalist approaches. 
This was a shift from a concern with the reconstruction and investigation of the 
evolutionary process to a concern with the immediate ontogenetic production of 
form, therefore from the invocation of historical (phylogenetic) causes of form to 
proximate (we might say, mechanistic) causes of form, and to a focus on the 
relative role of different kinds of proposed or apparent proximate causes. This 
led Wilson to consider a shift in the role of embryology; how it can and should 
be conducted, and what it is good for. What was the epistemic object for which 
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 Specifically, in this particular anecdote related by Conklin, the cleavage stages. Other people in the 
laboratory labelled Conklin’s studies of cleavage as mere “cellular bookkeeping” (Conklin, 1968: 115). 
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embryological investigation was relevant, and what technical conditions 
embedded in new and existing methods and equipment used by embryologists 
were appropriate to such new epistemic objects? This is why attempts to 
establish a firm basis for the embryological criterion of homology, and the failure 
of such attempts, mattered. It was at the nexus of many different issues 
concerning the attribution of causation, and this helps explain the shift from one 
regime to another. This shift was from a set of practices directed towards 
providing explanations of changes in form. In that regime, whether embryology 
was useful for answering these questions was contested. The shift was to sets 
of practices and experimental systems directed towards providing explanations 
of the origin or causes of the production of organismal form (Amundson, 2005). 
In this sense, we there was not so much of a revolt from morphology, but rather 
a revolt towards morphology. In this regime, comparative and experimental 
methods combined were deemed more fruitful, rather than just comparative 
method alone, as we will see over the course of the rest of this chapter, 
culminating in the arguments made by Wilson himself to that effect.  
3.3. Wilson’s training and early research 
In examining the biological sciences at the end of the nineteenth-century, and 
also Wilson’s career, it is vital to consider the rise of the graduate university. 
This rise went hand in hand with the massive expansion in the academic 
biology community. As Keith Benson observes, from 1875, when there were no 
graduate biology programmes in the US, and 1910, when such programmes 
were well-developed in the major universities, the number of graduate students 
increased twenty-fold (Benson, 1988a: 331). The rise of the graduate 
universities was not merely a quantitative phenomenon. These institutions 
provided the material basis for original scientific research, in terms of libraries, 
laboratories, and graduate students. They expected original research from their 
biologists, and specialised teaching. This was in stark contrast to the 
denominational colleges which previously dominated the hiring of biologists, 
and which burdened them with overwhelming, and extremely broad, teaching 
commitments, as well as religious constraints in some cases (Cravens, 1978: 
19-20). They also provided little in the way of resources for research.  
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Established in 1876 as a private research university, Johns Hopkins University 
was to become notable for the eminence of the biologists who passed through 
its graduate programme in the latter decades of the nineteenth-century. It 
decided to concentrate on doing a few things very well, rather than trying to do 
everything and achieving only mediocrity. The priority was placed on 
physiology, in anticipation of the construction of the medical school and 
hospital. The Head of Department at Johns Hopkins, H. Newell Martin (1848-
1896), was a physiologist and enthusiast for experimental methods. However, a 
morphologist, William Keith Brooks, was also hired, and the research 
programme he led did not just lie in the shadow of the physiological one in the 
department. Indeed, in terms of postgraduates trained, Brooks’ programme in 
descriptive morphological zoology outperformed the rest of the department by a 
significant margin (Benson, 1981: 118, 1985: 168-169). It was on that 
programme that Wilson did his doctorate.  
The two fundamental orientations in biology, morphology (a concern with 
structure or form) and physiology (an interest in function), became less distinct 
in the last decades of the nineteenth-century (Benson, 1985; Maienschein, 
1981). Wilson received training in both orientations. Furthermore, in the 1890s 
he imbibed Whitman’s urgings for a physiological morphology (Maienschein, 
1987b: 189). 
The influence of Brooks as a teacher at Johns Hopkins has been noted, with 
one historian highlighting the extent to which his “students exhibited many 
shared concerns owing to their joint exposure to the problems confronting 
embryological morphology” (Benson 1981: 118). His high quality research 
programme in morphology has also been recognised, as well as his rejection of 
Haeckelian recapitulationism in the mid-1880s (Benson, 1981: 122). 
Additionally, the importance of Brooks’ (and others’) descriptive embryology in 
providing the empirical basis for the nascent experimental embryology has been 
stressed, as well as his support for experimental techniques (Benson, 1981: 
124). In his programme of descriptive work and hypothetical modelling Benson 
sees Brooks as “representative of the embryological community at the end of 
the nineteenth century” (Benson, 1981: 122).  
 
91 
 
As a graduate student of Brooks, Wilson underwent training and conducted 
work concerning the problems of “vertebrate ancestry, the gastraea-theorie, and 
definitions of homologous structures” (Benson, 1985: 174). Wilson’s 
postgraduate training exposed him to both the morphological concerns of 
Brooks and the concerns and (experimental) methods of physiology. Brooks, 
notwithstanding his limited use of experimental methods and manipulations in 
his work, was a morphologist largely concerned with exhaustive descriptive and 
comparative work, and engaged in the establishment of phylogenetic 
relationships. He was also deeply interested in the problem of the origin of 
variation, an interest he shared with William Bateson (1861-1926), with whom 
Brooks briefly collaborated in the early-to-mid-1880s (Hall, 2005).  
The products of Johns Hopkins University, such as Wilson, are interesting 
because of the supposed clash between the scientific approaches of the two 
key figures in the biology department. Their mentor, Brooks, was a morphologist 
who had reservations about the uses and scope of experimentalism. But they 
worked in a department led by a physiologist – H. Newell Martin – who 
impressed upon students the importance of experimental methods. Wilson’s 
Major was in morphology, but his Minor was in physiology.  
Encouraged by his experimental training and the insistence by Brooks that his 
graduate students should be able to draw, Wilson became a talented artist, 
section-cutter and user of novel staining techniques. He had therefore mastered 
the new techniques generally acknowledged to have been pivotal in the 
transformation of biology in the late nineteenth-century – the improvement of 
microscopes and the use of effective sectioning, preserving and staining 
methods (Benson, 1988b: 71; Coleman, 1977: 22-24; Maienschein 1994a: 8-9). 
His artistic abilities allowed him to produce many of the diagrams and 
representations for his papers and books, some of which I shall analyse later in 
this chapter. 
There is little scholarly work on Wilson’s early papers. This should not be a 
surprise, as this work was rooted in the methods and preoccupations of his 
mentor and his mentor’s generation of biologists, and therefore does not 
interest modern scholars as much as his later work on cell-lineages, 
experimental embryology and chromosomes. But Wilson’s early works are 
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important in establishing that the early parts of Wilson’s career were rooted in 
descriptive and comparative methods. Wilson was at the cutting edge in terms 
of adoption of new techniques, but he employed these techniques as part of 
well-established wider methodologies to answer the research questions that 
were posed.  
Wilson did not to spend his whole career using these methods, but it would be 
folly to think that he abandoned them in the late-1880s and 1890s. It was in 
using the germ-layers as the basis for an embryological criterion of homology to 
ascertain phylogenetic relationships that Wilson spent the bulk of his early 
career, involving himself in the problems and debates of the community of 
descriptive, comparative, evolutionary morphologists.  
What most supports the thesis that in the 1880s Wilson’s observations, 
descriptions and comparisons were explicitly made with traditional 
morphological questions in mind is that the conclusions he drew were almost 
exclusively phylogenetic.  This occurred even when he made comments which 
made it clear that the same work might have led him to draw conclusions 
relating to completely different problems.    
Wilson’s work on Renilla – the sea pansy, a cnidarian which is a colony of 
polyps – in the early 1880s illustrates this (Wilson, 1882a). He observed “great 
variation in the earliest stages of development” with many different “modes of 
segmentation, belonging apparently to quite different types of development, yet 
bringing about the same result” (Wilson, 1882b: 247). But rather than draw 
conclusions or pose questions about differentiation or determination in 
development, about why different modes of segmentation were produced, he 
concluded that “little weight consequently can be attached to the early changes 
of the egg as a guide to the affinities [i.e. relatedness] of animals” (ibid.). He 
was therefore focused on how his embryological observations could guide 
investigators seeking answers to phylogenetic questions or problems. Wilson 
was seeking a firm foundation on which to base an embryological criterion of 
homology. As late as 1892, Wilson observed that the problems of evolutionary 
morphology could “only be solved by a study of the embryological history of the 
organism” (Wilson: 1892: 384). In 1882, Wilson simply reiterated the need to 
study a slightly later (though still early) stage of development, the formation and 
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fate of the germ-layers. In this respect, he was still completely in line with the 
mainstream of evolutionary morphological research.   
The Renilla paper raises in nascent form two themes in subsequent Wilson’s 
research career. These are the challenges associated with studying the process 
of development, and the problem of variation. These themes are intimately 
related. The following quote brings out some of Wilson’s excitement at the 
protean sea-pansy: 
The segmentation of the egg in Renilla is remarkable for the surprising 
amount of individual variation of which it is capable. So great is this 
variation that it is safe to say that no two eggs ever develop in precisely 
the same way; and although most of the variations may be arranged in a 
definite series, some of them are so irregular that they seem to follow no 
definite law. No one indeed without actually following the entire 
development of some of these eggs would suppose them capable of 
normal development. For a long time, in fact, I passed by some of the 
less usual forms as due to abnormal or pathological changes, and only 
after repeated and careful study was able to convince myself that these 
peculiar embryos gave rise to active larvae, differing in no visible respect 
from those which had developed along the more usual course.  
…at least five or six well-marked modes of yolk-cleavage, with many 
minor variations, may occur as normal phenomena of development, that 
the segmentation may be at first equal or unequal, complete or partial, 
regular or irregular, and that a great amount of variation exists in the 
duration of the various stages of activity and quiescence. 
Wilson, 1882a: 729-730 
Wilson’s early work on the sea-pansy therefore impressed upon him not only 
the great amount of variation that exists between organisms, but that even 
some of the more variant forms were capable of normal development. In order 
to ascertain the facts of the latter part of the quote, two other workers were 
involved in a painstaking effort which involved the separation and isolation of 
eggs and tracking of development to the free-swimming larval stage (Wilson, 
1882a: 730). That the normal development encompassed forms exhibiting 
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variation in the pathways of development and of forms exhibited at pre-larval 
stages therefore made Wilson aware early in his career of the need to 
separately observe the full development of numerous individuals. He could not 
assume that studying a small number of samples, without regard to particular 
individual courses of development, would inform him about the nature of 
development for that particular species. Similarly, no assumptions could be 
made about the fate of seemingly unusual forms observed. Only by observing 
the whole developmental process for organisms exhibiting such unusual forms 
could one know whether it would develop normally. Interestingly, his case here, 
while not analysed in causal terms by Wilson, implies that whatever causes 
were responsible for early embryonic variants exhibited little specificity, if one 
was seeking the causes of larval or adult normality.70 Conversely, any causes 
which were not thought to be responsible for the production of variants, but 
might be thought more specific in terms of producing larval or adult normality, 
might as a result of these observations be deemed to be more stable, as they 
held over a much wider range of conditions than had previously been thought. 
While this interest in variation would be somewhat suppressed in Wilson’s 
publications for several years after the work on Renilla, it would be re-activated 
and accompanied by a new interest in the causes of that variation in the 
research described in section 3.5., especially subsection 3.5.2.  
After Wilson left his fellowship at Johns Hopkins, and spent a happy spell 
working in Europe, the only academic employment in the USA he could find was 
at Bryn Mawr, a teaching institution. Although he was allotted time and 
resources for research, these were limited, as his published output in these 
years indicates.71  
3.4. Wilson from the late-1880s 
Baxter claims that it was only when Wilson embarked on projects concerning 
the embryology of annelids (a phylum of segmented worms, which includes 
                                                          
70
 But not necessarily for other effects, such as the fate of particular cells. Assuming the proportionality 
criterion holds, how specific or stable a candidate cause is course depends on the precise explanandum 
one is attempting to construct a causal account to explain.   
71
 The list of publications included in Morgan’s memoir of Wilson (1940), while incomplete, serves to 
illustrate this. 
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earthworms and leeches), between 1887 and 1890 (Wilson, 1887, 1889, 1890), 
that he systematically investigated the germ-layers, and sowed the seeds of his 
estrangement from the germ-layer doctrine (Baxter, 1977: 367). By 1890 he 
was starting to conduct ‘cell-lineage studies’, studying the origins of particular 
embryonic structures to particular origin cells, and tracing forwards the fate of 
the cells produced from successive divisions, starting with the egg. In the wider 
context of Wilson’s career, the cell-lineage studies not only undermined his 
adherence to the embryological criterion of homology, but opened up 
suggestive new avenues of research.   
For Baxter, it was the work on the cell-lineage of Nereis (a polychaete worm), 
published in full in 1892 (Wilson, 1892a), that undermined Wilson’s adherence 
to germ-layer doctrine. In this work, Wilson extended the logic of the germ-layer 
doctrine – that homology was determined by common embryological origin – to 
the germ-layers themselves. He found that while a particular germ-layer, the 
mesoderm, could always be traced back to the same cell or blastomere within 
the same species, it could not be traced back to the corresponding cell or 
blastomere in different species. Rather, “corresponding cells in different species 
could have different prospective values” (Baxter, 1977: 370). What this meant 
was that the same cell – in a particular place in the cleavage at a particular 
stage, and descending in the same way from the segmenting egg – could give 
rise to a different germ-layer, and consequently different descendant tissues 
and cells. The mesoderm was therefore not homologous across the animal 
kingdom. If the germ-layers themselves were not homologous, then surely any 
homologies established on the basis of the universality of the germ-layers was 
untenable.  
Baxter claims that Wilson’s loss of interest in phylogenetic questions was due to 
“his exposure to the work of his German contemporaries”, who revealed to him 
the more exciting possibilities of the new experimental embryology (Baxter, 
1977: 374). However, neither of these claims fully captures what was going on. 
As a proportion of Wilson’s work and interest, phylogenetic problems certainly 
faded over the course of the 1890s, but the lecture of 1894 (which Baxter cites 
as the key attack on germ-layer doctrine) if anything stands, not as a 
repudiation of the programme of comparative morphology, but an attempt to 
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clear the ground to allow it to continue on a firmer basis (Wilson, 1895a). 
Furthermore, as I will demonstrate, it was the progress of his own work and the 
problems and questions it threw up which led him to new questions and 
approaches, though the work and ideas of his contemporaries signalled 
possibilities that Wilson was receptive to as a result of the issues raised in his 
own research.  
1891 brought with it three significant linked events. Hermann Muller, a 
prominent geneticist who studied under Wilson, located the start of Wilson’s 
work on ‘The Cell in Development and Inheritance’ (Wilson, 1896) to 1891. As 
Muller knew Wilson and had little reason to distort the facts in this case, we can 
accept this claim and timeframe with some confidence. This means, as Muller 
explained, that in 1891 Wilson began the task of gathering the material needed 
for this wide-ranging text; editing, organising and integrating it. The basis for the 
book was subsequently laid out and developed in a lecture course delivered 
during 1892 and 1893. Muller believed that these tasks enabled Wilson to 
achieve a “rounded conception” of the cell and development that was lacking in 
many other biologists (Muller, 1943: 30). 
Additionally in 1891, Henry Fairfield Osborn (1857-1935), late of Johns Hopkins, 
offered Wilson a position at Columbia University. This position was to provide 
Wilson with the resources of a research-oriented university and time to conduct 
research. Additionally, the job offer came with the opportunity of spending a 
year abroad before taking up the position. Wilson accepted the offer, having 
wanted to conduct research to the extent that he had enjoyed as a 
postgraduate, and to be able to make a return to Europe, which he had found 
scientifically and culturally stimulating on his previous visit in the early-1880s.  
In Europe, he first went to Germany, then Italy. In Germany he not only indulged 
his cultural interests, but met up with his friend Theodor Boveri (1862-1915), 
who was to influence his work, not just then, but subsequently as well (Monroy 
and Groeben, 1985: 41). The timing of Wilson’s stay in Germany coincided with 
a debate raging about the nature of the cell and its role in development.  
Through Boveri, Wilson assimilated the concepts of Zellforschung, the 
programme of experimental cell research that posited the cell as the centre of 
all biological phenomena (Dröscher, 2002: 364). Criticised by the likes of T. H. 
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Huxley for being preformationist and morphological, Zellforschung treated the 
cell as autonomous, and sought explanations for phenomena at a higher, 
multicellular level at the lower level of the cells and their interactions (Dröscher, 
2002: 359-360). Against Zellforschung’s emphasis of the role of the nucleus in 
directing development, Huxley outlined an epigenetic view of development 
which focused on the properties of protoplasm responsible for the 
transformation of the relatively homogeneous germ into a complex differentiated 
form (Richmond, 2000: 277).72 The debate over the role of the cell in 
development centred on how the cell and particular constituents of it related 
ontogenetically and physiologically with other cells and the rest of the organism, 
as well as on questions of functionalist versus morphological and epigenetic 
versus preformationist conceptions of the cell and development.   
The sojourn in Europe was to be critical in shaping the direction of Wilson’s 
research. In Italy, Wilson travelled first of all to Naples, and the Stazione 
Zoologica. Some of the key morphological studies establishing the 
embryological criterion of homology were conducted by German workers at 
Naples in the 1860s and 1870s.73 Through Brooks at Johns Hopkins University 
and Whitman at the Marine Biological Laboratory, this led to similar questions 
being pursued by similar means by the scientists trained at those institutions 
(Benson, 1988a: 338).   
It was at Naples that many of the instruments and techniques that were to be 
used in cell-lineage studies were perfected. Most notably, these included “the 
Zeiss homogeneous oil immersion objective, which increased the resolving 
power of the microscope, and the rotary microtome from Leyer that allowed 
continuous or ribbon sectioning of embryonic material” (Benson, 1988a: 339). 
Additionally, stains became available with the development of the dye industry 
                                                          
72
 Huxley also criticised what he thought were metaphysical assumptions underpinning Zellforschung, 
particularly on the powers attributed to the nucleus to direct the cell, the organism, and development 
(Richmond, 2000). 
73
 It is clear that many of the threads that contributed to the change in American biology had their roots 
in German debates and work. The influence of Wilhelm His on American embryology – and Whitman in 
particular – is one such example (Maienschein, 1986: 86). Others include the role of the Roux-Driesch 
debate in focusing attention on the internal and external in development (Maienschein, 1986: 84). The 
British influence from Huxley cannot be ignored, and there is ample evidence of this throughout 
Wilson’s work in particular – see the references, otherwise sparse, to Huxley’s work in ‘General Biology’ 
(Sedgwick and Wilson, 1886) and also in the various editions of ‘The Cell in Development and 
Inheritance’, e.g.  Wilson, (1896: 295 and 328). 
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in Germany in the nineteenth-century, in the 1880s in particular. These 
instruments and techniques made possible lines of research that had previously 
been impossible.74 As well as being developed in Naples, such instruments and 
techniques migrated quickly to Johns Hopkins University and the Marine 
Biological Laboratory, the latter being a regular haunt of Wilson (ibid.).  
The use of marine invertebrates as organisms of choice in evolutionary 
embryology was also pioneered at Naples. Countering Allen’s (2007) claim that 
it was the establishment of marine laboratories themselves that made the use of 
marine invertebrates inevitable, Benson quotes Anton Dohrn, the driving force 
behind the creation and running of the Stazione Zoologica, who justified the 
establishment of marine biological research stations in terms of the usefulness 
of marine animals for evolutionary embryology research: “to get back to these 
ancestors, and to build up scientific genealogy, must lead to the investigation of 
the embryology of marine animals, must cause, in consequence, the desire of 
having laboratories near the coast” (Dohrn, 1872, quoted in Benson, 1988a: 
338).75  A further advantage of marine invertebrates for the scientific 
investigator was that “marine organisms were both more durable and less 
personable than higher animals, they were easier to manipulate while alive; 
they were, figuratively and sometimes literally, transparent to the sufficiently 
careful observer” (Pauly, 1988: 135).  
If the nineteenth-century can be characterised as a period of globalisation, with 
qualitative improvements in means of communication and transport across the 
world, the Stazione Zoologica can be seen as a consequence of that. Certainly, 
scientists had previously travelled to different countries for study, or research 
trips. But the international community at the Stazione was something beyond 
that, something that has been described as “an international centre of scientific 
exchange” (Fangerau and Müller, 2007: 609). Such a centre provided a place 
                                                          
74
 The availability and development of this equipment and associated techniques owed much to Dohrn’s 
pioneering deal with the Zeiss company. In exchange for discounted instruments, Stazione scientists 
would make suggestions as to how they could be improved (Groeben, 1985: 12). 
75
 Though Allen does detail the extent to which such organisms were wonderful for scientific research. 
Indeed, “Once biologists became familiar with the advantages of working with marine organisms…these 
groups became model organisms for the study of all manner of general biological problems” (Allen, 
2007: 137). 
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where scientists could share suggestions, thoughts and techniques, and also 
critically discuss methods and problems (Fangerau and Müller, 2007: 612).  
At Naples Wilson met Hans Driesch and Curt Herbst (1866-1946) and 
encountered their nascent employment of experimental methods and 
techniques, and the problems that they were using these methods to address. 
The Naples ‘experience’ was pivotal in bringing to the fore these methods and 
questions (Maienschein, 1985: 189; Monroy and Groeben, 1985: 41), and 
Wilson’s first work in experimental embryology took place using Amphioxus in 
Sicily in 1892.76 The paper that was to result from this work was published in 
1893 (Wilson, 1893a).  
3.5. The shift from ‘traditional’ morphology to cell-lineage work 
From the early-1890s Wilson conducted research on the earliest stages of 
development. This involved the tracing and tracking of cells, and their 
descendants or lineages, throughout the course of development.  
There have been a number of reasons suggested for Wilson’s adoption of cell-
lineage work, including the fascination he held from his student days with the 
work of Edward Laurens Mark (1847-1946) on the very early stages of snail 
development (Maienschein, 1987a: 779).77  Wilson’s relationship with Charles 
Otis Whitman was more significant (Maienschein, 1990a: 368-369). Whitman 
himself conducted cell-lineage studies on Clepsine (a leech, also an annelid), 
which were published in 1878, 1886 and 1887.  In this research, Whitman was 
attempting to test claims that cleavage produced “indifferent cells” which “have 
no more of a fixed relation to the postembryonic body than have snow flakes to 
an avalanche” (Stent, 1998: 237). The germ-layers would thus only be formed 
at gastrulation, and only after gastrulation would they “be destined to take on 
the tissue differentiation characteristic” (ibid.).  Whitman found the contrary. In 
                                                          
76
 That this is Wilson’s first foray into experimental work is generally acknowledged, not least by Morgan 
and Muller in their obituaries-cum-biographies of Wilson (Morgan, 1940; Muller, 1943). The significance 
of this lies in the tendency in those accounts to emphasise Wilson as an experimental embryologist, to 
the exclusion of the rest of his work. The only exception to this is the work Wilson undertook on 
chromosomes in the 1900s, which Muller places even before the experimental embryology in 
importance, for obvious reason given Muller’s work in genetics. 
77
 Curiously, among his other accomplishments, Mark has also been recognised as the creator of the 
Harvard System of referencing! (Chernin, 1988). 
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tracking the fate of individual cells from the first cleavage to the formation of the 
germ-layers, he found that “a definite developmental fate can be assigned to 
each identified embryonic cell and to the clone of its descendent cells” (ibid.), 
suggesting that “the differentiated properties that characterize a given cell of the 
post-embryonic animal are causally linked with that cell’s developmental line of 
descent” (ibid.).78 Crucial here is variation, or rather, the lack of it. Too much 
intraspecific variation in early embryogenesis would make the kind of 
determinate development Whitman discovered less likely. 
Contrary to the views of William Brooks, Whitman came to see the investigation 
of these early stages as vital, still (as of the late-1880s) within the framework of 
an evolutionary comparative morphology that aimed to establish a definitive 
basis for ascertaining phylogenetic relationships (Maienschein, 1978: 136-138). 
Through the cell-lineage work Whitman came to see the importance of 
identifying the “distinction between the roles of internal and external factors” in 
development (Maienschein, 1978: 138). However, even this additional problem 
was related to the more traditional task of establishing homological 
relationships, by separating out the primary ancestral characteristics 
(palingenetic) from the secondary adaptations (cenogenetic) (ibid.). The cell-
lineage work in the 1880s constituted for Whitman a pursuit of problems within 
the Haeckelian framework, while increasing his doubts about specific aspects of 
that framework (Maienschein, 1978: 137). In Whitman’s work in this period, he 
displayed an interest in the efficacy and role of different modes of causality. The 
question of the relative importance, role and nature of internal (historical) and 
external (proximate) factors became not just relevant for explaining the 
production of form, but also for explaining changes in form. This is also clear in 
the works of Wilson in the early-1890s, as we shall see. 
Maienschein notes that, as well as Whitman, “To some extent Wilson had 
begun to recognize the inadequacies and confusions of tracing evolutionary 
relationships by 1890” (Maienschein, 1978: 139). The 1890 lecture Wilson 
delivered at Woods Hole entitled “Some Problems of Annelid Morphology” 
demonstrated that while “still operating within an essentially Haeckelian context, 
considering phylogenetic questions through germ-layer studies…at this point he 
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 Both of these are quotes about Whitman’s work rather than by Whitman himself. 
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felt frustrated by the confusions of the search and sought the more stable 
ground of empirical detailed description of embryonic development” 
(Maienschein, 1978: 140).  
This assessment, as we shall see, is partly correct. However, working within the 
Haeckelian framework and pursuing the problems of evolutionary morphology 
was not necessarily the same thing (a point also made in Guralnick, 2002). 
Furthermore, in Whitman’s cell-lineage research, Wilson did indeed have a 
model of how to pursue the tracing of evolutionary relationships unencumbered 
by the problems emerging with the Haeckelian approach.  
A weakness in Maienschein’s 1978 account is that it relies too much on the 
1894 lecture delivered at Woods Hole by Wilson (Wilson, 1895a) as the basis 
for a discussion of the significance of the cell-lineage work. Wilson’s views on 
the significance of germ-layers and the embryological criterion of homology 
changed in a short space of time. But the precise timing, and way in which this 
impacted on the rest of his research agenda in the months and years following 
the commencement of his cell-lineage work,  is best dealt with in that period. To 
that end, I will examine the path to the cell-lineage work itself, and also trace the 
immediate consequences of it for Wilson’s research.  
3.5.1. Before cell-lineage – working with Lumbricus 
The 1887 paper entitled ‘The Germ-Bands of Lumbricus’ (Wilson, 1887) was the 
first research paper published by Wilson since 1884. At this time Wilson was 
still working at Bryn Mawr College. The work was conducted with two species of 
common earthworm, Lumbricus rubellus and Lumbricus communis.  These had 
been the subject of works previously conducted by Kovalevsky and 
Kleinenberg. The paper is a work of comparative evolutionary morphology, with 
the aim being to “describe only the general structure and mode of growth of the 
germ-bands, reserving for a future paper an account of the early embryonic 
stages and a detailed description of the development of organs” (Wilson, 1887: 
183). This he does in a paper which appears in the Journal of Morphology at the 
end of 1889 (Wilson, 1889). Lumbricus was chosen due to its close 
(phylogenetic) relation to organisms on which similar work had been conducted, 
such as the leeches of the genus Clepsine (Wilson, 1887: 183). 
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The 1887 and 1889 works constitute a distinct phase of Wilson’s career, which 
ended with a paper published in October 1890 (Wilson, 1890). All three of these 
papers were published in Whitman’s new Journal of Morphology, which also 
hosted the key papers he would publish in 1892 (Wilson, 1892a) and 1893 
(Wilson, 1893a) detailing the results of his studies on cell-lineage and the 
experimental manipulation of development.  
In comparing the derivation of the nervous and excretory systems of annelids 
and vertebrates from the germ-layers, the works are obviously meant to be a 
contribution towards testing the hypotheses of the so-called ‘annelid theory’ (for 
example, Wilson, 1887: 188-190). The annelid theory proposed that vertebrates 
(and arthropods) evolved from a “primitive” annelid, a type of worm (Russell, 
1916: 274). Anton Dohrn was the primary advocate of the annelid theory. 
Central to this theory was the claim that the segmented structure (metamerism) 
of (modern) annelids and vertebrates was the result of common ancestry, and 
was therefore homologous. Consequently, rather than the lack of segmentation 
in invertebrate hemichordates being explained by the evolution of segmentation 
in the vertebrate lineage after they parted, it was explained by the 
hemichordates losing the segmentation, which nevertheless had been retained 
by the vertebrate lineage. Dohrn therefore proposed that degeneration – loss or 
simplification of parts or features – was more widespread in evolutionary 
change than had previously been thought (Dohrn and Ghiselin, 1994). While the 
genesis of the annelid theory “drew its main support from comparative anatomy” 
(Bowler, 1996: 157), embryological evidence was soon required to support its 
claims and deal with the difficulties presented (Bowler, 1996: 161).79  
The annelid theory was a contribution to the efforts to account for the origin of 
vertebrates, a problem which “became a centrepiece of evolutionary biology” in 
the late nineteenth-century (Bowler, 1996: 141). Such a search was made 
possible by evolutionism’s overturning of the conception of four distinct types of 
animal proposed by Cuvier in 1812 (ibid.). Vertebrates descended from 
invertebrates, but which, and how?  
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 One difficulty arising from the idea that the vertebrate is simply an ‘inverted’ annelid “is that the 
relationship between the mouth and the brain does not correspond to what the hypothesis predicts” 
(Bowler, 1996: 158).  
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A competitor of the annelid theory, the ‘ascidian theory’ was based on work by 
Kovalevsky which demonstrated homologies between structures in the sea 
squirts known as ‘ascidians’ and the “vertebrate type” (Bowler, 1996: 150). 
While there were variants of the theory, the predominant version held that both 
ascidians and the ‘lowest’ vertebrates were derived from a common ancestor 
which was in fact a sexually mature version of the ascidian larva (Bowler, 1996: 
153).  
Despite his adherence to the ascidian theory, Brooks required his graduate 
students to read Dohrn’s 1875 account defending the annelid theory, and 
considered it “one of the most important contributions to evolutionary 
morphology” (Bowler, 1996: 165). Wilson was therefore immersed in the 
debates over the relative merits of the annelid and ascidian theories.80 Once he 
was at Columbia, Wilson taught his own students Dohrn’s principle of the 
succession of function. This principle dictated that intermediates in a proposed 
succession of forms (for example, between his ancestral annelid and ancestral 
vertebrate) each had to be functional despite the changes in form hypothesised 
(Groeben, 1985: 16; Dohrn and Ghiselin, 1994).81 In Wilson’s 1889 paper there 
was serious engagement with previous work connected with the annelid theory 
by the likes of Balfour and Kleinenberg (e.g. Wilson, 1889: 391-393). 
Wilson was also influenced by the work of the zoologist Adam Sedgwick 
(Wilson, 1889: 441), who proposed (in key papers published in 1880 and 1884) 
that the divergence of invertebrates and vertebrates was ancient, and 
consequently that the metamerism of both invertebrates and vertebrates were 
derived, so analogous, features and therefore not homologous (Bowler, 1996: 
184). The relevance of annelids to the study of vertebrate origins was that they 
                                                          
80
 A series of articles on the annelid theory by a British morphologist, John Beard, were published in 
Nature over the course of 1888 and 1889. They couldn’t have inspired Wilson’s 1887 work, but at the 
very least they reflect the importance of these issues in this crucial period. They also served to highlight 
the changes and transformations that occur in annelid development, and the consequent difficulty in 
detecting “traces of adult annelid structures in vertebrate development” (Bowler, 1996: 167-168).  
81
 This was a functional morphological approach, which emphasised the role of changes in function in 
leading to transformations in the morphology of particular parts, or even the whole of the organism 
(e.g. Dohrn and Ghiselin, 1994: 34-37 and 45). Dohrn stressed that in the transformation of an organ the 
bearer of the function remained that same organ, though what was the main function was replaced by 
what was a subsidiary one (Dohrn and Ghiselin, 1994: 67). He claimed that this approach would “be of 
great use for morphology – and for the evolutionary history of structures, which, finally, are only the 
content and the process of functions projected as form, and cannot even be conceived of without 
functions” (Dohrn and Ghiselin, 1994: 74). 
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could be used to embryologically test hypotheses like this. At issue in particular 
for Wilson were the origin of the metameric structures, and the formation of 
nephridia (excretory structures in annelids) and rudiments of the nervous 
system. The former involved investigating their derivation from a particular 
germ-layer (the mesoderm or the ectoderm), and from this sprang the need for 
Wilson to establish the independence of the mesoderm as a primary germ-
layer. The latter related to the comparative morphological work of Balfour on the 
relation of the annelids to vertebrates (Russell, 1916: 282). 
The 1889 paper was vital in throwing up problems for Wilson in his attempt to 
come to grips with the relationship between annelids and vertebrates by using 
the germ-bands, their ‘history’ and the structures derived from them. In this 
paper, he addresses the origin of the mesoblast (mesoderm) which he briefly 
dealt with in the 1887 paper. Wilson aimed to establish that the mesoblast was 
not derived from either or both of the two other germ-layers, contrary to other 
accounts such as that of Kleinenberg (Wilson, 1889: 391-392). The purpose, as 
in previous work, was to use the mesoblast, and the structures which derive 
from it, as a basis for establishing homologies between Lumbricus species, 
Clepsine (Whitman’s leeches) and vertebrates. Wilson found that “The entire 
mesoblast is derived from a pair of primary mesoblasts or teloblasts that lie at 
the posterior ends of the germ-bands, and no mesoblastic elements arise from 
the ectoblast overlying the germ-bands. The primary mesoblasts are 
differentiated in the course of the cleavage” (Wilson, 1889: 389). The mesoblast 
germ-layer therefore arose, not from pre-existing layers after gastrulation, but 
before the crucial process of gastrulation. 
Variability in development caused problems for Wilson however. There was 
variation in both the developmental tempo and the cleavage (Wilson, 1889: 395 
and 397). Wilson noted that such variability was an issue in other species as 
well. These problems led Wilson to confess that “I have had no better success 
than Kleinenberg in following the details of the cleavage process” (Wilson 1889: 
397). He also admitted that “my account of the cleavage will be found 
unsatisfactory, owing to the impossibility of following continuously the 
development of the individual ova” (Wilson, 1889: 395).  
 
105 
 
Indeed, cleavage was to cause Wilson some problems. He observed that “the 
cleavage process varies greatly in the order of division, which after the first two 
divisions loses all appearance of regularity. On account of these circumstances 
the segmenting ova vary widely in appearance, and the process of cleavage 
thus acquires that apparent irregularity which other observers have found so 
perplexing” (ibid.). In the stage following the third cleavage, “There are in all 
thirteen cells, which do not perceptibly differ in the character of the protoplasm, 
and I am unable to say what is the precise relation of these cells to those of 
earlier and later stages; or to recognize the future primary mesoblasts, though it 
is possible that they are already present” (Wilson, 1889: 397). We see here the 
germ of problems concerning the nature and morphological significance of 
cleavage to which greater attention would be drawn in subsequent works. In 
particular, the problem of the variation of cleavage forms presented itself. Such 
variation in early developmental processes posed a challenge for the conduct of 
embryology. Given this variation, how were meaningful stages, cell-lineages 
and standards to be determined for the purposes of compiling data for 
representation and comparison? They also posed a challenge to the Haeckelian 
framework, which was based on the constancy and equivalence of early 
development across the animal kingdom. If this was seriously challenged, then 
the application of embryology for phylogenetic purposes was undermined. At 
the very least, the firmness of the basis of certain ways of embryologically-
ascertaining homologies was undermined. This would trigger a search for other 
ways to do this, which animated subsequent work by Wilson. 
For now, when dealing with the question of the origin of the germ-layers, Wilson 
located the origin of the mesoblast back to two “primary mesoblasts”, but he 
“failed to trace the origin of these cells in the process of cleavage, the original 
character of which has been so altered that it is impossible to determine the 
relation of the primary mesoblasts to the micromeres and macromeres of the 
typical unequal cleavage” (Wilson, 1889: 398). Once again, the nature of 
development in Lumbricus had prevented him from tracing the origin of the 
mesoblast. 
Wilson considered the relation of the head and the trunk in annelids to be one of 
the most crucial in annelid morphology (bearing as it did on the development of 
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the ancestral form of annelids, and thus on key genealogical questions [Wilson, 
1890: 62]), and in this was directly inspired by the ideas of Adam Sedgwick.82  
Relating his observations to this key question Wilson concludes that: “The 
essential agreement in the history of the mesoblastic bands between forms so 
different both in structure and in the conditions of embryonic development as 
Clepsine, Lumbricus, and Polygordius, is very strong evidence that mesoblastic 
concrescence has some ancestral meaning, and was not originally caused, 
though afterwards it was undoubtedly in many cases modified and rendered 
more conspicuous, by accumulation of food-yolk in the ovum” (Wilson, 1889: 
437). By “ancestral meaning”, Wilson meant that this process was not a result of 
functional or adaptive modification or what we might call proximate causes, but 
resulted from a hereditary or historical cause. 
However, he made “no conjecture as to the character of the adult ancestral 
form, except to state that the views suggested are reconcilable with the 
derivation of annelids either directly from Coelenterata, or from Platyhelminths, 
in accordance with the views of Balfour and Sedgwick, or Lang” (Wilson, 1889: 
441). The purpose of the observations Wilson made, and the interpretations and 
discussions arising from them, was an elaboration of certain key aspects of the 
development of Lumbricus, with the aim of providing more data and evidence to 
help sort out the competing hypotheses about vertebrate origins, and how 
annelids related to this. 
As Wilson moved towards the end of the paper he noted that “Our knowledge of 
the mesoblast in annelids appears at present to be in a very confused and 
unsatisfactory condition” (Wilson, 1889: 442). He continued: “It appears 
impossible at present to determine the primitive origin of the material now 
segregated in the primary mesoblasts, for the extreme condensation of 
development involved in their origin has completely masked the original mode 
of development” (Wilson, 1889: 445). Despite the monumental work that went 
into the 1889 paper, he was unable to definitively settle the matter, because of 
the intractability of the early stages of development for embryological study.  
                                                          
82 Indeed, Wilson stated that “as far as our knowledge goes, the development of Lumbricus can be most 
simply and clearly interpreted in accordance with Sedgwick's hypothesis” before going on to outline an 
account of the development, using the framework of Sedgwick’s ideas (Wilson, 1889: 441). 
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He restated the problem at the beginning of his 1890 paper: “It is impossible to 
doubt the homology of the mesoblastic bands in Polygordius, Eupomatus, 
Lumbricus, Clepsine, Lopadorhynchus, and Enchytroeides—a series that 
includes representatives of the three modes of mesoblast-formation” mentioned 
by Wilson (Wilson, 1890: 206).83 He believed that it must “be possible to reduce 
these modes of development to a common type” (ibid.) and considered it “a 
remarkable illustration of the elementary state of our knowledge of annelid 
development that no one, as far as I am aware, has made even a suggestion as 
to how this is to be done” (ibid.).  
He mentioned a hypothesis that he raised in the 1889 paper, which he 
dismissed as “a somewhat unsatisfactory suggestion, which, however, had the 
merit of emphasizing the importance of a careful study of the relations between 
the germ-bands and the blastopore in the Polychaeta” (Wilson, 1890: 207).84 
Wilson needed a means to establish the homology of mesoblast-formation. He 
believed that the only way to do this was to track the cell-divisions and fates of 
early stages of development, to determine whether there was a common mode 
of formation. In this way he would be following in the footsteps of Whitman’s 
cell-lineage research. The summer of 1890 brought with it a possible way of 
doing this. Wilson was able, “through the kindness of Dr. E. A. Andrews, to 
procure very abundant material for the study of the early stages of two species 
of Nereis…and the facts thus brought to light point the way, as I believe, to a 
solution of the problem” (Wilson, 1890: 207).85 The eggs of Nereis “are 
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 The three modes: “in some cases the mesoblast first appears in the form of a pair of large cells 
(teloblasts), by the proliferation of which the paired mesoblastic bands are produced. The teloblasts are 
often differentiated at a very early period, – sometimes even prior to the gastrulation, – arising near the 
region corresponding to the posterior lip of the blastopore. In no case do they arise from the ectoblast; 
in some cases they seem to arise from, or at least to be closely associated with, the cells of the 
archenteron. In still another class of cases the mesoblast appears to arise neither by delamination from 
the ectoblast, nor from teloblasts, but from a central mass of “mes-entoblast,” the lateral portions of 
which give rise to the mesoblast-bands, and the central portion to the entoblast”(Wilson, 1890: 205-
206). 
84
 The hypothesis was “that the walls of the coelomic cavities were originally formed as a series of gut-
pouches, as in Amphioxus. The primary mesoblasts lie at the extreme posterior limit of the entoblast, 
and it is not difficult to picture the process by which a series of gut-pouches, successively formed at the 
posterior part of the archenteron, might be crowded further and further back in development, until the 
present complete segregation of the mesoblast in a single pair of the cells was attained” (Wilson, 1889: 
445). 
85
 Nereis is another annelid, in a different class (Polychaeta) to Lumbricus (Clitellata – though Wilson 
referred to its modern subclass, Oligochaeta). Andrews himself was an advocate of the annelid theory, 
and proposed his own version of it (Bowler, 1996: 167). 
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transparent, of comparatively large size, and they may be procured in 
abundance” (ibid.) so they were amenable to observation, and enough material 
could be found to conduct proper studies. Also aiding observation and the 
tracking of cell-lineages through development was ‘self-marking’, a technical 
condition produced by the organism itself: “The transparent macromeres 
contain large oildrops, which run together during the development, until, in the 
great majority of cases, only four are left” (ibid.). However, Wilson would also 
need to apply his own marks in order to track cell-lines throughout development. 
Here again though the properties of Nereis development would help. Wilson 
found, to his advantage, that the cells constituting the part of the embryo from 
which the mesoblast arose were not only distinctive in appearance (“larger, 
differently granulated” [Wilson, 1890: 208]) from other nearby cells, but also 
stained differently. Fortunately, they, “upon treatment with certain reagents 
(combinations of acetic acid, etc.), assume a brownish color that differentiates 
them very sharply” (ibid.). 
Observations seemed to suggest that “The mesoblast…arises directly from a 
thickened bilobed ventral plate” and therefore “seems to arise from the 
ectoblast” (ibid.).  The distinctive appearance and staining of the cells of the 
“thickened bilobed ventral plate” allowed Wilson to examine this possibility, as it 
made “it possible to trace their origin, cell by cell, from the beginning of 
development” (ibid.), in other words, to trace a cell-lineage. This work 
succeeded in demonstrating “that the mesoblast is completely segregated in the 
anterior part of the plate, while the posterior part alone gives rise to ectoblastic 
structures (neural plates, seta-sacs). Moreover, each of the two divisions of the 
ventral plate may be traced back to a single cell (pro-teloblast), which is 
obviously homologous to a corresponding cell in the early embryo of Clepsine” 
[Wilson’s emphasis] (ibid.). All of these factors had thus enabled Wilson “to 
trace the origin of the mesoblast-bands from the beginning of development” 
(Wilson, 1890: 207). 
Wilson depicted these early events in the three diagrams below (Figures 8, 9, 
and 10). These diagrams were, in Wilson’s own words, “from camera [lucida] 
drawings, and are not schematized in outline, though slightly simplified” (Wilson, 
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1890: 208).86 To say they were slightly simplified is something of an 
understatement, given that the cells were represented as nothing but outlines. 
Such representations, however simplified, do demonstrate several key pieces of 
information. They depict the relative positions of the cells in three dimensions, 
display which daughter cells form from the division of which parent cell, and 
highlight the ancestral cells from which particular structures (in this case the 
mesoderm) ultimately derive.87 The diagram therefore displays some form of 
activity. 
 
Figure 8 – Depiction of the cells in the eight-cell cleavage stage of Nereis. Note 
that the macromeres (large blastomeres formed due to unequal segmentation of 
the egg) are labelled with capital letters, and micromeres (small blastomeres 
formed due to unequal segmentation of the egg) are labelled with lower-case 
letters, the same letter belonging to ‘sister’ cells. The diagram displays three 
dimensions, and shows the generation of the particular form of cleavage. 
Source: Wilson, 1890: 208. 
                                                          
86
 The camera lucida allowed the observer to view both the sample and a projection of it onto a drawing 
surface simultaneously. I discuss the camera lucida more in chapter 4. 
87
 The technique of using dots, lines and arrows to indicate the three-dimensional and dynamic nature 
of development had been pioneered by von Baer. See Brauckmann (2011). 
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Figure 9 – Depiction of the cells in the sixteen-cell cleavage stage of Nereis. As 
in Figure 8, the diagram displays three dimensions, and shows the generation of 
the particular form of cleavage. In this one, however, the fourth cleavage division 
displayed shows the formation of new micromeres from the division of both 
macromeres and micromeres. It also shows the formation of the cell labelled ‘X’, 
which divides from the macromere labelled ‘A’. X is large and granulated, and is 
called the “first pro-teloblast” by Wilson. Source: Wilson, 1890: 209. 
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Figure 10 – Depiction of the cells in the sixteen-cell cleavage stage of Nereis. As 
in Figure 8, the diagram displays three dimensions, and shows the generation of 
the particular form of cleavage. In this one, however, the fourth cleavage division 
displayed shows the formation of new micromeres from the division of both 
macromeres and micromeres. It also shows the formation of the cell labelled ‘X’, 
which divides from the macromere labelled ‘A’. X is large and granulated, and is 
called the “first pro-teloblast” by Wilson. Source: Wilson, 1890: 209. 
 
Wilson’s diagrams over the period 1896-1925 have been shown to increase 
both in their abstraction and the amount of specific information contained in 
them (Maienschein, 1990b). This is said to reflect his growing confidence in the 
diagrams serving as accurate interpretations of what is being presented. The 
later diagrams are deemed to be more abstract because they come to represent 
general types rather than particular individuals. This is how abstraction can 
accompany greater specific detail (Maienschein, 1990b: 235). Although 
Maienschein does not discuss depictions presented by Wilson earlier than 
1895, it is clear from Wilson’s own words that the drawings are of specific 
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cleavage forms, rather than generalised depictions of a ‘typical’ cleavage 
form.88  
One way of understanding these diagrams is as models, mediators between 
‘the world’ or ‘nature’ and theory (Morgan and Morrison, 1999). This enables us 
to approach their role in a way which highlights not merely their genesis, but the 
possibilities they presented. They were intended by Wilson to represent 
particular, important aspects of the embryo at particular times, and the 
processes that were occurring. Such representations are not only 
representations, but by being separated from the world, can be used as tools for 
generating new hypotheses as well as new questions. In so doing they permit 
new ways of engaging with the world. In Maienschein’s account of the 
transformation of Wilson’s composition of diagrams, she observes that as 
Wilson gained greater confidence in the theory he was expounding, the 
diagrams he constructed moved closer to theory, and away from ‘nature’ or ‘the 
world’. In the earlier period of Wilson’s career that I am concerned with, the 
issue is rather the lack of theory, or at least its haziness. In this sense, the 
diagrams can be seen as emanating from, and closely corresponding to, ‘the 
world’, and in so doing providing Wilson with pointers to theoretical possibilities. 
In this way, the diagrams can be seen as a “descriptive model” which becomes 
ever more “distinct from the data set from which it has been generated” 
(Ankeny, 2000: S269). Crucially, “once these descriptive models have been 
established, they are used by scientists without regard to the particular 
experimental arrangements under which they were developed” (ibid.) and so 
can have a life of their own.   
This mirrors the path from which an epistemic object of prior experimental 
systems is made into a technical condition (or part of a technical condition) of a 
new experimental system. The abstraction of the model from the concrete 
details which allowed it to be constructed in the first place allows it to be used in 
different contexts for different purposes. It constitutes a technical condition 
which shapes the expectations of researchers, as well as providing a material 
                                                          
88
 Wilson’s ‘An Atlas of the Fertilisation and Karyokinesis of the Ovum’, an exercise in ‘mechanical 
objectivity’ (after Daston and Galison, 2010) in which Wilson attempts to remove as much of his 
subjective presence from the atlas as possible, and allow the ‘objective’ photographs to present the 
states and phenomena of interest (Maienschein, 1990b: 229) (see Wilson, 1895b). 
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comparator or reference, providing the relative stability required of a technical 
condition. The background conditions of an investigation will be shaped in part 
by this model functioning as a technical condition, as ensuring that the 
experimental materials conform to the model will affect the construction and 
usage of the rest of the technical assemblage. The technical assemblage must 
contain means of identifying and controlling potentially relevant causal factors 
which might make experimental materials (e.g. embryos) diverge sufficiently 
from the model to compromise their usefulness as indicators of the effects of 
experimental manipulations. These factors must be identified and controlled as 
background conditions. Normal development functioning as a technical 
condition plays the kind of role indicated above, but at this stage in Wilson’s 
research, his diagrams and his descriptions were not explicitly those of normal 
development. Normal development would be present in his experimental work, 
however, as I describe in chapter 4.  
Wilson promised to furnish a more detailed account of his cell-lineage work in a 
later piece of work, which was to be the classic 1892 paper. The cell-lineage 
programme was now underway. It was prompted by problems with tracing the 
mesoblast-bands back to the earliest point in development, to establish a 
common mode of mesoblast development across the annelids and vertebrates, 
a task made important by the need to examine the basis of the ‘annelid theory’. 
Wilson’s move into cell-lineage work was as a result of problems with working 
with the germ-layers as the basis for investigation, but it did not constitute a 
rejection of the centrality of germ-layers for comparative evolutionary 
morphology. He was still concerned to establish whether certain germ-layers 
had common modes of formation, and could therefore be deemed homologous.  
3.5.2. Wilson’s cell-lineage research 
The problems associated with assuming the homology of germ-layers meant 
that the formation of the germ-layers themselves needed to be investigated: 
It appears to me that the only course open to embryological investigation 
is to examine more precisely the origin of the gastrula itself; to take as a 
starting-point not the two-layered gastrula, but the ovum. The “gastrula” 
cannot be taken as a starting-point for the investigation of comparative 
 
114 
 
organogeny unless we are certain that the two layers are everywhere 
homologous. Simply to assume this homology is simply to beg the 
question. The relationship of the inner and outer layers in the various 
forms of gastrulas must be investigated not only by determining their 
relationship to the adult body, but also by tracing out the cell-lineage or 
cytogeny of the individual blastomeres from the beginning of 
development; and I am convinced that many contradictions that appear 
under the ordinary germ-layer theory will disappear when thus examined.  
[italics in original] Wilson, 1892a: 367  
Wilson made it clear at the very beginning of the 1892 paper entitled ‘The Cell-
Lineage of Nereis’ that the work was undertaken “in the hope of clearing up 
certain perplexing problems involved in the origin of the germ-layers in annelids, 
especially those relating to the formation of the mesoblast in the polychaetous 
forms” (Wilson, 1892a: 362).89 At the end of the paper the use of the study of 
cell-lineages as a research method to these ends was reaffirmed, as from it, 
“rightly applied, we may hope ultimately to attain a firm basis for an estimate of 
the different forms of gastrula and a comparison of the germ-layers” (Wilson, 
1892a: 455).  
As has already been described, the eggs of Nereis were to prove extremely 
worthwhile, seemingly providing Wilson with “a form in which the detailed 
history of the mesoblast might be followed in the cleavage-process, and its 
precise relation to the other layers thus determined” (ibid.). It was precisely the 
ability to trace “the history of the individual blastomeres in the cleavage-
process” that also made this particular work amenable to the study of the 
cleavage of the egg in its own right (ibid.). Observations about cleavage had 
been made by Wilson before, but they were largely of an incidental character. It 
was in this 1892 work (conducted from the summer of 1890 onwards) that the 
problems of cleavage came to assert themselves more forcefully. 
Through his cell-lineage studies Wilson established a triploblastic conception of 
germ-layers, and was able to trace back the entire mesoblast to a single cell 
(Wilson, 1892a: 370). This is significant, as was the use by Wilson of a highly 
                                                          
89
 Wilson is said to have coined the term ‘cell-lineage’ in this 1892 work (Guralnick, 2002: 541). 
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schematic representation of the process of development understood as 
‘cytogeny’. In this, distinct cells arose in distinct stages in a determinate way 
(see Wilson, 1892a: 382), though beyond a certain “point the development of 
the embryo as a whole cannot be fully represented in the diagram, on account 
of increasing variations in the order of division of the individual cells” (Wilson, 
1892a: 383) (see Figure 11 below). 
 
Figure 11 – Wilson's cell-lineage diagram of Nereis. The descent of the cells is 
presented in a genealogical fashion. The diagram combines the continuity of the 
lines with the discrete stages (marked by the vertical dotted lines) reflecting 
patterns of cell-division. Note also the division into three ‘periods’, labelled at the 
top of the diagram. Source: Wilson, 1892a: 381. 
 
The diagram above was a considerable technical and observational 
achievement. How Wilson represented his observations was a departure from 
previous representations and accounts of cell-lineage. Both Wilson and 
Whitman’s method was to “mentally mark the embryo in observation and 
physically mark a diagram to track a process of cell division leading from a 
determined state to a visible embryonic differentiation” (Griesemer, 2007: 402). 
But Wilson’s genealogical representation was something novel. Considered as 
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an abstraction from Wilson’s raw observations, the diagram represents an 
overall process (early embryogenesis) over time, as well as individual 
processes, such as the formation of particular cells with particular fates as 
particular structures or organs. The original purpose of the diagram is betrayed 
by the attempt to superimpose discrete stages on the processes exhibited. The 
stages, divided by the vertical dotted lines, are defined by particular events of 
cell-division. The stages formed part of the three periods which Wilson divided 
early embryogenesis into: spiral, transitional, and bilateral. The cell-lineage 
programme, which originated in the need to trace back particular germ-bands to 
particular cells, now possessed a hybrid character. The division of the diagram 
into the three periods characterised by the form of the cleavage exhibited and 
the relation of the patterns of cell-division to those periods shows how important 
the phenomena (and problems) of cleavage became to Wilson. What the 
diagram does not depict is any sort of detail about the cells themselves, beyond 
their ancestry and, for some, their fate. Unlike the previous diagrams examined 
in this chapter, there is no indication of the form or position of the cells 
themselves.  
While the diagram exhibits a great deal of (condensed) information relevant to 
Wilson’s research interests, it is abstract enough to take on a life of its own.  
Griesemer contends that “abstraction of genealogical form from 
cytoembryological content through the history of cell-lineage diagrams 
facilitated an identification of the cell-lineage workers’ findings on fate 
determination in embryogenesis with Weismann’s doctrine of germ plasm 
continuity and somatoplasm discontinuity”. He goes on to claim that “the 
working drawings of cell-lineage workers facilitated the theoretical abstraction of 
Weismannism and the conceptualization of Mendelism as the foundation for a 
modern causal theory of heredity” (Griesemer, 2007: 406).  
Drawing parallels between Mendel’s research programme and the cell-lineage 
programme, Griesemer notes that in both programmes, “the aim is inference 
about an earlier stage of the process on the basis of a distribution of progeny 
(organisms or cells) later on” (Griesemer, 2007: 404) and that the data 
produced “could be manipulated via further symbolic annotation, and new 
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diagrams…could be drawn to abstract features of theoretical interest” 
(Griesemer, 2007: 406).  
One of the promises of a research programme which was concerned with 
tracing back structures further back in development, to the one cell that gave 
rise to an entire cell type, tissue, or germ-layer, is that it could then be used to 
trace forward from the early stages of embryogenesis, and ultimately from the 
egg. This tracing forward would allow researchers to identify which germ-layers 
and cell-types might derive from one blastomere in a particular position at an 
early stage. It promised the ability to predict the course of differentiation, and 
therefore to identify the causes of it. If the promise was to be fulfilled, the 
causes could be identified as existing internal to the cells, and acting in a highly 
specific and stable manner. Undoubtedly, Wilson came to take a strong interest 
in how the differentiation exhibited as one moves from left to right in Figure 11 
was actually caused. The following chapter discusses this issue, the problems 
encountered in trying to ‘trace forward’, and the role of his early experimental 
work in transitioning to new questions concerning the role of different causes in 
the process of differentiation.  
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Figure 12 – ‘Realistic’ drawings of the early stages of embryogenesis in Nereis. 
The top row depicts the first cleavage, the middle row the second cleavage, and 
the bottom row the third cleavage. Source: Wilson, 1892a: 467. 
 
As already suggested, the 1892 paper was significant in pointing to new 
research directions and for its commentary on the nature of development.  One 
of the new directions was Wilson’s interest in the cleavage of the egg (see 
Figure 12 for Wilson’s naturalistic depictions of the first three cleavage stages), 
which he noted “takes place with a precision and regularity which oft-repeated 
examination only renders more striking and wonderful” (Wilson, 1892a: 377).90 
Wilson in the course of the paper placed great emphasis on the orderliness of 
development, sharing his “impression of a strictly ordered and predetermined 
                                                          
90
 Wilson outlined his method for the ‘naturalistic’ depictions before the plates section at the end of the 
paper: “All of the figures, unless otherwise stated, were drawn with the aid of the camera [lucida], but in 
many cases the finer details have been added free-hand to the camera sketch. Most of the figures were 
drawn from a single specimen, but in a few cases, in order to economize space, a single figure combines 
the sketches from more than one specimen” (Wilson, 1892a: 464). While generally individual instances 
were drawn, Wilson still had to select the specimen he believed to be most representative for his 
depiction, a process which was not dealt with by Wilson here. 
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series of events, in which every cell-division plays a definite rôle and has a fixed 
relation to all that precedes and follows it” [Wilson’s emphasis] (ibid.). 
This orderliness allowed Wilson to divide the cleavage phases “into three very 
marked periods”, which he dubbed spiral, transitional and bilateral (Wilson, 
1892a: 378). He observed that “[i]n the first period, [the spiral] which extends to 
the thirty-eight-celled stage, the germ-layers are completely differentiated. At 
the same time most of the individual blastomeres are differentiated into the 
parent-cells or protoblasts from which the future organs arise. The 
embryological material is, as it were, sifted out and arranged” (Wilson, 1892a: 
377-378). Here the symmetry exhibited was not the bilateral symmetry 
displayed by the adult organism, but “a peculiar modification of radial symmetry 
which is best characterized as spiral in character, and which cannot be reduced 
to the bilateral type” [Wilson’s emphasis] (Wilson, 1892a: 378). It is at this thirty-
eight cell spiral stage that the cell from which the entire mesoblast arises (the 
shaded d4 micromere) is separated from the macromere labelled D, as seen in 
the diagram on the following page (Figure 13). 
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Figure 13 – Wilson's diagram of the thirty-eight-celled cleavage stage in Nereis 
(Wilson, 1892a: 378). The diagram shows the derivation of the micromeres in 
three stages from the correspondingly lettered macromeres. The macromeres 
are represented with capital letters (A, B, C, D). The micromeres are labelled 
according to the macromere they derive from (in lower case form) and the stage 
at which the division of the macromere gives rise to the micromere. So, b2, 
derived from macromere B in the second round of formation of micromeres.  
Wilson used this diagram, and the related account, to explain how these early 
cleavage stages give rise to a spiral cleavage form: “The first four (a1, b1, c1, d1) 
are formed in a right-handed spiral, the second four (a2, b2, c2, d2) in a left-handed 
spiral, and the third set (a3, b3, c3, d3) in a right-handed spiral like the first set” 
(Wilson, 1892a: 378). The micromere d4, which is the primary mesoblast that 
gives rise to the entire mesoderm, separates from macromere D after the three 
previous waves of micromeres (which constitutes the basis for the entire 
ectoblast) are separated from the macromeres (ibid.). 
 
Figure 13 is a depiction by Wilson of the first cleavage stages of Nereis, which 
is consistent with the description contained in the 1890 paper. However, it 
differs in several respects. Less significantly, the importance of the ‘secondary 
mesoblast’ over the ‘primary mesoblast’ (to use the 1890 terms) was 
emphasised by the shading of just the d4 blastomere (‘M’) rather than both ‘X’ 
and ‘Y’ being shaded in the 1890 diagram (Figure 10). Also without much 
significance was that all blastomeres were now labelled. More significant is the 
fact that, although the outlines of the macromeres had been sketched in, there 
was less of an attempt to faithfully depict in three dimensions. Though there 
was no specific comment (as there was in the 1890 paper) on how the diagrams 
such as Figure 13 were constructed, the note on how the later figures were 
prepared suggest that once again Wilson drew from the camera lucida, though 
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not purely, as “in many cases the finer details have been added free-hand to the 
camera sketch” (Wilson, 1892a: 464). There was, then, the room for slight 
departures from the precise details of individual examples, and Wilson did 
indicate this for some of the later figures (ibid.). Figure 13 therefore constituted 
a greater abstraction than Figure 10. The most significant change from Figure 
10 was the arrows. In Figure 10, the arrows were bidirectional and indicated 
that the cells thus connected were siblings. In Figure 13, on the other hand, the 
arrows were unidirectional and denoted descent. It therefore aligned with the 
genealogical depiction of cell-lineage (Figure 11) but also moved from a static 
depiction (Figure 10) to a processual one. 
Wilson tellingly remarked that “It is impossible to reflect upon the complicated 
yet perfectly ordered events of the cleavage in Nereis without attempting to 
discover the nature of the causes by which their course is determined” (Wilson, 
1892a: 443). Having become newly fascinated with cleavage-forms, Wilson 
assessed the significance of his findings with inferences concerning the roles of 
different causal factors in development, namely a “hereditary tendency” (or 
historical cause) and “mechanical conditions”. He gave an example of how the 
same micromeres give rise to cells in different germ layers in polyclades 
(flatworms) and annelids, and observed “that cells having precisely the same 
origin in the cleavage, occupying the same position in the embryo, and placed 
under the same mechanical conditions, may nevertheless differ fundamentally 
in morphological significance”. From this, he reached “the conclusion that the 
cell possesses a definite hereditary tendency upon which primarily its nature 
depends, however much its outward form or mode of division may be affected 
by the mechanical conditions of its environment in the body; and full weight 
must be given to this heredity in every attempt to interpret the origin and 
meaning of cleavage-forms” (Wilson, 1892a: 441). What is the significance of 
such a remark? Maienschein claims that “Cell lineage study, in fact, focuses on 
cells and cell fates and reveals a complex interaction of external and internal 
directive factors operating on development” (Maienschein, 1990a: 368). Baxter 
concurs: “Wilson’s study of Nereis was also significant because it was his first 
encounter with the question of internal versus external determination of 
development” (Baxter, 1976: 39).  
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Is this the case? It would certainly seem that the practical demands of cell-
lineage work raised the problem of how determinate and regular within 
particular species the pattern of cell-lineage is. This provoked questions about 
the fates of the descendants of individual cells, and to what extent they can be 
accounted for by position, external influences (which can then be identified and 
controlled) and factors internal to the cell. In short, the broader question about 
the determination of development as a whole was raised. The work on 
cleavage-forms, which demonstrated that mechanical conditions alone could 
not account for the fate of particular blastomeres, therefore led Wilson to invoke 
a hereditary tendency which the investigator had to account for and give full 
weight “in every attempt to interpret the origin and meaning of cleavage-forms” 
(Wilson, 1892a: 441). Wilson’s preliminary conclusions concerning cleavage-
forms and the developmental significance of the division of the egg into 
succeeding generations of cells generated further questions. Indeed, his 
preliminary conclusion would not apply to an organism which did not display 
determinate development, such as Lumbricus, which Wilson was aware of, 
having worked with Lumbricus. The problem was to find some way of explaining 
both forms of development, and the cleavage-forms manifested (and their 
variability) in both. The problem was to find some way of investigating the 
precise role each posited cause – hereditary and mechanical – had in 
development. 
Although he dealt quite extensively with cleavage in this paper, he promised 
further work on “the internal phenomena of cleavage and a detailed study of the 
differentiation of the tissues and organs” (Wilson, 1892a: 371). He outlined the 
questions concerning cleavage that his work had suggested to him: 
What is the significance of the spiral and bilateral forms of cleavage, and 
where lie the causes that determine the transformation of the one into the 
other? What determines the form and succession of the divisions of the 
individual blastomeres, which, as in the case of the first somatoblast, 
may have so complicated and yet so definite a history? Is the 
blastomere, like the ovum, a self-regulating mechanism that contains 
within itself the causes of its own transformations, that is wound up like a 
clock, as it were, and must of necessity run the course predetermined in 
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its own structure? Or are its successive phases of activity determined or 
guided by influences proceeding from without – by the interaction of the 
cell with its fellows in the cell-complex?  
Wilson, 1892a: 444 
Wilson’s preliminary treatment of the origin of the three main types of cleavage-
form (bilateral, radial and spiral) is striking and instructive.91 Wilson was still 
interested at this point in what his researches into the cleavage stages could tell 
him about the embryological demonstration of homologies. He related that “the 
spiral form of cleavage has no necessary relation to the homology of the 
blastomeres, and hence is without phylogenetic significance” (Wilson, 1892a: 
447-448) and concluded from this that “exact equivalence of embryological 
origin is not a proof of homology, as far, at least, as the cleavage-stages are 
concerned” [italics in original] (Wilson, 1892a: 448). Although Wilson’s research 
demonstrated that adult homologies within the annelids corresponded to cell-
homologies in the cleavage stages (ibid.; Wilson, 1892a: 436), he concluded 
that cleavage forms had no relation to the adult form, and that “precisely similar 
modes of cleavage may arise quite independently of the nature of the materials, 
upon which the cleavage operates” (Wilson, 1892a: 448). Although he found 
that the fate of a particular cell in a cleavage form differed between embryos of 
different taxa there was in fact little relation between the cleavage forms 
themselves and phylogenetic position. A hereditary tendency might be 
responsible for the fate of a cell within a given cleavage form, but a shared 
hereditary tendency (to employ Wilson’s language) across related species 
causing a particular form of cleavage did not seem to exist.    
Instead, to account for the cleavage forms, Wilson turned to the “mechanical 
conditions peculiar to the earlier stages of embryonic life” (ibid.). Figure 14 is an 
example of one of Wilson’s attempts to use mechanical conditions to explain 
differences and similarities in cleavage-forms. The most abstract diagram 
Wilson had yet constructed, it accompanied his argument that the difference 
between spiral and radial cleavage-forms lay in the timing of the mechanical 
conditions leading to an alternation of cells, so that new layers of cells straddle 
                                                          
91
 These three kinds of cleavage-form, as well as another, had been identified by von Baer, see footnote 
33.  
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previous layers, rather than a particular cell lying directly on top of another in an 
older layer.92 Robert Guralnick highlights Wilson’s interest in investigating the 
role of mechanical conditions and in outlining “what the perfect form of cleavage 
would look like based on physical or mathematical laws” (Guralnick, 2002: 545). 
Forms could then be assessed depending on whether they conformed to such a 
mechanical ideal, and deviations accounted for by processes such as 
precocious segregation (Guralnick, 2002: 546).93 Precocious segregation is 
where later stages of development get pushed back to earlier stages.  
                                                          
92
 A figure depicting the tessellation of hexagons was probably more abstract (Wilson, 1892a: 451), but 
this was not intended in any way to represent cells, even if it would be employed as a geometrical 
argument in his discussion of cells, and cleavage-forms. 
93
 Although this mechanical ideal did not constitute an explicit normal development, it plays a similar 
explanatory role to the normative idea of the ‘natural state’ in Aristotelianism. The ‘natural state’ is the 
condition an organism or other entity should be in, and if it is not, this deviation must be accounted for 
by the action of ‘interfering forces’ (Sober, 1980). I discuss the Natural State Model more fully in chapter 
6. 
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Figure 14 – Highly abstract depiction of cleavage-forms at different stages and in 
different species. The only information remaining about the cells is their relative 
position, relative size, and genealogical relations. The diagram’s purpose is to 
illustrate Wilson’s mechanical argument that the spiral form of cleavage is 
distinguished from the radial by when the layers of cells alternate by a cell in a 
new layer lying on top of the border between the cells below, rather than on top 
of one particular cell (Wilson compared this to the tessellation of hexagons). In 
spiral cleavage-forms this alternation occurs early in development, in radial 
forms later on. Source: Wilson, 1892a: 452. 
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Guralnick is correct in suggesting that Wilson found mechanical causes to be 
primary, but not correct in asserting that Wilson in 1892 “has already rejected 
the use of embryology in reconstruction of phylogeny and in comparative 
sciences” (ibid.), a mistaken comment possibly resulting from a confusing 
skipping between Wilson’s works of 1892 and 1894.94 It is through the cell-
lineage work that Wilson comes to this view, concluding for example that “exact 
equivalence of embryological origin is not a proof of homology, as far, at least, 
as the cleavage-stages are concerned” [italics in original] (Wilson, 1892a: 448). 
The second (non-italicised) part of this quote reflects the process by which 
Wilson was trying to find secure grounds for an embryological criterion, but 
finding that it continued to elude him led him to greater scepticism about the use 
of embryological data. Wilson had embarked on his cell-lineage work to try and 
find a secure basis for establishing homologies between germ-layers, but had 
only found that when he traced lineages back to early stages – the cleavage 
stages – this left him with no grounds for homology. The hereditary tendency (a 
cause effected through a lineage of cells) Wilson spoke of was relevant to 
identifying the causes of different prospective fates of seemingly equivalent 
blastomeres, in the absence of a demonstration that identical mechanical 
conditions are associated with identical prospective fates. It therefore 
demonstrated that germ-layers derived from these cells could not be deemed 
truly equivalent, or homologous. Rather that demonstrating homology, 
ascription of a hereditary tendency instead removed the grounds on which an 
embryological demonstration of homology could be built. 
Guralnick does admit that there was still some role for Haeckelian thinking in 
Wilson’s work in 1891 (Guralnick, 2002: 546 and 548). But he downplays the 
importance of such thinking, and opposes it to Wilson’s tendency to ascribe 
mechanical causes for cleavage-forms. For instance, he claims that the 
argument concerning the origin of bilateral cleavage is “not phylogenetic” 
because Wilson attributed the delay in bilateral cleavage being achieved in 
development to “a mechanical cause” (Guralnick, 2002: 551). But in Wilson’s 
own words, we see that at this point there was no mutually exclusivity 
concerning the causes. He argued “that they must be the result of a throwing 
                                                          
94
 Guralnick seems to prefer to consider the findings of mechanical causes as reflections of prior belief. 
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back or reflection of the adult bilaterality upon the early stages. In some cases 
this influence has extended to the very beginning,…[but] In some cases, of 
which Nereis is a beautiful example, it has not extended so far; the early stages 
are still dominated by the mechanical conditions peculiar to them, and the 
bilateral form only appears when these conditions have been in a measure 
overcome” [italics in original] (Wilson, 1892a: 454). The mechanical conditions 
which give rise to the spiral form obscure the inherited bilateral form. So, for 
Wilson, in these early stages proximate (mechanical) causes prevent historical 
causes from manifesting themselves, and therefore inferences concerning the 
existence and operation of historical or hereditary causes could only be reached 
if the proximate causes were somehow controlled.  
Guralnick’s (2002) account of the cell-lineage research programme deals 
admirably with Wilson’s work, and his focus on cleavage-forms in particular. 
However, in moving from the 1892 work to the 1894 lecture and back again, it 
cannot give us a clear account of the immediate effects of Wilson’s findings and 
interpretations. These are that Wilson had picked up on some very different 
modes of development, which indicated that for some organisms cleavage-
forms are determinate, which was ascribed to an ‘hereditary tendency’, whilst 
for other organisms cleavage-forms were found to be less determinate (or 
indeterminate) and mechanical conditions were thus deemed to be more 
significant. This also seemed to apply to different stages of development, as 
Wilson’s explanation of bilateral and spiral cleavage exemplifies. Furthermore, 
Wilson perceived there to be no definitive phylogenetic pattern to these different 
modes of development, posing a further question mark against the Haeckelian 
framework.  
Wilson came to associate these findings and puzzles with the nascent debate 
over the applicability of the mosaic theory of development, and alternative 
context-dependent models of development and the role and fate of cells within 
the embryo. He ended his landmark 1892 paper by stating that “How far this 
dependence [of individual cells on the embryo as a whole] goes, and how far 
the various blastomeres may be capable of replacing one another, is a question 
to be determined not by analogy, but by direct experiment” (Wilson, 1892a: 
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460). This experiment, and how it attempted to account for variation in early 
embryonic development, forms the basis for the next chapter.   
3.6. Conclusion 
Wilson’s research from 1887 to 1891 posed problems that prompted the 
adoption of cell-lineage research. This research, which was intended to provide 
a sounder basis for comparative embryological work, raised new questions 
which provided a bridge to new research directions and methods.  
Firstly, the search for a firmer basis for the embryological establishment of 
homologies had succeeded in producing much valuable material on the origin of 
the mesoblast, but had also undermined the germ-layer doctrine by finding that 
the origin of the mesoblast was not homologous across the annelids, because it 
did not share the same developmental origin and processes of formation. 
Additionally, if it was not homologous across the annelids, it was not 
homologous across the animal kingdom as a whole. 
Secondly, as Wilson’s observations of relations between different stages of 
development grew denser, just like the addition of frames to a movie reel, the 
possibility of the apprehension of development as a process grew. The way in 
which Wilson conducted his cell-lineage research, and represented the results, 
was to strengthen this tendency.  
Thirdly, as Wilson travelled from Germany (his base when finalising the 1892 
paper, submitted at the end of 1891) to Italy (where he was to conduct 
experimental work) in early 1892, he took with him a considerable interest in 
cleavage-forms, and questions about the extent to which development is 
determinate. As with Whitman, the interest in the relative importance (and 
nature) of internal and external causes of the development of organismal form 
(including embryonic forms) was intertwined with the question of what role 
embryology could have in evolutionary morphology – how could homologies be 
placed on a firm footing using comparative embryology? 
As will be described in the following chapter, Wilson’s work on Amphioxus in 
1892 attempted to deal with such questions by adding an experimental 
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component, in conjunction with the comparative perspective. This was to 
produce some interesting and important outcomes for the direction of Wilson’s 
research and thinking about the nature of development. It led, in that 
experimental work, to Wilson systematically observing the courses of individual 
development in as large a number of samples as possible, to construct a normal 
development, against which he could compare the effects of his experimental 
manipulation of the mechanical conditions experienced by blastomeres.  
The shifts in Wilson’s work and interests, occasioned by the resistances he 
encountered in trying to find firm bases for comparison and the identification of 
homologies, exhibit the productivity of even pre-experimental investigative 
systems for generating new questions. In Wilson’s case, the new questions 
concerned the origin in early embryonic development of later, more 
differentiated structures. From this, questions arose concerning the causes and 
significance of the forms and processes of cleavage. Namely: to what extent 
and when did hereditary causes and mechanical causes operate, and which of 
these were stronger at particular stages of development? These were the 
questions which suggested themselves to Wilson, and from which he conceived 
of his 1892 experimental work. Like Roux, as I described in chapter 2, this led 
him to try to find a way to discern between the effects of historical causes and 
more proximate ones in embryonic development.  
By moving from more traditional observational morphological work with embryos 
(such as the work with Lumbricus) to studying the cell-lineages of Nereis, 
Wilson attempted to find new assemblages of technical conditions to better 
frame an epistemic object of evolutionary morphology. Namely, finding a more 
secure embryological basis for identifying relations of homology between 
structures in organisms of different species, including between those we today 
consider to be belonging to different phyla. Wilson’s work focused on trying to 
find a basis in early embryonic development to demonstrate the homology of 
germ-layers. He did not do this, but in the process of trying to frame the 
epistemic object, generated new questions and surprises concerning the nature 
of embryonic development. These new questions, part of the surplus of 
questions generated by the systems he devised but picked up by Wilson, led to 
a transformation of the epistemic object, which became now the causes of 
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differentiation and (level of) determination of development. This meant Wilson 
needed to devise a new set of technical conditions to frame the new epistemic 
object, and he did so by producing an experimental system incorporating 
normal development as a technical condition. At the heart of this new 
experimental system was a need to find a way to discern the roles and relative 
strengths of the causal factors he had invoked in his cell-lineage work, 
mechanical conditions and hereditary tendencies.  
In 1894, Wilson set out an assessment of the embryological criterion of 
homology, in the light of the many efforts he had made to employ it in his work 
(Wilson, 1895a). In the lecture he delivered that year at Woods Hole, he made a 
plea for the reform of comparative morphology. However, he still wished to 
preserve a role for embryological factors in the determination of homology, 
albeit now in a subordinate role to comparative anatomy. He saw the addition of 
experimental methods to the armoury of comparative morphology as a way of 
saving it (Wilson, 1895a: 123).  
In 1901, Wilson made the exuberant claim that “the introduction of experimental 
methods into morphology is the most momentous step in biological method that 
has been taken since the introduction of such methods into physiology by 
Harvey and Haller” (Wilson, 1901: 20). This did not imply a rejection of non-
experimental methods, still less the comparative method. Wilson acknowledged 
that “our science is entering on a phase in which experimental methods seem 
destined, and rightly so, to take the leading rank” (Wilson, 1901: 21). However, 
this was a concession following an extraordinary passage in which he stated 
two key points. The first was that “Observation and experiment give us our 
materials, but it is the comparison and correlation of those materials that first 
build them into the fabric of science” (ibid.). Then, secondly, that he considered 
it to be “a reversal of the true standpoint to regard biological classification, in the 
broadest sense of the term, as no more than a preparation for experiment” 
(ibid.). 
There are two key lessons to be learnt from these quotes. Firstly, he considered 
both observation and experiment as furnishing materials for comparison. 
Secondly, classification was still deemed important. Yes, he meant it here in a 
broader sense than specifically investigating the phylogenetic problems of 
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evolutionary morphology, but elsewhere in the piece he still affirmed that the 
sort of problems associated with classical evolutionary comparative 
morphology, such as “genealogical hypotheses…the origin of vertebrates, the 
origin of metamerism…still remain questions of very high interest” (Wilson, 
1901: 16) even if the wider interest in them was now (in 1901, not 1892!) 
“beginning to wane” (ibid.). 
Wilson emphasised the need for mutual support and exchange between the 
field naturalist and the experimentalist in the laboratory, and suggested that 
moves in that direction were already advanced: “The field naturalist came to 
realize that he could not attain right conclusions in the investigation of the larger 
problems before him without more thorough studies in anatomy and 
development. The laboratory morphologist learned better to appreciate the fact 
that his refined methods of technique are after all but a means toward the better 
understanding of the living organism and its relation to its environment” (Wilson, 
1901: 19). Wilson’s work with Amphioxus, explored in the next chapter, neatly 
demonstrates the use of experimental methods to investigate problems 
generated through more naturalistic work. 
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Chapter 4 – Establishing ‘normal development’ as an embryological 
research strategy 
4.1. Introduction 
As he travelled from Germany to Italy in his year-long European sojourn, 
Edmund Wilson was also making a journey from the descriptive and analytical 
cell-lineage work he had recently finished, to the experimental manipulations he 
was to conduct. As I described in the previous chapter, the work with Nereis 
impressed upon him various phenomena of development that he wanted to 
explain, such as the cause and morphological significance of particular 
cleavage-forms. He believed that only by intervening in the early stages of 
development could he gather the data needed to provide such an explanation. 
He chose to conduct this work with the marine invertebrate Amphioxus.  
While Wilson’s turn towards experimental work has been much commented on 
in scholarly literature, there has not been, to date, a detailed examination of that 
work.95 In this chapter, I undertake to do this. I locate the origins of his work in 
the problems posed for comparative morphological work by the variety of 
cleavage-forms in early embryonic development. After explaining the rationale 
behind Wilson’s selection of Amphioxus, I then provide a full account of the 
methods he used in the 1892 experiment. Drawing on Wilson’s descriptions, as 
well as the methods of the likes of Hans Driesch and Berthold Hatschek, I detail 
the way Wilson collected and treated Amphioxus. Central to Wilson’s 
experiment was being able to compare the effects of his experimental 
manipulation – of shaking apart the cells at early stages of development – with 
the ‘normal’ development of Amphioxus.96 Wilson split his samples of 
Amphioxus into two groups, one of which was to undergo this manipulation, the 
other was not.  
                                                          
95
 For example, while Allen (1981) and Maienschein (1981 and 1986 in particular) cite the experiment, 
they refer to it only in broad terms. For the points they were making, it was the interpretation of the 
fact of Wilson’s adoption of experimental methods, not the analysis of the conduct of his experiment 
that was crucial.  
96
 The relationship between the ‘natural’ and the ‘normal’ in Wilson’s experiment and paper will also be 
explored in this chapter. 
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Central to this chapter is an account of how Wilson constructed ‘Normal 
Development’ for experimental purposes, using it as a comparator against 
which the effects of the experimental manipulation could be determined. In 
Wilson’s experiment, normal development can be understood as a technical 
object or concept which is produced by his experimental practice. Starting with 
my examination of the experiment, I describe the processes by which Wilson 
selected, observed, compared and represented his material. This description 
reveals the importance of Wilson’s observation of actual samples in 
understanding how he produced normal development, in addition to the 
expectations generated by the study of previous accounts of the embryology of 
Amphioxus.  
The experiment provides an excellent example of the role that introducing 
experimental practice into embryology played in establishing ‘normal 
development’ as a tool of the embryologist. The crux of this chapter is to 
establish that not only was this ‘normal development’ required as a necessary 
input to the experiment, but that ‘normal development’, or at least a certain 
understanding of what this entailed, was also produced by the experiment. 
Wilson integrated control experiments, in which he studied normal development, 
into his overall experimental set-up. It was through these control experiments, 
conducted with the expectations conditioned by study of other work on 
Amphioxus, that a normal development was generated. Wilson’s normal 
development for this species was notably different from preceding (sometimes 
implicit) accounts of its normal development, for example in the work of Berthold 
Hatschek. The Amphioxus experiment conducted by Wilson therefore provides 
an excellent way of exploring material practices which resulted in the 
reconceptualisation of normal development. Later chapters will pick up on these 
practices and their consequences, by considering normal developmental as a 
technical condition. For now, we may note that the novel epistemic object which 
Wilson wished to explore entailed a new set of technical conditions, and that 
normal development was one of those conditions.  
I conclude by considering four ways of interpreting the findings I present. I 
contrast Wilson’s processes of generating normal development with the way in 
which, the year before, Driesch used normal development to deal with the 
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results of his experimental interventions on sea urchins. Then I explore how 
Wilson’s experimental practices (and the constraints upon them) can be made 
sense of. I make observations concerning the conceptual language employed 
by Wilson, such as the terms ‘mechanical’ and ‘inherited’, which chapter 5 will 
explore in more detail. Finally, I point towards implications for the 
conceptualisation of normal development itself, which is the task of chapter 6.  
The developmental psychobiologists George Michel and Celia Moore supply us 
with the insight that: “Intuitive definitions of normality maintain certain 
assumptions about the individual, the environment, and the types of processes 
that create the individual’s behavioural repertoire (including the symptoms 
characteristic of abnormality)” (Michel and Moore, 1995: 411). This is certainly 
true of Wilson’s definition of normal development by 1896 (Wilson, 1896). The 
task of this chapter will be to demonstrate that not only did prior expectations 
and assumptions guide Wilson, but that a deep engagement with the embryonic 
development of Amphioxus allowed him to produce normal development for the 
particular purposes of his experiment. 
In teasing out how the normal was produced and used in Wilson’s work, I 
provide the materials for the succeeding chapters, which analyse the role of 
normal development in embryological practice and theory, unmasking 
assumptions, background conditions and other factors that are implicit in the 
concept of normal development and its role within experimental systems.  
4.2. Background to the Amphioxus experiment 
As I described in the previous chapter, Wilson’s work on the cell-lineage of 
Nereis was meant to provide a more robust basis for the homologies of germ-
layers across species. But instead, it presented Wilson with findings that 
prompted new problems and questions – which led to the formation of a new 
epistemic object requiring a new set of technical conditions. The two main 
(linked) groups of new problems concerned cleavage-forms and the 
determination of development. These included questions about the “significance 
of the spiral and bilateral forms of cleavage” and “the causes that determine the 
transformation of the one into the other” (Wilson, 1892a: 444). These questions 
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were embedded in the phylogenetic debates concerning the origins of 
vertebrates (including the rival annelid and ascidian theories) described in 
chapter 3. Wilson was also beginning to ask serious questions about the nature 
of development itself. This included engaging for the first time with concepts 
such as preformation and epigenesis – to what extent was the fate of the 
organism (and its parts) set at conception, or progressively determined over the 
course of development (ibid.)? 
At this point, Wilson discussed these questions in broad terms of opposing an 
(internal) inherited tendency to (external) mechanical conditions, particularly in 
his assessment of his findings in the light of the fates of blastomeres he tracked 
from early embryonic development. The inherited tendency was the historical, 
phylogenetic causation. The mechanical conditions were the role of the yolk and 
the interactions between cells. Wilson observed that “We cannot escape the 
conclusion that the cell possesses a definite hereditary tendency upon which 
primarily its nature depends, however much its outward form or mode of division 
may be affected by the mechanical conditions of its environment in the body; 
and full weight must be given to this heredity in every attempt to interpret the 
origin and meaning of cleavage-forms” (Wilson, 1892a: 441). The point, 
however, was the relative weight of the two (sets of) causes, historical and 
mechanical, in the production of embryonic form. If the former causes could be 
shown to have much greater weight than the latter, then clear inferences could 
be drawn from embryological observations and comparisons for the solution of 
phylogenetic questions. If, however, the weight of mechanical or external 
causes were significant, this would pose serious problems for such inferences.    
One related dichotomy to the internal and the external were the rival the mosaic 
and regulatory theories of development (Amundson, 2005: 144-148 and 170-
175; Hamburger, 1997; Maienschein, 1991a; Sander 1991). The former 
proposed a view of development where the source of differentiation and change 
was internal to autonomous cells which operated largely independent of 
context. As a consequence, with each cell division, cells lose developmental 
potential or (to use a modern term) potency, and therefore become irreversibly 
differentiated. The regulatory view emphasised the influence of contextual 
factors (the whole, including sets of neighbouring cells) on the fate of individual 
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cells and their descendants (the parts). In the regulatory view, cells do not lose 
developmental potential or potency. Wilson started to engage with the mosaic 
theory of development (which was allied with ideas of internal sources of 
determination) associated with Roux and Weismann, noting its problems and 
the opposition to it. What was most perplexing for Wilson was that the nature of 
the development of the annelid Nereis seemed to differ so much from a 
previous organism he worked with, another annelid, Lumbricus (the earthworm).  
Nereis displayed determinate development, with early commitment of cells and 
their descendants to certain fates, whereas Lumbricus exhibited a less 
determinate development. How could these organisms – both annelids – have 
such different modes of development? Wilson now sought to account for these 
different modes of development, and at the same time assess whether the 
mosaic theory provided a basis to do so. Linking all these issues was the 
overriding question of variation.  
It was increasingly apparent to Wilson that there was considerable variation in 
early embryological development. How this related to later development, and 
how the variation could be explained, were crucial problems. I will pick up on 
these issues in following chapters. For now I wish to stress the significance of 
early variation for theories concerning the determination of development. 
Considerable variation in early development preceding a less variable outcome 
of development would have posed serious problems for ideas such as the 
mosaic theory. If the source of determination was internal, how could this early 
variation be explained in the light of a convergence of forms in later 
development? How could this decoupling of earlier from later stages be 
accounted for in a theory which purported to explain the later state of an 
organism in terms of its development from an earlier state, without reference to 
anything outside of the organism?  
Wilson began his 1893 paper by linking the question of cleavage, and variation 
in cleavage forms, to the “problems of embryological dynamics”, which included 
an assessment of the formation of particular cleavage forms in terms of their 
significance for the proximate, mechanistic understanding of the production of 
form (Wilson, 1893a: 579). But included in this “embryological dynamics” was 
still an interest in obtaining and interpreting data of consequence for the 
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programme of evolutionary morphology. The study of “the natural forms of 
cleavage” of Amphioxus was intended to form the basis for comparison for both 
“the cleavage of the chordates with that of lower forms” and the experimentally 
manipulated samples of Amphioxus (ibid.). He admitted that he “was led to 
examine the cleavage of Amphioxus primarily in order to determine the origin of 
the mesoblastic pole-cells described by Hatschek, and thus to find a definite 
basis for comparison with the annelids” (Wilson, 1893a: 597). Once again, the 
experimental work inspired by work in the new developmental mechanics was 
intertwined with questions deriving from debates on vertebrate origins. Even in 
this work, so methodologically different to his previous morphological 
investigations, there was still a concern with tracing the origin of particular cells 
forming precursors to later tissues. While this was motivated by comparative 
morphological concerns, the question as to what extent the fate of a cell (and its 
descendants) was determined at various points of development was highly 
pertinent to this.  
Wilson ended his 1892 paper on the cell-lineage of Nereis with the following 
observation: “The facts seem to accord best with the hypothesis that the 
blastomeres [cells formed by the cleavage or segmentation of the fertilised egg] 
are capable within certain limits of pursuing their individual development, yet at 
the same time depend in a greater or less degree on that of the whole. How far 
this dependence goes, and how far the various blastomeres may be capable of 
replacing one another, is a question to be determined not by analogy, but by 
direct experiment.” (Wilson, 1892a: 460). The 1892 experiment and 1893 paper 
on Amphioxus was intended to be such an experiment, “with the main object of 
determining first, the limit of regenerative power, and second, its form of action 
as shown in the mode of cleavage of the isolated blastomeres.” (Wilson, 1893a: 
587). 
The purpose of the experimental manipulation was to vary the mechanical (that 
is, external) conditions experienced by Amphioxus. Such a variation in 
conditions in early development could then be mapped to the variations in the 
course and results of development. This would enable Wilson to observe the 
particular respective roles of mechanical and inherited conditions. If the Roux-
Weismann version of the mosaic theory were true, then after each successive 
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division, (non-germline) cells would have progressively fewer inherited material 
factors to determine their own function and drive their descendant cells’ future 
differentiation. Therefore, if the cells were shaken apart when the embryo was 
at the eight-cell stage, each non-germline cell would only have some of these 
inherited determinants, and could only produce the cells and structures which 
those determinants were responsible for. In other words, only parts could be 
produced, monsters. The work by Driesch on sea urchins in 1892 had 
tantalisingly suggested that this need not be the case (Driesch, [1892] 1974). If 
the separated blastomeres could develop to produce functional wholes, this 
would support Driesch’s regulatory theory.  
According to Maienschein, Wilson saw “experimentation as essentially a refined 
extension of traditional empirical methods, a move away from speculative 
science, from excessive theorizing and from what he regarded as the earlier 
pernicious intrusion of metaphysics into science” (Maienschein, 1986: 181). 
Maienschein also highlights how experimentation was not just used to help 
produce causal-mechanical explanations in the analytical and manipulative 
mode of the likes of Roux.97 Wilson, and other American biologists, saw a 
different role for experiment, a creative role. Experimental manipulations 
created new phenomena that needed to be explained, and also helped to 
furnish clues for an explanation. Experimental methods and techniques 
therefore provided fruitful means of generating working hypotheses (as a means 
to guiding further experiments) and the creation of further new phenomena 
more refined, or perhaps broader, working hypotheses (Maienschein, 1991b: 
422).  
This explains why Wilson would want to conduct an experiment, manipulating 
the early stages of development. But why did he use Amphioxus? 
                                                          
97
 A detailed account of Roux’s approach to embryology can be found in Nyhart (1995: 278-305). 
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4.2.1. Amphioxus 
 
Figure 15 – Amphioxus, now known as Branchiostoma lanceolatum. Image 
courtesy of John Wahlert. 
 
The marine invertebrate Amphioxus (see Figure 15; now known as 
Branchiostoma lanceolatum) was a highly attractive organism for Wilson. 
Considerable work had already been done on the embryology of the organism, 
going back to the 1840s study by Martin Heinrich Rathke (1793-1860) (Rathke, 
1841), and the landmark studies by Alexander Kovalevsky in the 1860s (in 
particular, Kovalevsky 1866 and 1877). What merited such attention, which was 
to intensify after Kovalevsky’s work? Kovalevsky discovered a notochord in 
Amphioxus, making it a chordate. Although it is an invertebrate it therefore 
shares a key structure (and in modern taxonomy, belongs to a common phylum) 
with all vertebrates, but only with a small proportion of other invertebrates.  A 
modern primer on Amphioxus informs us that “the morphological and genomic 
simplicity of amphioxus, together with its key phylogenetic position, make it an 
invaluable animal model for understanding the invertebrate-chordate to 
vertebrate evolutionary transition” (Bertrand and Escriva, 2011: 4820). It was 
precisely this position that led to intense interest in Amphioxus in the final 
decades of the nineteenth-century, when the origin of vertebrates was a 
question driving much embryological research, as described in chapter 3 (also, 
see Maienschein, 1994b). A contemporary writer observed that:  
Probably no single group illustrates more beautifully the principles of 
transformism; for the Protochordates in their embryonic development 
exhibit remarkable reminiscences of past adaptations, and, in their adult 
development, the most varied present adaptations...[Amphioxus,] with its 
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resemblances to lower forms, gives us the connecting link between 
Protochordate and Chordate organisation.  
Willey, 1894: vii-ix 
The embryonic development of Amphioxus was therefore thought to provide an 
insight into past evolutionary changes, in particular those changes which 
occurred at the point at which the immediate precursors to vertebrates were 
coming into being. 
Perhaps the most significant work since Kovalevsky’s on Amphioxus prior to 
Wilson’s work was that of the Austrian zoologist Berthold Hatschek, originally 
published in German in 1881 (Hatschek, [1881] 1893). Hatschek updated 
Kovalevsky’s work without radically departing from it. Wilson cited Hatschek’s 
work a great deal, and, while their accounts differed, Hatschek’s methodology 
served as the basis for Wilson’s work.  
Amphioxus was valuable for Wilson because of its “plasticity” and “protean 
variability”, and because its “development is capable in a very high degree of 
artificial modification through mechanical disturbances” (Wilson, 1893a: 579).98 
It was abundant in the Bay of Naples, the lakes of north-eastern Sicily and on 
sandy shores worldwide; and as a genus it is composed of only eight species, 
with little substantive difference between these species (Willey, 1894: 11). They 
could therefore be obtained in many locations across the world, allowing 
scientists in a number of countries to work with the organism, and build on, 
compare and verify the work of others. It is, however, an organism which even 
today is difficult to keep for more than one life-cycle outside of its natural habitat 
(Bertrand and Escriva, 2011: 4827). This was a particular problem for Wilson, 
who was only able to work for a few weeks at Faro in Sicily. This time constraint 
was compounded by the need to get to grips with the organisms and make the 
experimental set-up work.  This produced practical difficulties that culminated in 
work that is somewhat rough around the edges.  
                                                          
98
 It is difficult to believe, considering the scientific literature on Amphioxus predating Wilson’s work, 
that he was aware of this while planning his experiment. More likely is that he acquired this knowledge 
as the result of his observations in that experiment.  
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4.3. The Amphioxus experiment – methods 
Wilson did not provide a detailed account of his methods, or justifications for 
every decision he made. He did, though, give enough detail to provide us with 
some instructive information about his practices and aims. We can also use 
some of the sources he drew upon to flesh out the picture. These include Arthur 
Willey, Berthold Hatschek and Hans Driesch (Willey, 1890; Willey 1894; 
Hatschek, [1881] 1893; Driesch, [1892] 1974).99 Willey and Hatschek’s studies 
of the embryology of Amphioxus were based on work conducted in the same 
place as Wilson (Willey, 1890; Hatschek, [1881] 1893). Driesch worked on sea 
urchins in Trieste and Naples (Driesch, [1892] 1974).  
Their work was similar enough to Wilson’s to indicate (along with relevant 
citations) that Wilson took inspiration from large parts of their methodologies.100 
Willey and Hatschek, in particular, spoke at greater length about their methods 
of collection, storage, preparation, preservation and observation. Any inferences 
about the similarity of Wilson’s procedures in these areas are strengthened by 
the fact that Wilson was not shy in making clear his differences with these men.  
For example, when Wilson described the release of “reproductive elements” or 
fertilised eggs, he contradicted Hatschek’s account of what part of the female 
they are discharged from, and tartly noted that “It is difficult to believe that 
Hatschek’s very explicit statements...rest upon erroneous observation, but I can 
suggest no other explanation of the contradiction unless the animals vary in 
habits from year to year” (Wilson, 1893a: 580).  
Wilson collected adult organisms from the shore, allowed them to spawn and 
then harvested their eggs, which he kept individually (Wilson, 1893a: 579). He 
divided the eggs into two groups, one of which was to undergo development 
untreated, while the other was to undergo the manipulation. Wilson monitored 
and observed the development of the eggs, and stained and preserved them at 
particular stages of their development (Wilson, 1893a: 580). Fixatives used 
were picro-sulphuric solution, sublimate-acetic and Flemming’s fluid (a nuclear 
                                                          
99
 I have been unable to find the location of Wilson’s laboratory notebooks. I am informed by Jane 
Maienschein that this is because, owing to Wilson’s modesty and fastidiousness, they were not kept 
(personal communication, 2013). 
100
 For example, the procedures outlined in Willey (1890: 81) are strikingly similar to those laid out in 
Wilson (1893a: 579-580). 
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fixative), and stains included Mayer’s haema-calcium (a general reddish-violet 
stain, presumably intended to produce contrast) and osmic-carmine (which, 
according to a contemporary source, stained chromatin, and stained it a 
different colour depending on whether it was “resting” or “kinetic”; Lee, 1893: 
100-101) (Wilson, 1893a: 586 and 597). The purpose of such staining was to 
identify which cells were dividing at particular points, and to distinguish between 
different types of cells (ibid.). With the manipulated group, he would shake apart 
the blastomeres at different stages (usually corresponding to the number of 
cells at the particular stage, so the two-cell, four-cell stages and so on) and then 
track their development (Wilson, 1893a: 587). Wilson aimed to compare the 
development of the non-manipulated (control) organisms with the manipulated 
ones.  This was to ascertain the effects of interventions in early development, to 
change the mechanical conditions affecting the embryo, and to discover what 
effects, if any, induced variation (through experimental, external interference in 
development) had on the fate of the organism.  
4.3.1. The paper 
The 1893 paper which Wilson published detailing his work with Amphioxus, and 
outlining his conclusions based on it, was developed from autumn 1892 to 
spring 1893, and the final version submitted to the Journal of Morphology in 
April 1893, being published in August that year. 
Wilson started this paper with a brief introduction, which (together with a 
footnote) outlined the purpose of his work and a sketch of his methods. He then 
described his observations of the non-manipulated Amphioxus in a section 
entitled “Part I.-Normal Development” (Wilson, 1893a: 580-586). This was 
organised into sub-sections pertaining to the different stages of Amphioxus (e.g. 
two-cell, four-cell). This was followed by a section entitled “Part II.-Induced 
Forms of Development”, dealing with his observations of the results of his 
experimental interventions (Wilson, 1893a: 587-596). This was split into sub-
sections, the first and last of which dealt with general observations, the other 
three with the cleavage forms observed after particular types of post-
manipulation forms were generated (e.g. developed from isolated blastomeres 
or from fragments comprising two or more blastomeres still attached after 
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shaking). Part III of the paper began with a sub-section, entitled “A. Cleavage 
and Germ-layers in Annelids and Chordates”, in which Wilson compared the 
cleavage forms he observed in Amphioxus to those of other organisms (Wilson, 
1893a: 597-598). He then moved on to “B. On Normal Cleavage-Types” where 
he discussed the three main types of cleavage form, how they might possibly be 
generated, and the significance of this for debates on the determination of 
development (Wilson, 1893a: 598-604). He dealt more fully with the latter 
question in the final part of the paper, entitled “Regeneration and the Mosaic 
Theory of Development” (Wilson, 1893a: 604-615). 
4.3.2. Collection and handling of Amphioxus 
Hatschek observed that spawning occurs with greater frequency and in greater 
numbers when the weather is reliably warmer and recommended visiting from 
May onwards (Hatschek, [1881] 1893: 22). Wilson conducted his work in June 
and July (Wilson, 1893a: 579). He will not therefore have been restricted in the 
amount of organisms available, though the time required to store, process and 
record more samples was tight. Wilson was only in Sicily for six weeks, and 
Amphioxus eggs could not be artificially fertilised. In the light of this, he decided 
to devote most of his time to “the study of the earlier stages [of development] 
and to the preservation of material” (Wilson, 1893a: 586). 
Willey revealed that he collected the embryos from a pantano (small lake or 
lagoon) which was connected to the sea by a canal. He recounted that the 
Amphioxus “embryos float on the surface, and are to be had by dredging on the 
surface at sunrise, but the readiest method of obtaining them in quantity is to 
take the adults in glasses and allow them to spawn there, if they will” (Willey, 
1890: 81). Wilson followed suit, allowing him to maximise the number of 
samples at his disposal. He described how he obtained the animals and their 
eggs (“the reproductive elements”), transferring the eggs from the small vessel 
containing “clean water” to smaller vessels, also containing clean water and “a 
small quantity of freshly discharged spermatozoa” (1893a: 579-580).101 Wilson 
claimed that the advantage of this method is that it obtains “perfectly clean” 
                                                          
101
 One of the points of disagreement between Wilson and Hatschek was over the discharging of the 
egg, which Hatschek (and Kovalevsky) believed emanated from the mouth. Wilson observed it many 
times emerging from the atrial pore (Wilson, 1893a: 580). 
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eggs “in any desired quantity” (Wilson, 1890: 580). By clean, Wilson probably 
meant that the Amphioxus eggs are kept from potentially damaging influences. 
In their natural habitat these would include parasites. In the water in Wilson’s 
laboratory, this might have included microbial growth or the build-up of waste. 
Willey also spoke of the need for clean water. Following spawning, he believed 
that the resulting eggs “must be very carefully distributed among several 
glasses containing clean, but unfiltered, water from the pantano” [italics in 
original] (Willey, 1890: 81). Willey claimed that “If the water is filtered, or if sea 
water is employed, or if too many ova are place in one glass, they will certainly 
die or develop abnormally” (ibid.).  There was thus already a judgement of 
normality (and how it would be ensured that Amphioxus developed normally 
rather than abnormally) underpinning the methods of collection and storage of 
Amphioxus, methods which Wilson was himself to employ. In Hatschek’s more 
extensive account of collecting in the pantano of Faro, he refers to the waters of 
the pantano as being salt water (Hatschek, [1881] 1893: 2). When Wilson 
described later in his paper how his manipulated samples were to be kept, he 
referred to them being “poured into a larger vessel of fresh water”, speaking of 
refreshed or new water, relatively free from contaminants, and not freshwater. 
On the use of the vessels, while Hatschek distributed his samples into individual 
vessels to avoid overcrowding (which could have led to abnormal results), 
Wilson did not elaborate on this matter. However, Driesch emphasised the 
advantages of storing specimens individually in terms of being able to track the 
individual developments of organisms (Driesch, [1892] 1974: 42). 
At various stages of development the embryos were “preserved” in a mixture of 
reagents. Each individual Amphioxus thus prepared served as a representation 
of only one particular stage of development. Comparing his preserved samples 
with live embryos and balsam-mounted samples at the same stage of 
development, Wilson observed that “specimens show that with proper 
precautions the only perceptible alteration is a very slight swelling, and even 
this does not take place if the ingredients of the mixture are used in exactly the 
right proportion” (Wilson, 1893a: 580).  
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4.3.3. Manipulating Amphioxus 
Wilson employed Driesch’s “ingenious shaking-method” to separate the 
blastomeres (Wilson, 1893a: 586). In essence, this involved gently shaking the 
eggs “in a small glass tube about half filled with water” and then pouring this 
“into a larger vessel of fresh water”, as previously mentioned (Wilson, 1893a: 
587). While inspired by Driesch, the shaking method was modified by Wilson, 
taking into account the greater ease with which the blastomeres can be 
separated in his organism compared to Driesch’s sea urchins, and the 
disintegration of the Amphioxus blastomeres caused by violent shaking.  
Following the shaking method of the Hertwig brothers, Driesch had put in water 
between 50 and 100 eggs which had already undergone cleavage in specified 
conditions after they had been artificially fertilised. Note that the conditions were 
merely stated rather than strictly controlled and standardised. Driesch referred 
to an average temperature in which they were kept, rather than a constant and 
uniform temperature to which all eggs were subjected. 
There was clearly a ‘knack’ to the activity of vigorous shaking. Driesch detailed 
the consequences, from hard-won experience, of shaking too early (cleavage is 
“reversed”) or too late (second cleavage has already occurred) (Driesch, [1892] 
1974: 41). He observed that “It is therefore necessary to watch carefully for the 
right moment” (ibid.). He did this by microscopically inspecting them as “often as 
possible” during cleavage (Driesch, [1892] 1974: 42).  
The advantage of Amphioxus over Driesch’s sea urchins of the easier 
separation of the blastomeres was offset by the inability to artificially fertilise the 
eggs (Wilson, 1893a: 580). This, combined with Wilson’s short stay in Faro to 
complete the work, necessitated a prioritisation of problems and tasks. Thus he 
paid most attention to the two-cell and eight-cell stages. 
Wilson identified his “main object as determining first, the limit of regenerative 
power, and second, its form of action as shown in the mode of cleavage of the 
isolated blastomeres” (ibid.). This quote betrays the heritage of interest in 
cleavage-forms, and also the inspiration of Driesch’s experiment revealing the 
regenerative power of his sea urchins. It also exhibited the comparative 
approach which Wilson brought to, and integrated with, his experimental 
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work.102  Such an approach does not simply involve stressing and accumulating 
examples of the variability of biological phenomena across (and within) species, 
but within this approach “practices have also been used to uncover regularities 
and produce universal (or at least general) knowledge” (Strasser and de 
Chadarevian, 2011: 320).  This was certainly an aim of the practices that Wilson 
exhibited throughout his research career. In knitting together the comparative 
with the experimental in his work with Amphioxus, Wilson stood out from other 
experimental embryologists such as Driesch and Roux, whose different 
backgrounds precluded such a union. Driesch and Roux’s backgrounds were 
experimental and physiological, not comparative and morphological. Their 
primary concern (at this time) was with the mechanics of development, and not 
with the variation exhibited in forms.  
On the face of it, Driesch’s and Wilson’s works were extremely similar. They 
were, it is true, dealing with different organisms. This fact cannot be 
underestimated, as the literature on the significance of the selection of 
experimental organisms demonstrates (Burian, 1993; Bolker, 1995; 
Rheinberger, 2010a).103 However, Wilson worked with a wide range of 
organisms, and was perfectly aware of the inter-specific variation in modes of 
development that were exhibited (Wilson, 1896 frequently displays this, e.g. 
281-282, 313-320). Wilson wanted to account for such variation (exemplified in 
the seemingly contradictory results of Driesch and Roux) and bring it under a 
common explanatory framework, as the following chapter will demonstrate. 
4.3.4. Comparing and calibrating – the structure of Wilson’s experimental 
set-up 
As we saw in the previous chapter, for Wilson experiments and observations 
served to furnish the materials for the higher-order task of comparing. His 
                                                          
102
 And, in combining these approaches, Wilson was able to bring together the natural historical and the 
experimental in his own work (see Strasser, 2010 for an argument on the combining of natural historical 
and experimental approaches in the twentieth-century), something which he would later argue for more 
broadly (Wilson, 1901). 
103
 I use the term experimental organism rather than model organism, after the distinction drawn by 
Ankeny and Leonelli (2011). Model organisms, according to this perspective, are a very particular sub-
class of the broader class of experimental organisms. The criteria for model organisms outlined in that 
paper do not correspond with the nature and role of Echinus (sea urchins) or Amphioxus in the work of 
Driesch and Wilson. 
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previous comparative work required comparison of cell genealogies and germ-
layers between different species. Previous work controlled and standardised the 
conditions in which organisms were kept, killed, prepared, marked and 
observed. In his 1892 experiments with Amphioxus, this was added to with a 
new group of samples – the ‘normal development’ – that formed what we might 
call a control, with which the other group exposed to a different treatment was 
compared.  
Wilson used the terms ‘natural’ and ‘normal’ at the beginning of the 1893 paper 
when referring to his discussion of the samples which he did not shake. Part I is 
entitled ‘Normal Development’, and in the introduction preceding it, he promised 
that this section would deal with “the natural forms of cleavage”, in contrast to 
the “induced forms caused by the isolation or mechanical displacement of the 
blastomeres”, which he dealt with in the second part of the paper (Wilson, 
1893a: 579). The account of ‘normal development’ therefore had at its heart a 
concern with natural forms generated in the course of normal development. 
After the introduction, the term ‘natural’ was not employed in the rest of the 
paper. Concern with the ontological status of the objects he was working with 
and creating were abandoned when he moved into the actual study itself. 
‘Normal development’ was used as a term denoting the overall mode of 
development (i.e. normal in contrast to abnormal development). ‘Natural’ 
referred to specific forms that could be found at particular stages of normal 
development, for example “the natural forms of cleavage” (ibid.).  
After the introduction, attributions of normality (through the use of terms such as 
‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’) and not ‘naturalness’ were applied to forms existing at 
particular stages of development. However, having established a link between 
notions of normality and naturalness in the introduction, the assumption of the 
naturalness of the ‘normal’ forms was embedded in the subsequent descriptions 
of the uninduced and induced development of Amphioxus. Such an association 
is not unproblematic. Wilson’s strategy of establishing a normal development 
was not intended to be used to provide an account of the natural development 
of Amphioxus. If this had been the aim, Wilson would have compared his 
‘laboratory normal’ samples at particular stages to ‘wild natural’ samples at the 
equivalent stages, as Hatschek did. However, the establishment of the normal 
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development was part of the experiment aimed at generating data concerning 
the natural processes of development in Amphioxus. These he could quite 
reasonably assume to be present in all three conditions (laboratory normal, 
induced, and wild natural), even if these natural processes of development 
generated different forms, depending on the different conditions the organisms 
were exposed to. While the normal development is produced as part of the 
experiment itself and did not refer to anything outside of the laboratory, the 
association of the normal and the natural allowed Wilson to associate his 
findings in the laboratory with what occurs ‘in nature’ itself outside of the 
laboratory. I will pick up on this observation shortly, and examine it in depth later 
in the thesis.  
Two different types of comparison took place in Wilson’s work. The first was a 
conventional interspecies comparison, the second a novel intraspecies 
comparison. The former reflected Wilson’s background in comparative 
morphology, the latter his new experimental approach. In the intraspecies 
comparison, there was still a need for some kind of comparator. Therefore, the 
‘normal’ Amphioxus set its own standard. The ‘Induced’ forms were measured 
against that very standard, and deviation from it was dealt with in a wholly 
different fashion to deviation exhibited by a ‘natural’ form.  
In the opening paragraph of his work Wilson used this language of an artificial 
modification being attained through mechanical disturbances (Wilson, 1893a: 
579). An example of the effect of the type of comparison engendered by the 
normal Amphioxus setting its own standard is how he dealt with the variation 
exhibited within the ‘normal’ samples that were not modified by artificial and 
mechanical disturbances. Such variation was acknowledged, but tucked away 
from the main body of text into a footnote describing the issues and problems 
he experienced in conducting the experiment (Wilson, 1893a: 587). He 
recounted the following as “sources of error”: “First, normal eggs and embryos 
vary considerably in size. Second, they do not develop precisely at the same 
rate” (ibid.). Results, which are of interest in themselves, do not form a central 
part of the discussion of the nature of the ‘normal’ forms. Instead, the deviations 
away from what were deemed to be the natural and the normal are relegated to 
the status of a footnote and abstracted away from the model of the normal that 
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Wilson was building.104 While it might be argued that attributes such as size and 
rate were not central to Wilson’s research questions, these attributes were 
definitely relevant for the form of the embryos which presented themselves to 
Wilson, and form was central. Given the relevance (recognised by Wilson, see 
Guralnick, 2002) of physical forces and interactions for the production of 
particular forms in early embryonic development, any variation in these forces 
and interactions due to variation in size at a particular stage would surely have 
been a relevant consideration. The rapid changes of form in early development 
also suggest that changes in the rate of development would also be a relevant 
factor. Wilson made a judgement about what kinds of variation he would ignore 
in producing a normal development, kinds of variation that could conceivably 
have played a role in this production, given their relevance for his main 
concerns pertaining to form.  
A key part of the process of generating normal development was the selection 
of organisms. Wilson states in a methodological footnote that “a certain number 
of the eggs always develop abnormally, whether shaken or not” (Wilson, 1893a: 
587). Yet the descriptions of these ‘abnormal’ forms are missing from the 
descriptive portion of the paper dealing with ‘Normal Development’ (Wilson, 
1893a: 580-586). He therefore left out embryos which he deemed to be 
abnormal in his construction of an idea of the normal or natural. Then, although 
he gave quantitative details of, for example, the proportion of different cleavage 
forms at various (e.g. eight-cell, sixteen-cell) stages, he arrived at the ‘normal’ 
development through a qualitative process of abstraction.105 He selected or 
removed certain embryos from consideration, and assimilated his observations 
(within stages using the various samples of Amphioxus preserved at those 
points, and between stages thus abstracted) to internalise a picture of normal 
development. To measure the effect of the varying of mechanical conditions 
that the blastomeres experienced, Wilson needed to observe not only the 
variation exhibited between manipulated (i.e., shaken) embryos, but also the 
variation exhibited by those that did not undergo this treatment. What was 
therefore being compared was the variation between the variations of two 
different populations of Amphioxus. Moreover, both of these populations were 
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 A footnote which was not actually in the section dealing with the ‘normal’ forms! 
105
 I shall deal fully with the role of abstraction in normal development in chapter 6. 
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kept and observed in artificial conditions. Wilson and Hatschek’s collecting 
strategies differed in that, in addition to capturing mature forms for in vitro 
spawning and subsequent tracking of the development from the fertilised egg, 
Hatschek collected organisms at all stages of development from the pantano 
and compared their states at particular stages to the forms developing in the 
laboratory. Wilson only compared forms developing in artificial conditions, and 
did not compare these forms to those in the wild. There was thus a tension 
between the relatively naturalistic interpretation of Wilson’s observations of 
Amphioxus development, in which he sought to encompass a wide range of 
observed variation within his normal development, and the less naturalistic 
conditions in which the Amphioxus developed and were observed.  
While he described the different forms in quantitative ways (for example by 
enumerating the frequencies of particular variants at particular stages), what 
made the difference for Wilson’s judgements was the qualitative assessment of 
data, through the process of calibrated observation, which I detail in the 
following section.  
4.3.5. Observing and representing Amphioxus 
Wilson described how, and more pertinently with what combination or mixture of 
reagents, the embryos were preserved, and the stages prepared (Wilson, 
1893a: 580).  Wilson’s language (“the best results being” [ibid.]) betrays, though 
does not explicitly state, the trials he went through to secure a combination of 
reagents to preserve the embryo, the yardstick being a comparison of the 
preserved embryos against living, unpreserved embryos. The preparation of the 
stages drew on his experience of working with annelids, and the materials that 
worked with those organisms (ibid.).     
The observation of the formation of the ‘natural’ forms exhibited at different 
stages was to provide a basis for the experimental manipulation. Attempting to 
calibrate a ‘basis’ or baseline using extremely variable phenomena is a tricky 
task. What Wilson established for himself in the first part of his experimental 
work was what I call ‘calibrated observation’. This did not involve an objective 
compiling and analysis of data (quantitative or qualitative) to provide some kind 
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of average figure. Instead it was a calibration of Wilson’s own expectations of 
what constituted normal development.  
Crucial to Wilson’s construction of a normal development were the prior 
expectations generated by his reading of Kovalevsky and Hatschek, who he 
cited as precursors to his own work (Wilson, 1893a: 580). Hatschek’s work 
presents an unequivocal account of the development of Amphioxus. It did not 
acknowledge variation at any stage of early development, not even to dismiss it 
as irrelevant or an artefact (Hatschek, [1881] 1893: 43-52).  
These expectations were calibrated by repeated and focused observations, and 
the development through these of a keen sense of the organisms and their 
pathways of development. It involved establishing an intuitive sense of what 
happened in the normal development to generate expectations, empirically 
grounded to some extent (but not totally), which he could then take to the 
observation of the modified forms he created. The quote I included in the 
introduction to this chapter speaks of “Intuitive definitions of normality” (Michel 
and Moore, 1995: 411). I am describing the generation of such intuitions. As 
Michel and Moore suggest, assumptions are built into these intuitions (ibid.). I 
have already indicated a few of these, and will document more throughout the 
rest of this chapter and thesis.  
How might this process of calibrated observation be conceptualised? Such a 
process does not conform to the regulative representational ideal of 
“mechanical objectivity” prevalent in late-nineteenth-century science. This ideal 
has been defined as “the insistent drive to repress the willful [sic] intervention of 
the artist-author, and to put in its stead a set of procedures” (Daston and 
Galison, 2010: 121). It was supposed to ensure the representation of actual 
instances rather than ideal types by a scientist working as a passive mediator 
(possibly using automatic or mechanical aids), rather than as an active 
constructor of representations (ibid.).  
In the 1893 paper Wilson makes no reference to the details of the mechanics of 
his observational techniques. However, in previous work (e.g. Wilson, 1892a) 
he used the camera lucida to aid him in his depictions.  The camera lucida is a 
device which uses a prism to allow the observer to view the image of the 
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specimen under the microscope superimposed onto an image of paper on the 
desk next to it. The figures in the 1893 paper, resembling in form many of those 
in the 1892 paper, suggest that a camera lucida was used to produce them. 
They were not naturalistic, but contained some deviations away from 
‘perfection’. This is characteristic of the style of depiction associated with the 
camera lucida. The camera lucida does not merely allow the image to be copied 
onto the paper. It does, however, save “the memorization step otherwise 
needed in the interval elapsing while turning from the object to the drawing can 
be spared” (Fiorentini, 2006: 33). Any “mental activity directed to the technical 
accomplishment of the drawing, thus, recedes in favour of an inspection of the 
observed in terms of its meaning” (Fiorentini, 2006: 34). This, combined with the 
ability of the observer to comprehend depth due to the ability to change the 
microscope focus (something a photograph could not achieve), will have 
allowed Wilson to assess the three-dimensional structure of embryos.106 
Wilson’s use of the camera lucida hints at mechanical objectivity, of the 
automatic (and therefore supposedly more objective) production of 
representations. However, some of his representations, particularly geometrical, 
suggest a kind of “truth-to-nature” representation style revealing an ideal form or 
type underlying the apparent variation. I suggest, however, that Wilson’s 
method has more in common with the ideal of “trained judgement” by which the 
scientist – building on internalised experience – discerns patterns, rather than 
ideal types, through his or her own “interpretive eye” (Daston and Galison, 
2010: 311). While this is associated with a rejection of mechanical objectivity 
occurring from the early-twentieth-century, it does seem to reflect what Wilson 
was doing in 1892-3. The camera lucida, for instance, requires that judgement 
be exercised in translating the reflected image into a drawing. As Fiorentini 
describes, “the mirroring surfaces of the prism guarantee the fidelity of the 
perceived image in relation to the chosen scene; however, the degree of 
congruence of the resulting picture depends on the process of selection 
performed by the observer after having perceived the virtual image conveyed by 
                                                          
106
 In this way, the use of the camera lucida corrects a problem with microscopical observation – that “it 
is not possible to ascertain the relative place and form of an object by moving one’s head” (Schickore, 
2001: 137). This also applies to relative places and forms within an object. This causes observers “great 
difficulties in assessing particular details”, particularly those pertaining to three-dimensional structural 
relations (ibid.).   
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the prism in his or her eyes” (Fiorentini, 2006: 35-37). Such selection, 
particularly selection leading to the successful apprehension and representation 
of the three-dimensional structure of embryos, suggests the employment of 
trained judgement. 
As detailed in the previous chapters, representations, in the form of diagrams 
and figures, are extremely instructive in analysing the interpretation and the 
stress placed on particular results by the scientist. Wilson in particular used a 
considerable amount of carefully constructed diagrams to not only illustrate and 
demonstrate, but also to work through the material he observed to develop 
wider points. They therefore served a cognitive function as well as an expository 
one. In the 1893 paper, unlike previous papers, the diagrams are not a roughly 
even mixture of the abstract and the naturalistic. They are overwhelmingly 
abstract, and the depictions of the early stages of development are particularly 
so. There is a curious division in terms between the representations found at 
the back of the paper in the ‘Plates’ section, which were labelled as figures, and 
the one ‘diagram’ found in the main body of the text. The difference is that the 
figures are of actual specimens (a very few living, most preserved), however 
abstracted or idealised, whereas the diagram is an abstract representation of 
the three main types of cleavage shown by Amphioxus in its normal 
development, with some indication as to their possible formation.  
Figure 16, taken from the back of the 1893 paper, depicts the first three 
cleavage stages of Amphioxus. It does so by depicting the first two cleavage 
stages (labelled as figures 2 and 3, respectively in my Figure 16), and then the 
different ways in which the third cleavage stage can proceed, to produce four 
different resulting eight-cell cleavage forms. Wilson employed only the cell 
outline, the ghosted cell outline of cells lying behind or beneath foregrounded 
cells, arrows, circles and bars. The arrows depict the division of cells. In the 
second cleavage stage the arrows are bidirectional, indicating that the division 
is equal. In the third cleavage stage the arrows are unidirectional, and depict the 
lineage of cells, with the smaller micromeres derived from the larger 
macromeres. The circles help to show how the cells move in relation to each 
other (for instance between figures 7 and 9 in my Figure 16). The bars (with 
circles at either end) provide information about the orientation, and relative 
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orientation, of cells. These simple symbolic representations, placed in and 
between outlines of cells, allow the reader to visualise the process of cleavage 
and the transition between stages, dynamically, as a process. In subsequent 
cleavage stages, the complexity of the divisions and cell movements meant that 
Wilson could not and did not depict all divisions and movements, but selected 
particular ones in an individual figure to give some indication of what must be 
occurring throughout the development of the embryo depicted in the diagram. 
They therefore demonstrate how abstractions, when skilfully conducted, can 
end up conveying more important information than a less abstracted depiction. 
This was enabled by Wilson’s deep engagement with the individual 
development of Amphioxus embryos, together with the representational skill he 
had developed in years of research.  
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Figure 16 – Wilson's depictions of the early stages of embryogenesis. He 
represented the first three stages of cleavage, and the variation in forms 
exhibited in the third stage. Figures 2 and 3 correspond to the first cleavage 
(two-cell) and second cleavage (four-cell) stages. The next three rows represent 
the proposed formation of the three main cleavage forms in the third cleavage.  
Figures 4 to 7 represent the formation of the “pure radial form” (Wilson, 1893a: 
620), figures 8 to 10 represent the formation of the spiral form, figure 11 a “mixed 
form” (ibid.) and figure 12 the bilateral form. Source: Wilson, 1893a: 621. 
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4.3.6. The Amphioxus experiment – comparisons with Roux and Driesch 
Examining Driesch’s work with sea urchins reveals a key difference with Wilson. 
Rather than using his own ‘normal’ or control group to serve as a comparator, 
Driesch instead used the books of the zoologist Emil Selenka (1842-1902). 
After describing his methods of keeping the sea urchins and intervening in their 
development, he began the description of his results with “a few words about 
the normal course of events as revealed in Selenka’s excellent investigations” 
(Driesch, [1892] 1974: 42). Driesch does not state why he relied on Selenka’s 
account rather than observing a control group of his own. However, he had 
faced trouble obtaining material which wasn’t “almost exclusively useless” (as 
he referred to the samples which stymied his first week of research) and only a 
small number of samples (fifty) survived the vigorous shaking procedure 
(Driesch, [1892] 1974: 41). It would therefore not be unreasonable to suppose 
that Driesch believed that using all samples at his disposal to conduct the 
experimental treatment was a better use of his resources than setting aside 
some into a control group, particularly given the availability of Selenka’s 
account. If Driesch assumed little or no variation in normal development, this 
decision would be unproblematic for him.  
Selenka produced over sixteen volumes of ‘Studies of the Developmental 
History of Animals’, which were detailed accounts of the embryology of various 
animals of interest to zoologists.107 Generally, the first half of these handbooks 
were given over to detailed textual descriptions of what can be found at different 
stages of development, with no illustrations. The second half then comprised of 
double-page plates (‘Tafel’) providing examples of different stages of 
development. The right-hand page would feature hand-drawn examples of 
particular stages and the left-hand page the written details of what each figure 
represents. Figure 17 below is an example of one double-page (Selenka, 1886: 
146-147): 
                                                          
107
 The 16
th
 volume is the highest number I could find in a search on archive.org. ‘Studies of the 
Developmental History of Animals’ is a translation of the original title ‘Studien über 
Entwickelungsgeschichte der Thiere’. 
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Figure 17 – Example of a Tafel from one of the works of Emil Selenka, a key 
source of information for Hans Driesch (Selenka, 1886: 146-147). 
 
Driesch drew his conception of the normal course of development from such 
images. Wilson, while having initial expectations of what constituted normal 
development generated by the work of the likes of Hatschek, deepened, 
developed and fundamentally changed this view by directly observing the 
embryos which had not undergone his experimental treatment. The nature of 
Driesch’s engagement with the ‘normal’ or undisturbed was indirectly mediated 
through the idealised view of Selenka, thus robbing him of the realisation (for 
sea urchins at least) of the variability that is exhibited by even uninduced forms. 
The two men may have been exposed to the same sorts of inputs, but Wilson’s 
methods enabled a transformation of the product of these inputs (normal 
development) in a way that Driesch’s could not. All Driesch could do was to 
map the differences between the sea urchins which underwent his experimental 
treatment and the normal development on the page. It was not possible for him 
to rework what was on the page. This is nicely illustrated by a figure depicting 
the (normal) sixteen-cell stage, which he tells us is “copied from Selenka” 
(Driesch, [1892] 1974: 44). 
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Unlike Driesch, in his key experiments and paper on the early stages of frog 
(Rana esculenta) development, Wilhelm Roux did use a control group of non-
manipulated samples (Roux, [1888] 1974). Like Wilson, Roux spoke of normal 
development, and compared the observed forms in the manipulated group to 
those of the control group. However, unlike Wilson, Roux only introduced 
particular observations of the control group when discussing the results of the 
experimental manipulation, to determine (and usually, demonstrate) that the 
results are a consequence of his intervention (Roux, [1888] 1974: 9). There was 
no separate discussion of the observations and patterns displayed in the control 
group. Furthermore, while the establishment and description of the control was 
central to the generation of normal development within Wilson’s experiment, it 
was not so for Roux. It is clear that for Roux, normal development (more 
specifically, the normal development of this particular species of frog) 
transcended the experiment, including the control and the manipulated arms. 
Roux spoke of cells which he repeatedly punctured “with a fine needle” 
developing “normally”, without reference to unmolested cells in the control 
group. Shortly afterwards he deemed “malformations” to be exhibited in control 
eggs (ibid.). His standard of normal development was therefore external to the 
control group and the experimental set-up. I develop these points in the 
following chapter. 
4.4. The Amphioxus experiment – results 
In the paper, Wilson aimed to establish the normal or natural development and 
forms of cleavage (remember that normal and natural are interchangeable in 
this context for Wilson) and then deal with “induced forms [of cleavage] caused 
by the isolation or mechanical displacement of the blastomeres” (Wilson, 1893a: 
579). The first part was therefore entitled ‘Normal Development’ and concerned 
the first four cleavage stages in particular, with brief summaries of the 
subsequent stages.   
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4.4.1. ‘Normal Development’ 
 
 
Figure 18 – Diagram of the three main cleavage forms exhibited in the animal 
kingdom and in Amphioxus. Source: Wilson, 1893a: 599. 
 
Starting with the earliest stages, we may note that Wilson agreed with Hatschek 
in his depiction of the first two cleavage stages, though Wilson observed that 
despite four cells of equal size being the rule after the second cleavage, “slight 
variations exist in the position of the blastomeres” (Wilson, 1893a: 580). These 
were not without significance for Wilson, and he believed that they were “a key 
to the more considerable deviations of later stages” (Wilson, 1893a: 581). He 
attributed any “displacements” to the “mutual pressure” of the four cells, 
invoking a mechanical explanation for any variation. Wilson believed that the 
four-cell stage of Amphioxus was radial, “and that the departures from this 
arrangement are purely accidental”. The use of the term accidental to describe 
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such ‘departures’ from a “type” (a term used by Wilson in this respect) is 
suggestive, as we shall see in chapter 6 (ibid.).108  
The third cleavage stage in the normal development of Amphioxus fascinated 
Wilson. In this stage, three distinct forms (see Figure 18) were found (and 
transitional forms between these), “each of which is a fixed type of cleavage 
elsewhere in the animal kingdom” (Wilson, 1893a: 581). Around three-quarters 
of samples exhibited radial cleavage, one-fifth spiral and only one sample 
bilateral (Wilson, 1893a: 582). The three main forms and their ‘intermediates’ 
are all, Wilson believed, “capable of complete and normal development” 
(Wilson, 1893a: 584). Having found them all exhibited at this stage of 
development, Wilson regarded all of the three different cleavage forms (radial, 
spiral and bilateral) to be both natural and normal in Amphioxus. Willey 
acknowledged this discovery as “an example of a polymorphic cleavage”, which 
contradicted the idea that cleavage “follows the uniform and stereotyped plan 
that has been hitherto supposed” (Willey, 1894: 108).109 The mature work by 
Edwin Conklin on Amphioxus also acknowledged this, praising Wilson’s study of 
cleavage, and generally agreeing with his results (Conklin, 1932: 78-80). He 
noted “that the spiral character of the cleavage in Amphioxus is not as constant 
nor as prominent a feature as in annelids and mollusks” and that “the cleavage 
is pre-eminently bilateral” (Conklin, 1932: 80). While acknowledging the 
variation, Conklin tried to establish one type as ‘pre-eminent’, which is subtly 
different from Wilson’s treatment of relations between the three forms, as I will 
elaborate on in the next chapter. 
One consequence of the ‘polymorphic’ cleavage was that Wilson’s idea of 
normal development was broadened – a considerable amount of variation of 
form in early embryonic development could be considered to be part of normal 
development, provided that the end result was functional. This meant that the 
adult stage was reached and that this had a ‘normal’ structure and functioning, 
even if it was smaller in size. The presence of the three main forms of cleavage 
in Amphioxus provided Wilson with a model which could be used to explore the 
                                                          
108
 For now, I merely note the connotations of the term accidental with contingency, anomaly, and as an 
antonym of essential (and so relating to deviations away from essences). 
109
 One can only assume that it was “hitherto supposed” by the likes of Hatschek, as in this particular 
section Willey includes many figures taken from Hatschek’s monograph, which was also the most recent 
comprehensive work on the embryology of Amphioxus before Willey’s book (Willey, 1894: 107-108). 
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formation of the different cleavage forms existing throughout the animal 
kingdom. There was the potential, therefore, for Wilson’s experimental 
manipulations to provide an insight into key developmental mechanisms at early 
stages of development, as well as ascertaining their morphological and 
evolutionary significance. The value of results gained from experimentation 
using Amphioxus was therefore amplified owing to its natural properties.  
The fourth cleavage stage also exhibited the three main types of cleavage form, 
and Wilson indicated that there were more transitional forms between them than 
in the third cleavage stage. He now spoke of “numerous transitional forms” 
rather than “Various transitional forms” (Wilson, 1893a: 582). Indeed, in the 
discussion of the radial forms exhibited, he admitted that the form he depicted 
only denoted two samples which corresponded in “the nearest approach to a 
true radial type” (Wilson, 1893a: 583). However, in this stage most forms 
exhibited bilateral cleavage (ibid.). Within the bilateral form he conceived of two 
varieties; both involving the equal division of the upper tier of cells, and the 
unequal division of the lower tier of cells. The difference between the two 
varieties was where two of the secondary macromeres (C2 and D2) were 
formed. Wilson observed that the less typical “form closely approximates to the 
cleavage of the tunicate Clavelina” (ibid.). Hence, as for the other cleavage-
forms depicted in Figure 18, one of the variety of cleavage forms exhibited by 
Amphioxus was compared to that of another organism in the animal kingdom, 
even if the forms only approximated and did not completely correspond (Wilson, 
1893a: 584). 
Wilson also compared the spiral form found in variants of Amphioxus to fixed 
types of cleavage form in other organisms, in this case annelids. However, 
Wilson observed of the spiral form that the “pure form is very rare” (ibid.), and 
that in those spiral forms he was unable to track the origin of blastomeres and 
their changing relationships, meaning that his depictions of them were 
“hypothetical” (ibid.).   
Beyond this cleavage stage Wilson no longer recorded or detailed the variation 
in cleavage form, “since they are even more numerous than those of the earlier 
stages” (ibid.). He did observe that from the sixteen-cell stage to the two-
hundred-and-fifty-six-cell stage, the bilaterality in the upper half of the embryo 
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disappears. Moving away from an orderly division of planes, the “division in the 
micromeres comes to conform to no general law and appear to be determined 
by individual mechanical conditions of environment” (Wilson, 1893a: 585). 
4.4.2. ‘Induced’ embryos and assumptions about normality 
Wilson found that when he shook apart the blastomeres at the two-cell stage, 
the isolated blastomere obtained underwent “a cleavage identical with, or 
approximating to, that of a normal embryo” (Wilson, 1893a: 587). Furthermore, 
though it would be of roughly half the size of the non-manipulated organisms, it 
would lead to the production of a larva much like normal, albeit with an 
abnormally positioned tail. For the blastomeres isolated by shaking at the four-
cell stage, such a fate was also possible, but less likely. They “may undergo a 
cleavage nearly or quite identical with that of a normal ovum, but often varies 
more or less widely from it.” Wilson found only one example of a larva being 
produced in this case, albeit one with no mouth or anus, and therefore unviable. 
If, however, the shaking of the four-cell stage produced two two-cell forms, it 
“may give rise to two perfect, half-sized dwarfs” (Wilson, 1893a: 588).  
When he examined the results of his manipulations on embryos at the eight-cell 
stage, Wilson observed development to the gastrula stage on occasion, but 
attributed this to incomplete separation of blastomeres. The isolated 
blastomeres underwent cleavage “approaching that of a complete ovum but 
never identical with it” [italics in original]. But these forms only rarely reached 
the blastula stage, and never the gastrula stage. Of the ones which reached the 
blastula stage, they seemed to form parts of the normal gastrula. This 
suggested to Wilson “the view that the corresponding blastomeres have 
undergone a partial development – i.e., as if they still formed part of a complete 
normal embryo” [italics in original]. Beyond this point, although some developed 
cilia and moved like normal non-manipulated forms, they did not progress 
beyond this point and died within a few days (Wilson, 1893a: 589). In modern 
terms, as development proceeded they progressively lost potency.  
As with the cleavage-forms for the ‘natural’, uninduced embryos, Wilson did not 
go into detail about the fates of the embryos shaken apart at the sixteen-cell 
stage, though he noted the “immense variety of forms” (Wilson, 1893a: 590). 
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Like Driesch’s work with sea urchins, once again the eight-cell stage seemed to 
be the ceiling for regulative capacity. The terms ‘regulative’ or ‘regulatory’ 
development – as opposed to ‘mosaic’ development – were not used by Wilson, 
and there was no alternative term used in the results or discussion sections of 
the paper, presumably because of the novelty of the perspective. Importantly, 
however, Wilson observed that “The isolated blastomeres undergo a cleavage 
that approximates more or less nearly to that of a normal ovum, but the extent 
of divergence is nearly proportional to the age of the initial form” (ibid.). I take 
age to mean the stage at which the development was at when the blastomeres 
were separated. In other words, the earlier in development the blastomeres 
were isolated, the more likely it was that the ‘normal’ course was pursued, and 
the ‘normal’ end result obtained, size being the only difference.  Regulative 
capacity diminished with developmental time, and the clock started ticking when 
the egg was fertilised. It could not be rewound by reversion to a one-cell state 
by mechanical separation, or restoration of the original mechanical conditions of 
one cell not bounded by others.  
Wilson concluded that mechanical conditions alone could not account for the 
cleavage-forms. If they could, blastomeres shaken apart at stages such as the 
sixteen-cell stage should exhibit the same regenerative power (the ability of a 
separated part to reconstitute the whole, which underpinned the regulatory 
theory) as ones shaken apart at the two-cell stage. This would have been 
because they faced the same mechanical conditions, in the sense of being 
isolated cells not exposed to different interactions from neighbouring and 
surrounding cells, regardless of the nature of the eventual processes triggered 
by the change in mechanical conditions and interactions between cells being 
altered or lost (Wilson, 1893a: 607-608).  
Wilson did not find that the regenerative power (a term Wilson did use) at later 
stages was the same as for earlier stages. He discovered that the separated 
blastomeres from a two-cell embryo “may give rise to a half-sized dwarf larva 
exactly agreeing, except in size, with the normal larva up to the period when the 
first gill-slit is formed” (Wilson, 1893a: 588). However, for separations at the 
sixteen-cell stage, “isolated blastomeres continue to divide for some time, but 
as far as observed always give rise merely to flattened plates or shapeless 
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masses of cells” (Wilson, 1893a: 590). Other specimens which developed after 
manipulation at the eight-cell stage produced either parts or severely deformed 
organisms which did not survive past a certain stage of development such as 
the blastula (Wilson, 1893a: 589). These ultimately non-viable forms were for 
Wilson evidence of abnormal development. 
Such findings led Wilson to the conclusion that “the unity of the normal embryo 
is not caused by a mere juxtaposition of the cells. They indicate that this unity is 
not mechanical but physiological, and point toward the conclusion that there 
must be a structural continuity from cell to cell that is the medium of 
coordination, and that is broken by mechanical displacements of the 
blastomeres” (Wilson, 1893a: 595). If it were purely mechanical, then an 
isolated blastomere shook apart from its fellow cells at any stage of 
development would be able to develop in such a way as to reconstitute a new 
whole organism, but this was not the case.  
Wilson did not specify what this ‘structural continuity’ might be. If it was some 
form of hereditary substance it surely could not be the sort of static, 
morphological mosaic-work of hereditary particles envisaged by Roux and 
Weismann. That would not account for the phenomena Wilson was attempting 
to explain here.  
4.5. Conclusion – ‘Normal development’ as an input and output of 
experimental work 
The way in which I have presented Wilson’s work from the late-1880s to the 
mid-1890s highlights his transition from work belonging to the tradition of 
evolutionary morphology to experimental embryology. His previous work, with 
Lumbricus in particular, generated questions about the origins, and thus the 
determination, of later structures in embryonic development from earlier parts. 
This led to his adoption of cell-lineage research, which then threw up questions 
of its own relating to the causes and significance of the phenomena of cleavage 
and the variation he observed. It is intriguing to observe many of the facets 
Rheinberger described concerning the progress of experimental systems in 
what was, strictly speaking, non-experimental work. Initial resistances and 
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problems become epistemic objects in themselves. In Wilson’s case, these 
epistemic objects led him to devise an early experimental system of his own, 
involving Amphioxus and some basic equipment and methods. Wilson’s interest 
in the variation in early embryonic development was reflected in the variation 
found in the normal development that he produced as a technical condition as 
part of his experimental system.  
The experimental design of Wilson’s experiment called for the establishment of 
a ‘normal development’, against which the results of the experimental 
manipulation could be compared. ‘Normal development’ constituted both an 
input and an output of the Amphioxus experiment. It was an input, because 
some idea of what constituted ‘normal development’ needed to be in place for 
the experiment to occur at all. Reading the work of Kovalevsky, Willey and 
Hatschek, and studying the (abstracted) accounts and diagrams of the 
development of Amphioxus will have formed a significant part of that. During the 
course of his work, Wilson’s own processes of observation, selection, exclusion, 
comparison, integration and recording,  were guided by this input (a cultivated 
preconception) of what the ‘normal development’ of Amphioxus consisted.  
As we have seen, the result of this re-calibration of expectations (the output) 
was a ‘normal development’ which included considerable variation, which was 
considered by Wilson to be ‘natural’. For example, all three main cleavage-
forms exhibited by Amphioxus in the early stages of development were included 
as part of the normal development. The effects of the experimental manipulation 
were measured by comparing the observed variation in the manipulated 
samples to the ‘natural’ variation established by the control samples. Wilson 
also set out to understand the significance of variation, and to explain its 
generation. Variation is therefore central to understanding the background, 
rationale, method and explanations in Wilson’s experiment and paper. It will 
therefore be examined, in progressively more conceptual ways, in the next two 
chapters. 
I will now try to make sense of some of the findings of this chapter. I believe that 
it is helpful to consider that normal development performed an active heuristic 
function for Wilson. A heuristic procedure can be defined (Wimsatt, 2007) as a 
rule or rules employed implicitly and/or explicitly, with the aim of simplifying the 
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collection and management of data.110 Three key properties of heuristic 
procedures have been identified (Wimsatt, 2007: 68-69). A heuristic does not 
guarantee a correct solution, or even a solution at all. If it does produce a 
solution, however, it does so in less time and with less effort than an algorithmic 
procedure. Finally, a heuristic produces errors which are systematic, thus 
allowing the biasing effect (and working backwards, the existence) of the 
heuristic to be identified (ibid.). Using the notion of heuristics as a theoretical 
lens allows us to do two things. Firstly, to give us a way to analyse the decisions 
Wilson made, why he made them, and what the effects of them were. Secondly, 
it neatly distinguishes the practice of Wilson from that of Driesch and Roux, and 
therefore gives us a possible explanation for the differences that arise between 
Wilson’s theorising and the theoretical frameworks of the other two men. 
Considering the role of heuristic procedures in the establishment of normal 
development, we may consider the following observations. Wilson did not 
collect and incorporate every item of data about the samples he observed. He 
did not specify exhaustive rules for the selection (or discarding) of samples, for 
deciding what aspects of the ones which were selected were to be used, or for 
integrating these into an overall account of the normal development. There was 
no algorithm which simply needed to be applied to move from the preserved 
samples in the laboratory to the verbal and pictorial representations on the 
page. Instead, Wilson used his own rules to sort out the ‘normal’ from the 
‘abnormal’, to select what was to be observed from the totality of observable 
properties, and to reduce the ranges of variation exhibited at each stage of 
development to the ranges expressed in the paper. Normal development for 
Wilson performed a heuristic function in a way that it couldn’t for Driesch, who 
had to rely on the passive images on a page to compare the effects of his 
experimental intervention.111 For Roux, any heuristic function of normal 
                                                          
110
 Nickles emphasises the role of heuristics as “problem-solving methods”, which is compatible with my 
definition, if one take a broad view of ‘problem’ (Nickles, 1987: 106). 
111
 The insight of the artist Alexander Ecker cited by Wilhelm His in support of three-dimensional 
modelling of embryos is relevant to understanding the significance of this difference between Driesch 
and Wilson. Ecker held that “the pictures in the memory that have once made their way through the 
hand stick much more firmly in the head” (Ecker, 1886, as cited in Hopwood, 1999: 483). Although 
Wilson was engaged in two-dimensional representation rather than three-dimensional, Hopwood 
observes that according to this view, “If drawings were good, then drawing was held to be better” for 
appreciating the form of the embryo depicted (ibid.). 
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development was external to (perhaps even transcendent of) his experimental 
set-ups.  
Wilson’s establishment of a normal development which was an abstraction from 
observed variation was the aim of this heuristic activity, the end-result of 
calibrated observation. Such abstractions can themselves be considered to be 
heuristic tools, insofar as they are considered “as baselines to organize and 
structure our perceptions of the data in productive ways” (Wimsatt, 2007: 152). 
Given the function of normal development within Wilson’s experimental set-up, 
this was exactly its role. One can say that, picking up again on the insight of 
Michel and Moore, the determination of a normal development had, through the 
process of its own generation, become intuitive through the development of 
empirically-mediated heuristics.   
An analysis of normal development, what it is, what role it plays, how we can 
characterise its production and reproduction and how variable it is, will be 
undertaken in the following chapters. Central to that task is how normal 
development was, and is, produced and used to provide a means to manage, 
describe and explain variation.  
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Chapter 5 – Variation and conceptualisations of development 
5.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I outlined how normal development was generated by 
Wilson’s work with Amphioxus. Wilson’s normal development was generated by 
him as part of his experiment (rather than relying on a table produced by 
someone else), and included a wide range of variation in early embryonic 
development. In this chapter, I assess the role and significance of variation in 
that work. The key thrust of this chapter will be to identify the relations between 
the use and explanation of variation and other key aspects of biological thought 
and practice. These include questions concerning differentiation and the 
determination of development.  
I introduce variation as a theme of the chapter by detailing some of the 
conceptual changes in the biological sciences surrounding variation up to and 
including the 1880s and 1890s. Crucially, as well as variation becoming a major 
focus of biological research in the latter half of the nineteenth-century, how it 
related to other concepts in flux such as heredity and development was also 
shifting. The challenge for scientists in this period was to work out new ways to 
provide coherent accounts of these three problem areas (what these concepts 
actually refer to, how they are caused, and what effect they have on other 
questions) and the links between them. Variation became for Wilson an 
instrument as well as the very phenomenon he was trying to explain and take 
account of, as it was part of the experiments that sought to provide the empirical 
data for such explanations.  
Moving on from this background, I explore the theoretical developments Wilson 
drew from the Amphioxus work, from the 1893 paper to 1896’s The Cell in 
Development and Inheritance. This will illustrate the deep connections and 
reciprocal relations and accommodations between variation, normal 
development, and various theoretical and methodological stances. I detail in 
particular how Wilson tried to explain the variation in cleavage-forms that he 
found and how he interpreted his experimental results to provide a modified 
account of the mosaic theory of development. I chart how he tried to make 
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sense of the seemingly contradictory and confusing results that had been 
thrown up by his and his peers’ experimental work.  
The latter issue demands that a number of characteristics associated with 
particular conceptions of development, which were either identified at the time 
or can be distinguished analytically, should be considered. The parameters I 
use to capture these conceptions of development are: mode of differentiation, 
type of cause, source of causation, mode of transmission, type of cell division 
and metaphor of cell relations. An analysis such as this is not without its 
drawbacks. The terms I use in this analysis do not (and did not) have 
universally agreed meanings. Furthermore, though I consider the characteristics 
separately, they cannot be understood without reference to their context and 
relations with the other characteristics, and to explanations that use them. With 
this in mind, after separating them I have attempted to bring them back 
together, and in doing so reveal their inter-relations.  
The analysis will show that seemingly logically related concepts that attempt to 
explain development (including variation in development, one aspect of this 
being differentiation), such as the link in the mosaic theory between the 
‘atomistic’ mode of transmission and the ‘inherited’ type of causation, are only 
contingently associated. This is demonstrated by a comparison of Wilson’s 
ideas to those of Roux and Driesch. Given the different ways in which Roux and 
Driesch conducted their experimental work compared to Wilson, this provides 
another key connection between normal development (which underpinned and 
shaped Wilson’s research in a different way to the work of the other men) and 
the changing conceptions and use of variation in biological research. The 
connection is that normal development is a way of managing the variation in 
experimental set-ups. This theme will then be developed in chapter 6, when the 
exact nature of the relationship between normal development and variation is 
analysed.  
5.2. Variation – Introduction and Historical Background 
As we saw in chapter 3, Wilson’s morphological work was made difficult by the 
variation in early development which was exhibited to a greater or lesser extent 
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by the organisms he worked with.  How could he unequivocally trace the origin 
of a particular germ-layer for a particular organism, when embryos differed so 
much at particular stages, particularly in the mode of cleavage? However, as we 
have seen in the preceding chapters, from being a factor which confounded 
Wilson, variation became both the object of and a tool for research. Variation in 
early embryonic development became a source of questions, which could also 
be used to tackle related questions concerning the determination of 
development.  
How the variation exhibited within and between organisms was treated 
underwent a shift in the late nineteenth-century. One aspect of this was the 
transformation in its relationship to the concept of heredity.112 Previously, the 
existence of both variation and heredity, while acknowledged (they were vital 
elements of Darwin’s theory of evolution), was deemed to be problematic. How 
could offspring vary from their parents, and how could variation be maintained 
and generated given the existence of heredity? Darwin himself conceived of 
variation as resulting from external interference affecting the development of 
particular organisms, either directly, or indirectly by affecting the reproductive 
system (Bowler, 2005: 10). Such variations could then become part of the 
inheritance transmitted to offspring (ibid.).  Additionally, Darwin observed that 
variability itself could be transmitted to future generations from exposure of 
populations or species to varied conditions (Hodge and Radick, 2003: 5). For 
Darwin, variations were not usually directed in any sense, as the later 
orthogenesists were to insist. They claimed that the direction of variation was 
directed by the development of the organism, such developmental forces thus 
driving evolution, which led some of them to deny the role of natural selection 
and adaptation altogether (Bowler, 2005: 17). For Darwin, variation (as a source 
of difference even given “identical external conditions”), and heredity (as 
conservative given those same circumstances) were “capricious processes that 
did not necessarily lead to adaptation”, though of course, given other conditions, 
they could (Müller-Wille and Rheinberger, 2012: 74-75).  
August Weismann’s theory of heredity and development supposedly led to the 
analytical separation of the processes of ontogeny and phylogeny, a 
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 Heredity was also a concept in flux during this period (Müller-Wille and Rheinberger, 2012: 76-94).  
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reformulation of the relations between variation and heredity and between 
variation and development. Weismannism divided variations into those which 
were heritable and non-heritable. Those variations which directly affected the 
development of an organism through changes in somatic cells which occurred 
after their sequestration from the germ-line (reproductive) cells would not be 
heritable. Weismannism made use of the hypothesised ‘idioplasm’, the 
hereditary substance thought to contain a hierarchy of materials responsible for 
the determinate progressive differentiation exhibited in development. Rather 
than being generated by a plurality of processes (as proposed by scientists 
following Darwin), in Weismannism heritable variation was generated by 
changes to the idioplasm contained in the germ-line cells. The scope for the 
generation of heritable variation was considerably narrowed. At the same time, 
heredity and variation were now understood to be complementary concepts. 
Weismannism’s ‘harder’ heredity accounted for the maintenance of variation, 
and his hypothesis of changes to the idioplasm (the inherited substance) 
accounted for the generation of variation (Churchill, 1987: 362). However, like 
Darwin, but not Weismannism as it came to be understood, for most of his 
career Weismann accepted that external circumstances were, in the final 
analysis, the means by which changes to the hereditary material in germ-line 
cells were effected, generating variation (Winther, 2001).  
Peter Bowler attributes the breakdown of the “developmental” view of variation, 
which Darwin himself subscribed to in many respects, to a combination of 
factors. These included the rejection of the inheritance of acquired 
characteristics (and therefore the delinking of heredity and development) and 
the reconceptualization of variation as a property of populations rather than 
individuals.113 A consequence was the reformulation of variation and heredity to 
be understood as complementary rather than antagonistic. ‘Hard’ Weismannian 
heredity (as opposed to a ‘softer’ heredity more intertwined with development) 
provided an explanation of how variation, once generated, was preserved. 
Finally, the view that variation was generated by “additions to development 
controlled by the existing process of development”, Haeckelian 
recapitulationism, was rejected (Bowler, 2005: 11 and 17). Rather than the 
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 Though, for Weismann, it was only the inheritance of acquired somatic characters that was ruled out 
– acquired changes to the germ-plasm could be, and were, inherited (Winther, 2001). 
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embryonic development of ancestors being preserved (but with the timing of 
various stages altered) with novelties added to the end of the developmental 
process (terminal addition), novelties and variants could manifest at any stage 
of development. This undermined the usefulness of studying the embryonic 
development of extant organisms to make inferences concerning the nature of 
ancestors.  This had implications not only for phylogenetic research (including 
the debates over the rival annelid and ascidian theories of vertebrate origins), 
but also for what causes were relevant and therefore worth investigating in 
ontogenetic – i.e. embryological – research as well.   
In Wilson’s time, a variety of views concerning all these factors existed, 
indicating that the 1880s and 1890s in particular was an era of flux and 
contestation about how variation and heredity was seen and treated. At the 
point we examine his career Wilson did not conceive of heredity in the 
Weismannian sense, though he was aware of it. In fact he specifically rejected 
it. He was to for years to come, because the hypothesis of a qualitative division 
of the idioplasm did not in his view accord with the cytological, morphological or 
embryological evidence (Wilson, 1896: 306-311).  
The 1880s and 1890s saw the advent of experimental investigation in 
embryology. Much of this work (particularly by the key actors examined in this 
chapter) centred on early embryogenesis, and took advantage of a picture of 
the cell which took shape in the second half of the nineteenth-century as entities 
which “possessed the capacity to escape the organism, to vary independently 
and to start a new life of their own under favourable conditions” (Müller-Wille, 
2010: 231). Indeed, it was the individuality of the cell and its centrality to the 
problems of development and heredity that directed Wilson towards its study 
(Maienschein, 1990a: 369). 
In this late-nineteenth-century experimental work, rather than merely taking 
account of variation and sorting it, the generation of variation became 
something to explain. The programmatic declarations of Wilhelm Roux, which 
justified and provoked such experimental work, helped to engender this. He 
made it clear that he believed that the development (and evolution) of 
organismal forms could be analysed into “the two components of variation and 
inheritance” which also needed to be explained, requiring analysis and 
 
173 
 
decomposition into their causally-efficacious components (Nyhart, 1995: 293-
294).114  
Experiment was not the only way in which this investigation could proceed, but 
Roux believed it to be the surest way. For Roux, some inferences as to the 
causes of variation could be made using naturally-occurring (i.e. not artificially-
induced) variations and abnormalities (Nyhart, 1995: 294). But the generation of 
variation was understood to arise from a constellation of factors known and 
unknown. In Roux’s programme, only a causal-analytical series of experiments 
which kept all factors (produced by analysis of a wider system into its 
components) except for one constant could identify the relevant factor or factors 
responsible for a particular phenomenon. In one such experiment, one factor 
would be varied to ascertain the effect of its variance upon organismal form and 
variation. This would provide an indication of the specificity of the varied factor 
in effecting changes to the organism, and also allow one to make judgements 
concerning the stability (against a range of changes to the varied factor) of non-
varied factors that one might regard as causally relevant.   
To conduct an experiment of this kind, an experimenter needs to be able to 
control the plethora of variables that exist inside and outside an experimental 
object, such as an organism. In the case of Wilson’s experiment, though the 
control of variables was far from the rigour that would be expected in modern 
laboratories, the variable he wished to vary, and did, was the mechanical 
conditions impinging on the blastomeres in the early embryo. To measure the 
effect of this, he needed to not only observe the variation exhibited between 
forms that did and did not undergo this treatment, but also the variation within 
treatments. Following this, he needed to use his results to draw conclusions 
concerning how the observed variation was generated, and spell out the 
consequences of this for the process of organismal development as a whole.  
                                                          
114
 William Bateson likewise wanted to explain the generation of variation, partly because of its intrinsic 
interest, partly to contribute towards explanations of evolutionary change. Like Roux and Wilson, 
Bateson rejected many of the methodological aspects of evolutionary morphology/embryology without 
abandoning many of the questions raised by that programme (Hall, 2005). 
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5.3. Consequences of the Amphioxus experiment 
5.3.1. Explaining cleavage forms and their significance 
In a discussion on the different types of cleavage manifested in Amphioxus, 
Wilson detailed the other organisms in which those types of cleavage were 
found (Wilson, 1893a: 600). For example, he observed that in annelids, “the 
cleavage is strictly spiral up to the 32-celled stage, after which it becomes 
bilateral”, whereas in a nemertean (ribbon worm) species, the cleavage is 
“perfectly radial up to the 8-celled stage, and then assumes the spiral form”, 
while for “gasteropods the cleavage is at first strictly spiral; in cephalopods it is 
perfectly bilateral from the beginning” (Wilson, 1893a: 601). 
He concluded from this that the cleavage forms or types “are obviously devoid 
of any great phyletic importance” (ibid.).115 Interestingly, this was not justified on 
the basis that there seemed to be no clear relationship between community of 
descent and what we might call ‘community of cleavage form’. Rather, Wilson 
supported this statement with evidence of organisms (including Amphioxus) 
exhibiting different cleavage-forms at different stages of development (ibid.). 
Wilson turned to questions of developmental determination, as he saw that the 
cleavage-forms were “very important for an analysis of the factors that 
determine the form of cell-division” (ibid.).  
Wilson was therefore moved by the unhelpfulness of his results for phylogenetic 
work to a greater focus on questions relating to developmental mechanics. 
Wilson presented two possible causes of the “form of cell-division” – mechanical 
conditions and an inherited character. These were presented as the only 
possibilities, with no mention of possible alternatives. Contradictory evidence 
was presented. On the one hand it was demonstrated that mechanical 
conditions alone could not account for the cleavage-forms. The power of 
regeneration (which as we saw in the previous chapter, Wilson associated with 
                                                          
115
 Evidence that Wilson was still concerned with (and maintained some optimism about) such questions 
surfaces in remarks made in a letter to Hans Driesch in July 1894, where he tells Driesch that “I still think 
you are too nihilistic regarding [the] question of descent & of general morphology” (Wilson, 1894a). 
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mechanical causation) therefore existed, but became less powerful and 
effective with every cell division.116  
Variation in cleavage-forms in Amphioxus also undermined the idea that the 
forms were inherited, as that would imply a constancy of cleavage-forms 
independent of external conditions, which was not observed (Wilson, 1893a: 
600-601). Wilson was therefore denied an unequivocal mechanical or 
inheritance-based explanation for the variation in cleavage forms. Reflecting on 
this, he observed that “the variable cleavage of Amphioxus is a very interesting 
case; for we here observe, as it were, a conflict between an hereditary tendency 
not yet firmly established, and mechanical conditions that are, in a measure, 
opposed to it” (Wilson, 1893a: 603). 
The use of the term “mechanical” by Wilson to describe an external factor 
relevant for the development of an organism requires some clarification. Driesch 
and Roux used the term “in the Kantian sense of law-bound causation” (Nyhart, 
1995: 295). However, Wilson used the term in a sense which to our modern 
ears is far more literal – the effect of physical forces impinging on objects. This 
radical difference does not seem to be a mere case of a concept which is in a 
normal state of ambiguity and flux. As Lynn K. Nyhart elegantly observes, in the 
1890s, “Researchers used the term in a bewildering variety of ways, and their 
discussions suggest the penumbra of confusion it wore at the time” (ibid.). In 
Wilson’s case, it concerned the physical interactions between a cell and its 
surroundings, including neighbouring cells (Wilson, 1893a: 607-608). He made 
use of Gottfried Berthold’s “principle of minimal surfaces”, to which he had been 
directed by Hans Driesch. This principle emphasised the reduction of surface 
area as determining the direction of the division planes of dividing cells (Besson 
and Dumais, 2014). Wilson used it to account for the production of spiral forms 
from radial ones as “an effect of mutual pressure among the blastomeres” 
(Wilson, 1893a: 601). 
                                                          
116
 Wilson himself rejected the use of the term “regeneration” to describe this: “This certainly is not 
‘regeneration’ – at least nothing is regenerated – but I believe nevertheless that it is one extreme of a 
series of which true regeneration forms the other” (Wilson, 1892b). As Wilson did not provide an 
alternative term to ‘regeneration’, for want of a more appropriate term I have used the term here, with 
this caveat. 
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The hereditary tendency he referred to was “a gradual shifting backwards in the 
ontogeny of the adult bilaterality, which thus became projected, as it were, upon 
the cleavage-stages”, a recapitulation (ibid.). He noted that this tendency “is 
often disturbed by displacements of the blastomeres”, which helped to produce 
the other cleavage-forms, and accounted for the independence of the variation 
in normal development in early embryonic development from the less variable 
normal development exhibited in adult Amphioxus (ibid.). After finding difficulties 
with the Haeckelian framework (of using early development as a means to 
gauge evolutionary relationships), it is curious to see this kind of Haeckelian 
process (of adult stages being moved to an earlier stage of development) being 
invoked. Crucially, Wilson had found that the normal or abnormal did not map 
onto the ancestral or environmentally-induced. 
The notion of the shifting of stages of development to earlier or later parts of 
ontogeny (heterochrony) became a key tool for Wilson in his attempts to 
grapple with the seeming contradiction between mosaic and regulative modes 
of development.  
5.3.2. Differentiation – discussion of the mosaic theory and its discontents 
Towards the end of the Amphioxus paper, Wilson moved towards discussing 
the theory of mosaic development. Mosaic development also formed the topic of 
his 1893 lecture at Woods Hole.  Wilson advanced a modified version of the 
mosaic theory of development, radically different from those versions advanced 
by Roux and Weismann. Wilson’s strategy in this section of the paper was to 
state the assumptions underpinning the Roux-Weismann version of mosaic 
theory, argue why these assumptions were untenable, and then engage with 
the opposing ideas of Driesch and Oskar Hertwig. At one point it seems as if 
Wilson was ready to endorse these ideas, based on a different interpretation of 
the idioplasm in which it divides quantitatively and is dynamically transformed 
physiologically, rather than dividing qualitatively as in the Roux-Weismann 
theory.  
I have previously noted how crucial the experiments conducted – and 
interesting phenomena generated – by his friend Hans Driesch (Driesch, 1892 
[1974]) were for Wilson’s Amphioxus work. Wilson acknowledged the 
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“wonderful impetus to the study of all these question [sic]” provided by Driesch 
(Wilson, 1893b). It was from Driesch that Wilson borrowed (though not 
wholesale) the key technique to separate the blastomeres (cells formed by the 
cleavage of the fertilised egg) of the early embryo. Driesch was at that time 
attempting to further the mechanistic programme of embryology, driven in 
particular by Roux. Both Roux and Driesch wanted to establish causal-
mechanical explanations of differentiation and the production of developmental 
form. Wilson’s interest in such a project will have been piqued by the results 
obtained, and conclusions drawn, by Driesch – which contradicted Roux’s 
theory of organ-forming germ areas, also known as the mosaic theory.  
The central ideas of Roux were derived from his experimental work with the frog 
Rana esculenta. In his 1888 paper detailing these experiments and the 
conclusions he drew from them, Roux observed that “we can infer from these 
results that each of the two first blastomeres is able to develop independently of 
the other and therefore does under normal circumstances” (Roux, [1888] 1974: 
25). He concluded from this “that developmental processes may not be 
considered a result of the interaction of all parts…We have instead of such 
differentiating interactions, the self-differentiation of the first blastomeres and of 
the complex of their derivatives into a definite part of the embryo” (Roux, [1888] 
1974: 25-26). Thus, the key element of Roux’s mosaic theory was that 
differentiation occurred through processes internal to the blastomeres, and was 
produced by the division of blastomeres into separate lineages of cells 
independent of each other. Cell division was therefore of prime importance for 
the Roux-Weismann theory, but only secondary for Driesch and Hertwig. For 
Driesch and Hertwig the stress was on external causes of differentiation: the 
modification of the idioplasm effected by external factors, which were thought to 
be mechanical or chemical conditions surrounding the cell or cells. However, 
Wilson believed that Driesch and Hertwig’s rejection of the mosaic theory was 
“one-sided and premature” (Wilson, 1893a: 612).  
Two separate theories thus purported to explain development, and to provide a 
framework for embryological investigation. Wilson was inspired by these 
dramatic and surprising results of experimental interventions in the 
developmental process (Maienschein, 1991a: 53). He saw his experiments as a 
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way of adding more empirical data to contribute towards a reconciliation of both 
theories, recognising that both said something meaningful about development, 
but that neither alone was able to account for the multifarious phenomena that 
embryologists were encountering. Wilson had the benefit of studying the early 
development of two organisms, Nereis and Amphioxus, which displayed very 
different characteristics in early development. He made this clear in a letter to 
Driesch. Justifying the promulgation of his “purely provisional hypothesis”, 
Wilson related to Driesch that he had “been forced to do this by the necessity of 
bringing under a common point of view my work on Nereis & that on Amphioxus 
– i.e. a highly specialized and a slightly specialized form” [Wilson’s underlining] 
(Wilson, 1893b). On this basis, Wilson argued that rather than reject the mosaic 
theory tout court, one must take account of at what point in embryogenesis 
mosaic development starts to hold, and the mosaic theory therefore becomes 
applicable. In some organisms, the mosaic theory would hold from a later stage 
of development, in others mosaicism would be apparent at much earlier stages. 
Wilson stated that, as a general rule, “the ontogeny assumes more and more of 
the character of a mosaic-work as it goes forwards” [italics in original] (Wilson, 
1893a: 610). So there was no confusing mess of contradictory evidence from 
different organisms, nor was there universal applicability of the theories of either 
Roux and Weismann or Driesch and Hertwig.117 Instead, these theories could 
be seen as explanations of different aspects of the same process – one that 
Wilson then endeavoured to explain.  
If the transition from regulatory development to mosaic development was simply 
a question of the progression of development, and the differences in the modes 
of development between different organisms was merely one of the different 
time-frames in which this process started and reached its various stages, how 
could these differences be explained? Wilson concluded that “the difference 
depends on a difference of organization which, in turn, ultimately depends on 
the nature of the original germ plasm.” (Wilson, 1893a: 611).  
                                                          
117
 Oppenheimer made the point, that is essential to bear in mind, that in these early years in the work 
of all the biologists concerned, the dogmatic schemes of later years had not yet appeared, and that Roux 
placed “strong emphasis on the interrelationship of parts” and Driesch exhibited a “remarkable 
materialistic analysis” (Oppenheimer, 1967: 78). This does not underplay the real differences between 
Roux and Driesch before they hardened, but simply recognises that it was simply two different models 
of development that were at stake at this point, even if they were not free from wider implications.  
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5.3.3. The further development of Wilson’s theoretical perspective 
The next steps in Wilson’s argument led him further towards the significant 
conclusion that differences in the type of development exhibited in two different 
organisms must be a result “of an original difference in the germ-plasm in the 
two ova” (Wilson, 1893a: 614). Furthermore, “The entire series of events [in 
ontogeny] is primarily determined by the organization of the undivided ovum 
that forms its first term, and, as such, conditions every succeeding term. The 
morphological value of the individual blastomere at any particular stage is the 
product of two factors, one of which (the embryonic environment) is external, 
while the other (the nature of the idioplasm) is internal” (ibid.). He noted that “in 
cleavage-forms that are identical up to a comparatively late stage, blastomeres 
may exactly correspond in position, mode of origin, and embryonic environment, 
and yet be of entirely different morphological value; and it is in this sense that 
we may regard cleavage-forms as controlled by a definite hereditary element 
apart from purely mechanical conditions” (ibid.).  
To see how Wilson reached such conclusions, I have identified the key steps in 
his argument: 
1. Ontogeny is “a connected series of interactions between the blastomeres in 
which each step conditions that which succeeds” (Wilson, 1893a: 613). 
2. Therefore “The character of the whole series depends on the first step, and 
this in turn upon the constitution of the original ovum” (ibid.).  
3. The mosaic character arises from an inequality in the division at a particular 
stage, “and this conditions the entire subsequent development through the 
peculiar inter-relations established by it” (ibid.). 
4. “If such inequalities exist they must be determined by a definite cause” 
(ibid.) – this is supposed to be in the inequalities in the undivided egg, which 
“must in the last analysis be sought in the constitution of the original germ-
plasm” (ibid.). 
I have presented the argument in this way, because rather than representing 
clear-cut premises and conclusions, the argument became increasingly strong 
in its claims by degree, starting from a fairly weak statement that could brook 
no disagreement, and proceeding almost imperceptibly towards quite a 
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remarkable concluding statement. The implicit assumptions held by Wilson led 
him to follow a thread of causation further and further back in development, 
until even the regulative development of Driesch could be explained by resort to 
the germ-plasm in the ovum. The only difference between an organism 
exhibiting mosaic development and one exhibiting regulative development was 
the degree to which the inequalities established in the cells as a result of the 
activities of the germ-plasm were more or less well-established at certain 
stages of development. If sufficient well-compartmentalised inequalities were 
established at a sufficiently early stage then the embryologist would see the 
sort of development associated with Nereis. If this process took longer, 
development would be more like Amphioxus or Echinus.  At no point did Wilson 
state that any one point of development completely determined the next and 
future stages. He used words like ‘conditions’ and ‘depends’, but then, as he 
followed one thread of causation, turned these into ‘determines’ and ‘is 
determined by’.  It was this slip that allowed the thread of causation to be traced 
back to the “constitution of the original germ-plasm” (ibid.). In Woodwardian 
terms, it seems that Wilson, having identified causes that were specific or 
stable enough to form a key part (‘conditions’ and ‘depends’) of a causal 
account for the phenomena he was trying to explain, then moved to judging 
them sufficiently stable or specific to be the predominant or only significant 
causes that needed to be invoked (‘determines’).  
However, it must be stressed that Wilson still had a physiological interpretation 
of the idioplasm, and not a morphological one that would posit a fixed, localised 
hereditary material. For Wilson, the idioplasm changed over the course of 
development in a dynamic and responsive way, and was not merely divided into 
qualitatively distinct parcels to be passed down to daughter-cells. By this 
interpretation of the idioplasm, Wilson was able to explain differentiation and 
“physiological specialization” without invoking the qualitative division advocated 
by Roux, which he believed his research had discredited (Wilson, 1893b).118 
This is important, and in one respect places him more in the Driesch-Hertwig 
camp. However, while Driesch and Hertwig would locate the original basis for 
changes in the idioplasm not exclusively internally, with perhaps significant 
                                                          
118
 Wilson was careful not to say too much about the idioplasm however. He admitted to “an intentional 
vagueness regarding the seat of the idioplasm” (Wilson, 1895c). 
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external influence, Wilson even at this early stage of his career saw the original 
conditions in the egg as responsible for the conditions which would modify the 
idioplasm in the course of development. Wilson’s physiological idioplasm just 
added a few extra stages in the causal chain originating in the germ-plasm. 
On the relation of the organism to the environment, or the internal sources of 
causation to external ones, formally Wilson advocated equivalence. But he 
exhibited greater concern for the internal rather than the external. For example, 
in a private letter to Driesch, he revealed that “the direction of my work has led 
me to give more thought to the inner factors...of cleavage” [Wilson’s underlining] 
(ibid.). This was a consequence of the thread he chose to follow, and the fact 
that external conditions could be controlled in a way that was not possible for 
internal ones. This meant that an asymmetry was established in terms of which 
potential causes were assigned to the ‘difference-making’ category and which 
were assigned to the ‘background conditions’ category.   
It was not just the research paper of 1893 that signalled a shift in Wilson’s 
thought and work, but also his summer lecture at Woods Hole that same year. 
The paper was an indicator of what Wilson felt confident about declaring in the 
more austere forum of the journal, but the lecture perhaps betrayed the general 
direction of his thought more clearly.  
The same criticisms that Wilson had of the mosaic theory in the 1893 paper 
were replicated here, though he once again refused to go over to the Driesch-
Hertwig camp. In fact, he suggested that their choice of organism – the sea 
urchin – may have led them astray. That said, Amphioxus demonstrates 
comparable plasticity to the sea urchin, though against this Wilson also had 
experience of the more mosaic-style development of Nereis.  
On the relation of the cell to the organism, Wilson accepted the claims of both 
camps, that on the one hand “the prospective value of a cell may be a function 
of its location” (Wilson, 1894b: 12) and on the other, that there exists “in some 
measure, an independent power of self-determination due to its inherent 
specific structure” (ibid.). These he integrated by emphasising the physiological 
specialisation of the cell, rather than the parcelling out of specific substances or 
structures to successor cells. This was contrary to the position of Roux and 
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Weismann. Whether development was seen as more regulative or more 
mosaic-like was a function of the timing of the physiological specialisation – 
before or after cell-division (Wilson, 1894b: 12-13). 
The 1894 lecture at Woods Hole revealed some fascinating insights into 
Wilson’s thinking on the relation of the organism to the environment. Speaking 
of the work conducted on the Pluteus-stage of sea urchin development, after 
accounting for the formation of the arms he pointed out that “In this case the 
necessary condition of development is a certain internal stimulus…This 
stimulus, itself, however, is directly dependent on external conditions (the 
chemical environment), and hence the formation of the arms is determined by 
both internal and external conditions” (Wilson, 1895b: 117).  
This led Wilson toward two conclusions. One, that “it enables us in a measure 
to comprehend how a single property of the germ-plasm may involve a whole 
train or cluster of events in development…, each differentiation tending to 
become the parent of new differentiations. This conception does not in any 
manner set aside the necessity of assuming, for each species of animal, a 
specifically organized germ-plasm, nor does it conflict with the fact that the egg-
substance may even show a certain amount of regional differentiation before 
development begins”. Rather than a remodelled preformationism, Wilson 
considered this ‘germ-plasm as the root of all developmental events’ 
perspective to be “a rational conception of epigenesis” (Wilson, 1895b: 117-
118).  
The second conclusion that Wilson reached concerned “the vital part played in 
development by environmental conditions. We perceive that our attention has 
been focused so closely upon the germ-plasm regarded as the substratum of 
inheritance and development as to obscure our view of the essential relation in 
which it stands to the conditions under which development takes place. In other 
words our point of view has been too largely morphological while the 
physiological aspect of development has been thrown into the background”. 
After discussing some of these physiological views, he identified two kinds of 
conditions: external to the embryo, and internal. The internal conditions, 
including chemical and physical factors as well as “physiological relations 
between the developing parts” are “progressively created by the activity of the 
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idioplasm itself” (Wilson, 1895b: 118-119). So although environmental 
conditions (external or internal) at any one particular point in development may 
play an equally important role as the idioplasm, the fact that a substantial 
portion of the conditions were created by the activity of the idioplasm sets up a 
primacy (in the sense of being the origin of chains of causation accounting for 
differentiation) for the idioplasm in development. This was stated quite explicitly 
for the first time in this lecture.119 By 1896 he had come to speak about normal 
development and the role of the environment in the following terms: 
[N]ormal development is in a greater or less degree the response of the 
developing organism to the normal conditions  
[Italics in original] Wilson, 1896: 326  
I explore the issues raised by this conceptualisation of normal development and 
the relationship Wilson perceived between the developing organism and its 
environment and analyse their significance in section 5.5.3. and chapter 6. For 
now, we may note the role played by the Amphioxus experiment in generating a 
conception of normal development in Wilson, and in providing him with the 
means to interpret it in terms of an opposition between active internal causes 
and passive external conditions. This opposition resulted from Wilson assigning 
primacy to internal causes in the chain of causation with which he sought to 
explain differentiation and the determination of development, and it reflected the 
modern distinction between instructive causes and permissive conditions.   
5.4. Drawing out the characteristics of different conceptualisations of 
development 
In the mid-1890s Wilson encountered and tried to evaluate two predominant 
conceptions of development, which attempted to explain the generation of later 
stages (larval and adult) through progressive cell differentiation.120 These were 
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 By 1897, Wilson finally acknowledged “the inadequacy of all mechanical theories of cleavage” and 
ruefully observed that “The more we study the problem of development, the more complex and difficult 
it appears” (Wilson, 1897). 
120
 These two ways of conceptualising development (and inextricably, heredity and reproduction as well) 
and the differences between these ways were important to Wilson (and subsequent historical and 
philosophical treatments of the period). The differences between those ways were not always judged to 
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associated with the work of Roux and Driesch. Remember that the mosaic 
theory postulated that the fate of a cell and its descendants was independent of 
context, and determined by factors internal to the cell. The alternative theory of 
Driesch (later called regulative development) claimed that the fate of a cell and 
its descendants was shaped by contextual factors – the parts were regulated by 
the whole, and thus determined by factors external to the cell, or “mechanically”, 
to put it in Wilson’s terms. Neither of these men’s ideas was in any way static, 
but we can characterise them at the point in the mid-1890s after Wilson worked 
with Amphioxus and was thinking through the consequences of this work and 
how it related to the experimental results and theories of Roux and Driesch.  
I will consider the two different conceptions by identifying them with a series of 
opposing characteristics, which reflected ideas about organismal development 
at the time. Such ideas, as I have noted, were in considerable flux at this time. 
Some of these were more explicitly advocated (i.e. mosaic vs regulatory) than 
others, and some of the characteristics (such as tree vs web) are purely analytic 
labels chosen by me. The separation of (and distinction drawn between) the 
organism and the environment allowed these characteristics to be generated, 
though it did not guarantee that they could or should be. The abstraction 
separating organism from environment has its roots in Darwinism (Pearce, 
2010), but also more immediately, experimental practice, particularly that 
deriving from the causal-analytical tradition which Roux did so much to promote, 
and which Driesch and Wilson were to a large extent working within (Lewontin, 
2001: 59-60). Neither the concept of the organism or that of the environment 
are unproblematic, nor divorced from scientific context. 
The characteristics are: 
Mode of differentiation 
Does differentiation occur early, or late? In the case of mosaic development, the 
differentiation occurs early, and a given somatic cell, if detached from the 
organism, cannot reconstitute the whole. However, in regulatory development 
                                                                                                                                                                          
be significant by contemporaries, however. A 1903 text on heredity which attempted to classify various 
theories of generation actually placed Roux and Driesch’s ideas in the same category (“Organicistes”, 
with Descartes and von Baer as well), and effectively in a different ‘kingdom’ to the theories of 
Weismann (Delage, 1903: 437). 
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such differentiation (and hence, mosaic development) occurs later, meaning 
detached cells retain the capacity to regenerate to form a new whole organism 
under adequate conditions. As patterns of development, they are not mutually 
exclusive, as Wilson showed, but can follow each other successively over time. 
Type of cause 
This is the type of cause exhibited (or attributed) in development, or at least 
foregrounded in explanations, owing to some set of empirical, methodological 
and epistemic factors. The types of cause include attributing developmental 
patterns and phenomena to inheritance (that is, to some form of transmission, 
or historical causation, such as phylogenetic explanations for ontogenetic 
processes and events), to mechanical forces and interactions impinging on and 
between cells, and to cascades of (intra- and inter-cellular) chemical 
(physiological) reactions.  
Source of causation 
The distinction between organism and environment divides a living system into 
internal (the organism) and external (the environment) parts. As the distinction 
between the internal and the external may also pertain to the cell and its 
surroundings (including, or perhaps not including, neighbouring cells), it is better 
to consider this as a measure of what extent a conceptualisation of 
development prioritises context in discussing the causes of particular 
phenomena. An Internal approach will prioritise causes internal to the central 
object of inquiry (a cell, an organism, both), whereas an External approach will 
emphasise the ultimate role of the contextual environment.  
Mode of transmission 
The kind of inheritance or transmission exhibited by and within an organism can 
be characterised as physiological or atomistic/combinatorial. A physiological 
mode of transmission is dynamic: that which is inherited (e.g. from cell to cell) is 
subject to change as well as contributing towards it. Additionally, it is the whole 
which undergoes these changes, rather than just parts. On the other hand, in an 
atomistic mode of transmission, that which is inherited is not subject to change, 
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except being sub-divided in ways which do not affect the properties of the 
individual parts thus separated.  
Type of cell division 
This refers to the type of cell division exhibited, more specifically the division of 
substances or forces relevant to intra-organism heredity from parent to 
daughter-cells. Qualitative division is the unequal distribution of such 
substances and forces, quantitative division their equal distribution. It must be 
stressed here that qualitative division does not necessarily imply the unequal 
parcelling out of some hereditary material. However, the extent to which all or 
only part of such material was relevant and active in the functioning of cells and 
their descendants, rather than being merely passive and only playing a role in 
extraordinary circumstances, is the point of distinction in this category.   
Metaphors of cell relations 
The metaphors of tree and web describe two perspectives concerning the 
relation of cells after one or more rounds of cell division. To what extent do cells 
continue to interact in causally relevant ways for the development of organismal 
form? The tree metaphor suggests that cell relations are conceived vertically, 
with the diachronic relation of parent and daughter cells in a lineage more 
explanatorily important than synchronic horizontal relations between cells. The 
web metaphor stresses those horizontal relations more than the vertical 
relations.  
* 
There are many connections and relationships which can be drawn between the 
different characteristics sketched above. For example, metaphors of cell 
relations seem to be closely related to the mode of transmission exhibited. If 
there are lateral relations affecting the constitution of hereditary materials or 
forces, as the physiological mode of transmission suggests, one would imagine 
that the relations between cells can be conceptualised more as a web than a 
tree. Conversely, if relevant hereditary materials are only altered as a result of 
cell-division (and so, vertically through lineages) the relations seem to be more 
 
187 
 
tree-like.  More connections will be revealed (or tested) by the comparisons 
drawn below between the schemes of Roux, Driesch and Wilson.  
5.5. Comparing Roux, Driesch and Wilson 
Up to this point, I have mainly focused on the debate over the mosaic theory 
against the regulatory theory as the key point of difference between the 
developmental theories of Driesch and Roux. However, this difference is only 
part of the story. Initially united by their mechanistic approach and embrace of 
experimental methods, they were divided on many issues as a result of their 
interpretations of series of experiments they carried out (most famously) on 
frogs (Roux) and sea urchins (Driesch). So that we may be able to compare 
these men further and examine how different elements of their thinking related 
to each other, I now detail other aspects of their theories.  
5.5.1. Roux 
One of the clearest statements of Roux’s views concerning organismal 
development is contained in his 1888 paper on the ‘Developmental Mechanics 
of the Embryo’ (‘Entwickelungsmechanik des Embryo’). This paper described 
the results of various experiments carried out on embryos of the frog Rana 
esculenta, using a hot needle to kill blastomeres at various stages of 
development. More crucially, it contained the first clear articulations from Roux 
of his contribution to the so-called (by Wilson among others) “Roux-Weismann 
hypothesis” of mosaic development.  
Summarised briefly, the results of the experiment showed that when a certain 
part of the embryo was destroyed by the needle (for example, one cell at the 
four-cell stage) the resulting development produced a form missing that part 
which it can be presumed was destined to be formed by the descendant cells 
and tissues from the destroyed blastomere. Among the “special inferences” 
Roux drew were “that the qualitative division of the cell body and of the nuclear 
material…can proceed properly without any influence from the neighbouring 
cells” and that “the nucleus reaches its proper position in the blastomere, so 
important for the correct arrangement of the separated materials, without being 
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affected by the vital activity of the neighbouring cells” (Roux, [1888] 1974: 27). 
These two quotes reveal several seemingly interlinked elements in Roux’s 
thinking. For Roux, the activity of the cells is largely autonomous and 
independent of context. This characteristic, of internally-driven self-
differentiation, is guided primarily by the nucleus. The nucleus itself is divided 
unequally at every cell-division – the daughter cells receive different 
complements of determinants to guide their future development, and that of 
their own descendant cells. The most important cell-cell relations are therefore 
those of diachronic genealogy, not of synchronic interaction. The differential 
parcelling out of nuclear determinants is what causes differentiation. While 
certain caveats were later added to Roux’s scheme to take account of 
phenomena such as regeneration, in the normal course of events he did not 
believe the hereditary material to be dynamic or responsive to changed 
conditions. 
With this in mind, it is easy to see why Roux’s scheme could be associated so 
closely with Weismann’s theory of development and inheritance. Deriving from 
exciting experimental results, and presenting such a powerful explanation for 
the complex phenomena of development (not just restricted to differentiation), 
Roux’s theory was an incredible impetus and reference point for future 
experimental and theoretical work, including most immediately that of his 
admirer Hans Driesch (Hamburger, 1997; Maienschein, 1991a).  
5.5.2. Driesch 
In the seminal 1892 paper in which he expounded the results of his experiments 
on sea urchins, Hans Driesch declared that Roux’s “principle of organ-forming 
germ-areas is refuted for the observed species” (Driesch, [1892] 1974: 49). He 
also speculated that this principle may well be refuted for Roux’s own frog 
species if “those who are more skillful [sic] than I” were able to isolate (rather 
than kill) the blastomeres of that species (Driesch, [1892] 1974: 48). 
What Driesch specifically rejected was the idea of qualitative nuclear division, 
whereby various nested levels of determinants were parcelled out to daughter 
nuclei during the process of cell division. Instead, in 1894 he proposed to 
replace this with a framework which purported to build explanations of 
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development – and differentiation in particular – upon “a broad base of 
demonstrable cellular reactions” (Churchill, 1969: 167). These reactions 
included physical forces impinging on and between cells, but also chemical 
processes occurring from, between, and in cells. Some of these chemical 
processes were so-called ‘biological releases’ which were cascades of chemical 
reactions, ensuring that “ontogeny, becoming an ever-expanding constellation 
of stimuli and responses, continued to progress” (Churchill, 1969: 169-170). 
Ontogeny was a progressive unfolding of various stages of chemical production, 
release, reaction and response. Despite the fact that Driesch saw a key role for 
the nucleus in directing this process, it differed from the sorts of suggestions 
made by Roux in a number of key respects. The progressive loss of potency 
experienced by a particular part of the embryo – the diminishing range of 
possible cell-types that could be generated – was not caused by any change in 
the nucleus. No, that structure remained with a full stock of whatever factors 
were relevant to development and heredity. It was progressive changes 
generated in the cytoplasm which reduced potency, and this resulted from 
progressive chemical changes brought about by the cascades of chemical 
reactions that had already occurred as part of the developmental process. As 
the cytoplasm acted as a mediator between external stimuli and the nucleus 
which had the capacity to act upon receiving a particular stimulus, the 
cytoplasm could determine whether any given stimulus elicited a response from 
the cell. This process was dynamic and multi-directional, as the nucleus could 
itself influence the chemical make-up of the cytoplasm by releasing various 
substances into it (Churchill, 1969: 172).  
As a result of all these dynamic chemical interactive processes, the fate of cells 
could change, as a result of external stimuli. For example, the isolation of a 
blastomere could reset a cell which had already been set down one 
developmental path, towards being able to give rise to all types of cell (like an 
egg-cell is able to). If a cell were moved within an embryo from one location to 
another, its new position in the whole might stimulate a change in its 
developmental fate. However, Driesch was keen to stress that such changes in 
fate were, after a certain stage of development, not completely unbound, and 
there were often limits to the changes that could occur. Whole-part and part-part 
relations were crucial in Driesch’s explanation not just of how development and 
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differentiation could occur normally, but also in explaining the results of his 
experimental interventions. Cells did not just relate to each other in a vertical 
way, passing on determinants to descendants, but also in a horizontal way, 
interfering in the activities and fates of their cousins. The inheritance of certain 
characteristics of cells to its descendants was to be understood not by the 
differential distribution of nuclear components, but in the transmission of 
cytoplasm which had undergone differential cascades of ontogenetic chemical 
reactions.  
5.5.3. Comparisons and analyses of the differences between Wilson, 
Driesch and Roux 
The table below displays how the ideas of Roux and Driesch can be 
characterised in these previously described categories: 
 
Mode of 
differentiation 
Type of 
cause 
Source of 
causation 
Mode of 
transmission 
Type of cell 
division 
Metaphor 
of cell 
relations 
Roux  
 
Mosaic Inherited Internal Atomistic Qualitative Tree 
Driesch Regulative Chemical External Physiological Quantitative Web 
 
The disagreement in every category of the distinctions I drew suggests that 
each member of a set of characteristics entails the rest of the members of the 
set. We should perhaps examine this suggestion in the light of the discussion of 
Wilson’s results and theoretical arguments. I have added a row including 
Wilson’s 1893-6 positions: 
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Mode of 
differentiation 
Type of 
cause 
Source of 
causation 
Mode of 
transmission 
Type of cell 
division 
Metaphor 
of cell 
relations 
Roux  
 
Mosaic Inherited Internal Atomistic Qualitative Tree 
Driesch 
 
Regulative Chemical External Physiological Quantitative Web 
Wilson Mosaic 
(modified 
version) 
Inherited, 
Chemical & 
Mechanical 
Internal Physiological Quantitative Web 
 
This extremely schematic representation of the three viewpoints, while failing to 
do justice to the richness of the three men’s ideas, does demonstrate that the 
concepts contained in the pairs of opposites do not in fact map onto one 
another; that is, there are not two exclusive sets of logically related concepts for 
each of the categories. One could not identify an entire conceptual framework 
from identifying one of the elements. The only association that is not broken 
(though not necessarily shown to hold in all circumstances) is that between 
Mosaic and Internal. Roux’s inferences concerning the self-differentiation of 
cells and their independence from external (mechanical) factors underpin his 
attribution of a mosaic pattern, and his mosaic theory in general. However, as 
we have seen, Wilson saw a role for external mechanical factors, and 
furthermore proposed a physiological view of the mode of transmission. How is 
it then possible that Wilson came to the same pattern of development as Roux, 
and proposed a modified view of his theory? How is it that Wilson’s views were 
so out of kilter with the sets of associations revealed by my schematic 
representation of Roux and Driesch’s theories? 
Part of the reason may be that while Wilson had warm personal relations with 
Driesch, he did not with Roux. Despite coming into increasingly serious 
epistemic disagreement with Driesch, his criticisms were couched very 
sympathetically. However, Roux’s accounts were treated with disdain: “Roux’s 
course has been a very devious one, and I think he will find it hard to clear 
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himself of the charge of not having been altogether candid; his writings are a 
terrible labyrinth through which [one] wanders in a state of mental stupefaction” 
(Wilson, 1897). 
Beyond that possible reason, we are confronted with a key difference between 
Wilson and both of these men concerning the respective roles of normal 
development in their experimental work, and how this informed their views on 
development. Remember that in Driesch’s experiment, he relied on the highly 
abstracted tables of Selenka, and that Roux used a control group in which no 
abstraction was used in producing a normal development. In Wilson’s 
experiment, on the other hand, the establishment of a moderately abstracted 
normal development was integrated into the experiment as a whole. Just as 
much focused attention was placed upon the embryos which did not undergo 
manipulation as those which did. The consequences of that are relevant for 
understanding why Wilson departed from the associations between 
characteristics of theories that were exhibited in the table covering only Roux 
and Driesch.  
The use of a normal development as a range of natural variation to compare the 
effects of manipulations (in terms of a range of variation exhibited in the results) 
will have provided a more fine-grained capacity to assess the role of the 
different causes (inherited or mechanical). One cause (mechanical) was varied 
in the manipulated arm and kept constant in the control arm. Within the normal 
development, the mechanical cause was kept constant (or at least as constant 
as possible, ‘accidents’ could happen and were suggested as reasons for 
particular phenomena), leaving open the possibility of data shedding some light 
on the role of inheritance as a cause. In so doing, Wilson was able to find 
evidence for both of these causes, and simultaneously the limitations of 
invoking any one of those causes as the only cause for the difference exhibited 
between his control and manipulated arms. The causes were therefore not 
incompatible in Wilson’s account; they were complementary, explaining in 
combination what any one alone simply could not. This was not inconsistent 
with Wilson’s prioritisation of the internal over the external, although this came 
to colour the relative significance allotted to the causes. Wilson’s more pluralist 
view did affect how he considered the question of cell-relations and descent. 
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Both the inherited and mechanical causes were reconciled by employing a 
physiological view of inherited substance and a web-like interpretation of the 
way cells relate to each other. Wilson’s interpretation of the idioplasm posited it 
as an inherited substance, albeit one which can be changed and also which 
must be changed over the course of the cycle of cell divisions so that 
differentiation of cells and tissues can occur. Using this interpretation of the 
idioplasm, Wilson was able to incorporate the evidence which suggested a role 
for internal inherited factors and external mechanical factors into a common 
explanation for differentiation and variation. This interpretation of the idioplasm, 
combined with the role of normal development in his experimental system, 
therefore provided the means by which the specificity of both mechanical and 
inherited causal factors could be detected and assessed. Wilson had 
constructed an experimental system which was sensitive to the effects of 
variation in both of these candidate causes. This made it clear to Wilson that in 
constructing an explanation of differentiation and variation he could not rely on 
one causal factor alone.  
When the focus is on the early stages of development, the difference between 
the mosaic and regulatory theories seems stark. The mosaic theory posited the 
narrowing of potency (the ability of cells to produce, upon subsequent divisions, 
different types of cells) with increasing cell differentiation whereas the regulatory 
theory claimed that potency is preserved throughout this process. However, 
beyond the earliest stages of development, the distinction between the two 
theories was one of degree rather than of kind, as Wilson observed when 
attempting to bring them both under the same explanatory framework. Driesch 
admitted as much in 1894 when he acknowledged that “as ontogeny progresses 
the prospective potency of all parts increasingly narrowed” (Churchill, 1969: 
170). Unlike Wilson, however, Driesch sought to preserve the difference 
between the two theories, by emphasising the causal relevance of each and 
every stage of development in determining the fate of any particular part (and 
thus also the whole) beyond that stage. Potency might diminish over time, but 
rather than development being the mechanical “determined unfolding of set 
steps” through the division of particles in the nucleus from the egg onwards, the 
future was still an open book (Churchill, 1969: 173). For the organism, and parts 
of it, its “fate changed within the limits of the prospective potency at the time” 
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(ibid.). Series of chemical reactions and triggers helped change this fate, by 
working within and mediating between cells (Churchill 1969: 168-169). The 
difference between mosaic and regulatory theories was the extent to which, for 
any part at a particular point in development, the fate of that part and the parts 
to be descended from it was already determined. Mosaic theories were 
determinate, regulatory indeterminate.121 
Driesch initially attempted to provide a mechanistic explanation for the different 
fates of isolated blastomeres which he found in his sea urchin experiments, and 
which Wilson found in Amphioxus. Driesch was soon to forswear the possibility 
of explaining (at least in terms acceptable to other embryologists) many of the 
phenomena he sought to account for in this way (Roth, 2011: 256; Churchill, 
1969: 177). Driesch’s continued belief in the constitutive and directive role of the 
environment in determining the fate of parts and the whole organism, coupled 
with his mechanistic ideal of explaining differentiation, localisation and 
accommodation in terms of cascades of ontogenetic chemical reactions 
(impossible, given the knowledge and technique available), led him to this 
conclusion. Wilson went in the opposite direction, attempting to find in the egg 
the sources (cytoplasmic or nuclear) of later differentiation. Unencumbered by 
the necessity of dealing with the sort of chemical ontogenetic complexity that 
Driesch envisaged, and having relegated the environment to a passive, 
permissive condition of development, in his investigations in the following 
decade Wilson was able to penetrate into realms which Driesch considered 
unknowable (Collier, 1997: 230-233).122 Wilson’s undoubted success suggests 
that Driesch was mistaken. These ways in which Wilson made a – cytological 
and embryological – study of development possible conditioned the ways in 
which development – and normal development in particular – could be 
conceptualised.  
                                                          
121
 Regarding cleavage patterns, a key concern of Wilson in the 1893 paper, developmental biologists no 
longer speak of them being determinate or indeterminate, but variable or invariant (Pearson, 2003: 69). 
This use of more neutral descriptive language seems intended to avoid making judgements about 
exactly the sorts of issues I am discussing in this section.  
122
 Roux noted the benefits of this approach in 1888. He claimed that “It has thus been shown that the 
development of the form of the fertilized egg…occurs without external formative forces. We therefore 
have to look for the formative forces in the egg itself, which imposes a very pleasant limitation on 
further investigation” [my italics] (Roux, [1888] 1974: 5). 
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5.6. Conclusion 
In the conclusions which Wilson drew from his experiments with Amphioxus, he 
attempted to reconcile the contradictory theories of development advocated by 
Wilhelm Roux and Hans Driesch. By 1896, Wilson spoke in harsh terms about 
the ‘Roux-Weismann theory’, and seemingly accepted many aspects of 
Driesch’s theory. However, Wilson adopted a similar approach to the 
internal/external distinction as Roux, and renovated the mosaic theory rather 
than rejecting it. Warm personal relations with Driesch (and hostility towards 
Roux) may explain part of this, as might Wilson’s greater satisfaction with the 
empirical details of Driesch’s scheme. That Roux’s theory had ossified into 
something of a closed system seemingly impervious to opposing facts, while 
Driesch’s ideas were still being worked out and closer to the experimental 
evidence, was also crucial in shaping Wilson’s relative attitudes to the two 
sides. One key link I have found between Wilson’s “provisional hypothesis”, 
which seemingly rejects so many aspects of Roux’s viewpoint, and the mosaic 
theory is in the relations of organism and environment.  
Whatever the curiosities of Wilson’s attitudes to Driesch and Roux, I have 
demonstrated that he did manage to provide an explanation for differentiation 
and determination which transcended their contradictory views, and brought into 
question links between particular sets of conceptualisations of the process of 
development, links which seemed to be necessary in Roux and Driesch’s work. 
The role of Wilson’s particular generation of normal development in this should 
not be underestimated. By appreciating the variation within normal development 
while abstracting some of it away from his control group, and incorporating the 
generation of normal development into his overall experimental set-up, Wilson 
was able to detect more sensitively the new variations generated as a result of 
his experimental intervention, without sacrificing tractability. In so doing, he was 
able to produce results which he interpreted in ways that partly reflected 
Driesch’s ideas, partly Roux’s, while producing an explanation which explicitly 
rejected both of them and forged a new working hypothesis. This working 
hypothesis situated the instructive causes of development within the organism, 
with the environment relegated to providing permissive conditions. This led, in 
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1896, to the explicit formulation of what normal development was, the theory 
now reflecting this methodology as well as ultimately deriving from it. 
In 1896 he came to define normal development in a way which divided the 
factors involved in development into what have since been labelled instructive 
causes and permissive conditions (Wilson, 1896: 326). This distinction allows 
biologists to control certain (external, environmental, extra-organismal) 
conditions which are deemed to be permissive conditions, and manipulate 
internal, intra-organismal conditions to identify the causes of the phenomena 
they wish to investigate. This distinction was implicit in the causal-analytical 
mode of experiment promoted by Wilhelm Roux, and was a powerful conceptual 
tool allowing scientists to focus increasingly finer techniques on the cell to 
understand its structure and role in development. Wilson’s experiments on the 
eggs of Dentalium and Patella (both are kinds of mollusc) in the early years of 
the twentieth-century were excellent examples of this (Wilson, 1904a, 1904b). 
Such work stood in contrast to Driesch’s drift away from experimental biology, 
methodologically paralysed in the face of the overwhelming complexity and 
dynamic interaction he conceived between developing organisms and their 
environments. This demonstrates the importance of the methodological and 
theoretical aspects of normal development as a technical condition, in helping to 
successfully frame an epistemic object in order to generate a viable and 
productive experimental system. This is achieved by providing norms to identify 
and control certain factors which become background conditions, while also 
providing the means for assessing deviation from a normal development 
defined in terms of the response of the organism to changes in those 
background (permissive) conditions.  
As I have shown, the background to so many aspects of the problems Wilson 
was trying to tackle in the Amphioxus experiment lay in the explanation of 
variation. In trying to explain variation, Wilson was forced to manage the 
variation in his own experiment. Part of this management was the incorporation 
of a range of variation into his normal development, another part the 
comparison between the ‘normal’ variation and the experimentally-induced 
variation. This was directed at explaining the variation in cleavage forms, which 
in turn offered Wilson pointers for trying to explain how variation is generated in 
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the course of development – differentiation. The nature of the experimental 
system which Wilson established allowed him to do this, by including as a 
comparator and norm a technical condition – normal development – which 
incorporated a wide range of variation itself. As I have shown, this provided his 
experimental system with the kind of sensitivity needed to detect specificity in 
the causal factors he was assessing. In the next chapter I use my study of 
Wilson’s work to explore how the treatment of variation can be conceptualised 
in a framework that interprets normal development as a kind of technical 
condition in experimental embryology.  
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Chapter 6 – Variation and strategies of abstraction 
6.1. Introduction 
In this chapter, I build upon the implications suggested by my analysis of 
Wilson’s experiments with Amphioxus. Chiefly, I aim to conceptualise Wilson’s 
generation of normal development as part of those experiments, by situating 
them in two approaches: that of experimental systems (already outlined in 
chapter 1), and that of a ‘taxonomy of norms’ produced by different ways of 
managing variation by methods of abstraction in experimental work.  
I begin by revisiting and recapping Wilson’s method of abstraction in the 
Amphioxus experiment. I reiterate the need to perform some operations of 
abstraction to take account of, and manage, variation. 
Moving on from this reminder, I make sense of the connections between the 
establishment of norms (such as normal development) in biological research, 
theoretical and epistemic stances taken towards variation, and methodological 
strategies of abstraction. To do so, I use what I have termed a ‘taxonomy of 
norms’, which is based on explicit connections between various types of norms 
and the ways of abstracting variation that are associated with them. The 
taxonomy includes the essentialist normal, the average or statistical normal, 
and the reference standard normal. Following my discussion of the taxonomy, I 
build an account of the practices of abstraction, and relate this to the 
procedures of standardisation and the use of heuristics in experimentation and 
reasoning.  
The previous two chapters illustrated how a particular set of experimental 
practices were made to work, and how they contributed towards a particular 
theoretical articulation of development. This was further demonstrated by way of 
a comparison with different articulations, which were arrived at using different 
experimental set-ups. My account has therefore foregrounded the role of 
practice in driving scientific agendas. In this chapter, I explore how Wilson’s 
work and his experimental strategies can be fruitfully interpreted by an 
experimental systems approach. This is a way of conceptualising the progress 
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of research as an investigation into epistemic objects (objects of investigation) 
by directing various resources (technical conditions) to create the 
circumstances in which the epistemic object’s contours can be traced.  
I use this approach to highlight the role of normal development within a nascent 
experimental system. I argue that understanding normal development as a 
technical condition in an experimental system is a powerful way of 
understanding normal development’s role in Wilson’s work, and suggest that 
this is also the case for subsequent experimental embryology and 
developmental biology.  
Regarding the taxonomy of norms, I find that previously identified norms do not 
encompass the norms and experimental strategies used by Wilson. In 
particular, Wilson’s normal development cannot be regarded as a reference 
standard, and in fact this norm was not exhibited in the early period of 
experimental embryology that Wilson worked in. I therefore propose a 
renovation of the taxonomy, and use the previously introduced concept of 
heuristics to make sense of how the different kinds of normal are employed in 
the work of practising scientists.  
Furthermore, using the example of Wilson’s work with Amphioxus, I bind 
together the experimental systems approach and the taxonomy of norms. In 
doing so, I establish a link between the practical and conceptual aspects of 
normal development. This will help to form the basis of a discussion concerning 
developmental biology more generally. This, together with the analysis of causal 
relationships drawn from Woodward (2010), forms the basis of the discussion in 
the following chapter.  
6.2. Wilson’s method of abstraction to produce normal development 
In chapters 4 and 5, I detailed how Wilson produced normal development as 
part of an experimental investigation into the development of Amphioxus. 
Recapping this, and reframing it for the different purposes of this chapter, I 
consider in turn Wilson’s attitudes to, and practices concerning, variation, 
abstraction, and normal development.  
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6.2.1. Variation 
Wilson’s attitude towards variation was remarkably liberal. Irritated by the 
variation in cleavage forms which stymied his morphological work before the 
Amphioxus experiment, rather than ignore the variation he decided to harness it 
and to try to explain its generation. Amphioxus was selected in large part for this 
reason, for its “protean variability” (Wilson, 1893a: 579). This variability had the 
implication that the embryos would vary with or without external interference. 
This presented an opportunity for Wilson to assess the significance of such 
variation for morphological and comparative purposes, but also a problem for 
his other aim of investigating the role of different factors (i.e. mechanical or 
inherited) in differentiation and development. He resolved this in part with a 
strategy of abstraction which discounted some of the observed variation by 
establishing a range of normal variation (his normal development), against 
which the variation observed in the manipulated samples could be compared. 
He managed to reduce the possible intractability of comparison between non-
manipulated and manipulated embryos by comparing against a normal range of 
variation. Such an approach allowed Wilson to take account of the variation 
inherent in the differing forms of Amphioxus, and provided a powerful means of 
establishing whether a change had occurred due to the experimental 
manipulation, rather than some other factor responsible for producing normal 
variations. Taking account of variation made the sensitivity of the experimental 
set-up more acute – and the conclusions more robust – than if Wilson had set 
upon a particular morphology and its stages and determined that to be normal, 
and ignored all other variation.  
Wilson considered all the three main cleavage-forms to be part of normal 
development in the early stages of the embryogenesis of Amphioxus, and 
recognised that these were similar to the kinds of cleavage exhibited in very 
different species. He concluded from this variation that for the task of assessing 
evolutionary relationships by identifying early embryonic homologies, the 
cleavage-forms were of no help. Instead, he used the results of his experiment 
to try and work out how the different forms were generated. He believed that 
this involved an interplay of mechanical forces (from outside and between the 
cells) and inherited factors (inside the cells), and a shifting of features of 
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particular stages of development to earlier stages. On this basis, he tried to 
explain the variation in the different modes of development that were exhibited 
between different organisms, and the differentiation of cells into cells of different 
types. Once again, the sensitivity of his experimental set-up aided by the 
comparison of manipulated embryos with a range of variation allowed Wilson to 
firmly define the level of influence mechanical factors (the variable in his 
experimental treatment) had on these processes. This sensitivity led Wilson to 
conclude that one factor or the other could not be found to act alone, which a 
less sensitive test might not have detected (cf. Roux and Driesch). He was thus 
able to come to a particular (and as the last chapter showed, distinctive) 
hypothesis explaining differentiation and the different modes of development in 
different species, simply by the fact that his experiment showed that neither 
mechanical conditions nor inherited tendencies alone could account for the 
phenomena he observed.  
6.2.2. Wilson’s method of abstraction 
Wilson’s method of abstraction was one in which he directly apprehended the 
variation exhibited by the non-manipulated or control embryos, but discounted 
those he considered to be abnormal. In order for Wilson to judge some embryos 
as abnormal, he must have possessed a pre-existing conception or expectation 
of the normality of Amphioxus embryos. This was likely to have been 
conditioned by his study of previous accounts of Amphioxus development, but 
also involved him employing functional criteria concerning the activity and 
viability of the embryos as they proceeded through development. Keeping the 
embryos separate allowed him to track backwards from embryos which did not 
reach the larval or adult stage to the forms they exhibited during the earlier 
stages of development. He did not include acknowledged variation in size and 
rate of development in his account underpinning the picture of normal 
development, despite these factors surely being relevant in considering the form 
of the embryo. As abstraction goes, however, this was light, as it still allowed a 
considerable range of variation to be considered normal. Wilson was not merely 
a consumer of an abstraction already produced, such as a ‘normal table’ or a 
handbook, but the producer of the abstraction, the results of which he would 
use to ascertain the effects of his experimental manipulation. Later I discuss the 
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role of heuristic procedures in such abstractions. For now, though, we may 
recognise that Wilson, in observing the development of those embryos which he 
had deemed normal after his abstraction, was able to generate a picture of 
normal development which informed his observations of the manipulated 
embryos. His representations, I have argued, constitute a form of ‘trained 
judgement’, which will also be associated with the role of heuristics in 
observation and representation later in this chapter. 
The abstraction was not just from observed variation to the variation deemed to 
constitute the range of the ‘normal’. It was from the experimental results to the 
“provisional hypothesis” he outlined. The experiment identified an interplay of 
inherited and mechanical factors in development. Over the next year or so, this 
resulted in a conceptualisation of the process of development as a series of 
stages through which an inherited substance is progressively transformed. The 
end result was a picture of development into which the internal factors are 
allocated the role of instructive causes, and external factors the role of 
permissive conditions. This led to a picture of normal development which is 
simply the development that occurs when the organism experiences “normal 
conditions” (Wilson, 1896: 326). 
6.2.3. Normal development 
Wilson’s normal development, as we have seen, was quite different in form and 
provenance to other normal comparators used by experimental embryologists in 
the years immediately before the Amphioxus work. Rather than taking normal 
development to be a particular series of forms at particular stages, Wilson 
conceived of normal development as encompassing a range of variation. So he 
attempted to not just depict static stages, but the dynamic processes by which 
the embryo at any one stage transformed into the particular arrangement of 
cells at a succeeding stage. Even when he abstracted from the variation to 
identify the three main types of cleavage-form exhibited as part of the normal 
development, he was cautious to point out the many transitional forms that 
existed between them. While, as I have indicated, normal development came to 
take on a very different (and unlike 1893, specific) definition, as a product and 
component of Wilson’s work with Amphioxus it was a way of taking account of 
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much of the variation observed in the non-manipulated Amphioxus. It identified 
this range of variation with the sort of variation that might occur naturally, and 
this was incorporated into an experimental set-up. In turn, the experiments were 
intended to provide evidence to aid Wilson’s attempts to explain how that 
variation itself occurred. In order to understand Wilson’s experiments more fully, 
and the role of normal development in experimental systems, we therefore need 
to understand the nature and the role of variation in embryology and 
developmental biology. 
6.3. Conceptualising abstraction and variation in experimental 
embryology 
Variation is absolutely central to the biological sciences. Variation is particularly 
important in developmental biology – variation in development can cause all 
sorts of problems in making comparisons, and therefore in making experiments 
tractable and meaningful. The inherent variability of the objects of biological 
study such as organisms, populations and species, is qualitatively different to 
those entities and processes studied by physicists or chemists. For example, it 
can be said that while it is in the nature of biological natural kinds (e.g. species) 
that there is variation within the kind (and for new kinds to be produced) this is 
rarer or a less important feature of the sorts of kinds dealt with in the physical 
sciences (such as elements, or fundamental particles).123 The biologist 
therefore has to engage with the problem of managing variation, and of 
explaining it, in a way that the physical scientist does not.   
Variation can exist within and between individuals and groups of individuals. 
There can be variation among the DNA of a population of cells within an 
organism, between two cells of different types, between two cells of the same 
type, between either side of an axis in a single organism, between two 
individuals, between two groups of individuals, between two species, and so on. 
What is being compared, over what time frame, how it is to be measured, and 
                                                          
123
 And any such variation in physical sciences is either highly discrete (i.e. isotopes of elements) or 
highly constrained within certain limits which may not be transgressed. There are exceptions to this 
point, such as the variation in the relationship between absolute magnitude or luminosity of stars, and 
their effective temperatures, as depicted on the Hertzsprung-Russell diagram.  
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for what purpose, is up to the investigator working within various material, 
theoretical and technical constraints. There are, conceivably, unlimited ways in 
which comparisons between two (or more) individuals or groups can reveal 
variation.  
Variation is a concept which links the interests of natural historical (or 
naturalistic) and experimental practices. Both seek to investigate variation, 
particularly the generation of it. Both also seek to abstract away variation as a 
methodological practice. In the case of natural historical work, variation is the 
object of inquiry insofar as the diversity of organisms and their classification is 
the goal.124 Certain practices, particularly those that seek to establish types or 
to represent natural objects, involve the abstraction of the variation that is 
exhibited in nature, albeit an abstraction guided first by an appreciation, 
comprehension and synthesis of the variation discovered or revealed. In the 
case of Wilson’s Amphioxus work, the fact that variation needed to be explained 
was the trigger for experimental manipulation. Generally in experimental 
practice, the generation of variation is understood to arise from a plethora of 
known and unknown factors. To make an experiment tractable, and its results 
meaningful, the variety of variation therefore needs to be reduced. The 
experimenter must control variation that is not an experimental variable, first by 
recognising it, then by reducing it as much as possible. This is where the 
establishment of a ‘normal development’ enters experimental embryology, as a 
typological practice, “a strategy for managing complexity and variation via a 
practice of categorization that proceeds not by applying definitional criteria but 
rather by comparison to some reference standard” (DiTeresi, 2010: 29). This 
perspective on typological approaches in biology takes inspiration from a 
reassessment of typological thinking and practice. Typological thinking was 
characterised – and rejected – by Ernst Mayr (1959) as tacitly invoking 
essentialism and metaphysically opposing the population thinking that was at 
the heart of post-Modern Synthesis biology. Recent work, however, has 
decoupled typological thinking from essentialism and demonstrated its potential 
compatibility with population thinking (Lewens, 2009). Additionally, the 
                                                          
124
 The variation studied and worked with will of course be at a level relevant to the particular goal. So in 
many cases this will be at the level of species or variety, and variation below that level is then 
discounted. 
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epistemological role of typological thinking has been distinguished from 
metaphysical claims, inviting us to instead direct focus onto how typological 
practices (such as abstraction, approximation, and generalisation) are used 
tactically by scientists in the specific investigative contexts they operate in 
(Love, 2009). This is the approach taken in this chapter. 
Central to this view of normal development is its role in an experimental system. 
This is a different focus to that of many biologists, who see normal development 
not as something to be produced, but something given. While they may 
acknowledge that certain conditions may need to be provided in a laboratory to 
enable normal development to be manifested, this simply allows it to be 
expressed, not to be actively created. We saw in Wilson’s 1896 definition the 
importance of reproducing “normal conditions” to allow normal development to 
be manifested (Wilson, 1896: 326).125 However, as we saw in chapter 4, to 
establish normal development is not quite as straightforward as simply allowing 
development to unfold unmolested by human intervention in ‘normal conditions’. 
It takes active work by a scientist to construct the conditions to allow this to 
happen, and then abstract the observed results into a normal development 
which serves as a control or standard. Wilson was forced to use normal 
outcome to help establish quite what was normal in the first place.  
Additionally, the term ‘normal’ encompasses a multitude of incompatible or 
overlapping concepts. Is ‘normal development’ a specific course of 
development, or a particular range of courses of development? How sensitive is 
this notion of normal to variation? How is it established? To explore this, some 
distinctions will have to be made between different types of normal, how they 
are established, and how they relate to other key concepts underpinning 
experimental embryology.  
6.3.1. Three types of ‘normal’ 
The different ways in which development can be normal are different ways in 
which scientists and particular scientific communities treat and conceptualise 
                                                          
125
 It is worth comparing this with Slack’s definition of normal development, which I cited in the 
Introduction to the thesis. Slack defined normal development as “the course of development which a 
typical embryo follows when it is free from experimental disturbance”. Quite what is meant by “typical” 
in Slack’s definition is not stated. 
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variation. I add as a caveat that this section should not be read as an 
endorsement or rejection of any one way of conceiving the normality of 
development or of organisms in general, even if some are exemplified by and 
associated with (by me, and in the literature) ideas and practices rejected by 
most modern biologists and philosophers. The approach I take in this section 
steers away from normative comment, but it underpins my normative thrust in 
the following chapters.  
Three different ways of conceiving of and producing normal development have 
been identified (I base my account on Christopher DiTeresi’s version of them, 
2010: 16-17). I label these three different types of normal a ‘taxonomy of 
norms’: 
1. Essentialist/Natural State, that only a type or ‘essence’ has reality, and 
that variation is merely contingent or accidental;  
2. Average/statistical, that the normal is the most common form;  
3. Standard, that the normal is constructed by a given scientific 
community, in a non-arbitrary manner, but guided by particular scientific 
purposes. 
The essentialist version of normal is most closely identified with the Natural 
State Model employed initially by Aristotle and described by Elliott Sober 
(1980).  The essentialist normal views apparent variation as masking an 
underlying reality, and therefore variation can either be ignored as an 
obstruction to the true nature of the biological entity of interest, or as an 
indication that interfering factors are present. In the case of a process, there is a 
“natural tendency” which proceeds towards the attainment of the “natural state” 
of a particular object, and which, in itself, does not require explanation (Sober, 
1980: 360). Departure (or ‘deviation’) from that course, however, does require 
explanation, in the form of “interfering forces” (ibid.).126 What interpretations of 
                                                          
126
 For Aristotle, the natural state need not be the most prevalent. In fact, in a very strict sense, it may 
not actually be present at all. Additionally, there may be some kinds which are by their very nature 
products of a divergence from a natural state, the result of events during development steering the 
organism away from its proper course. The mole is one such example, with its sightless eyes (Ransome 
Johnson, 2005: 173). James Lennox suggests “that Aristotle viewed an animal kind as ‘deformed’ relative 
to some wider class in which it belongs—the limbs of the seal or the subcutaneous eyes of the mole of 
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development are in accordance with this approach? Teleological ones, 
certainly. If there is a definite goal towards which the organism must strive, it 
can succeed or fail. Normal development is the organism more or less 
succeeding, abnormal development, more or less failing to achieve its goal or 
purpose. The source of this telos may be form imparted to the embryo from its 
male parent, a striving to participate in the perfection of transcendental forms, 
expression of a ‘genetic blueprint’ crafted by natural selection, or the existence 
of a tiny proportion of possible developmental routes to a tiny proportion of 
possible endpoints in some huge multidimensional developmental morphospace 
(an idea historically associated with idealistic morphology, today with varieties 
of structuralism). Note that these different manifestations of an essentialist 
normal type of development straddle the boundaries between very different 
conceptualisations of life – functional versus formal, historical versus logical. 
What they have in common is the idea that there is a narrow range of variation 
which can be deemed acceptably normal. This legitimates, and is in turn 
informed by, practices which reduce the variation of potential controls, 
standards, comparators, or models produced for experimental work.  
The essentialist normal, reflecting the Natural State Model (Sober, 1980), posits 
a single end-point and trajectory towards that end-point. The explanatory task 
set by this norm is to identify what factors cause deviation from this end-point 
and trajectory. One advantage of the essentialist normal is that it reflects 
(probably because it helped to shape) our intuitions concerning development. It 
is therefore less demanding of the user. It is less transparent, however, and the 
basis for its formulation is also implicit and therefore lacks verifiability and 
accountability. It does not sit well with modern notions of objectivity, which 
requires something beyond the judgement of individuals or collections of 
individuals; it requires measurement and analysis to produce norms. The 
essentialist normal, however, can be conditioned and improved by experience 
and expertise. In this sense it can be understood using dual-process theories of 
cognitive processes. There are at least fourteen varieties of these theories, but 
they all posit the existence of two main systems of cognitive processing (Evans, 
2008). Following Jonathan Evans and Daniel Kahneman (2011) I will use the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
deformed relative to the class of four-footed, live-bearing animals” [italics in original] (Lennox, 2001: 
229). 
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labels ‘System 1’ and ‘System 2’ for them. System 1 cognitive processes are 
automatic, unconscious and relatively effortless. System 2 cognitive processes, 
on the other hand, involve effortful and conscious mental work. System 1 
produces quick judgements based on heuristics, including noticing deviations 
from the normal. It is shaped by the conscious experience imparted onto it by 
System 2 cognitive processes (Evans, 2008; Kahneman, 2011). An example of 
this might be the shaping of expectations as to how embryonic development 
proceeds (to enable biologists to make quick judgements as to the normality of 
embryos, or perhaps the stage of development they are at) after much careful 
observation and recording of the structure of many embryos. A normal 
development produced in this way is difficult to transmit (and justify), but 
understanding it in this way means that when it has been produced and used by 
embryologists who have worked with and gained an appreciation of the 
embryonic development of a particular organism, it cannot be completely 
dismissed.  
The statistical notion is simply that what is regarded as normal is the most 
prevalent manifestation (or range of manifestations) of the entity or process of 
interest, within a larger set of varying entities or processes. Note here that there 
may be more than one normal under this definition. This is not necessarily a 
more ‘objective’ measurement, as what is chosen as the parameter, and how 
entities and processes are demarcated into groups (particularly if the variation 
between forms and processes are continuous rather than discontinuous), is a 
practice requiring some judgment on the part of the investigator or investigators. 
The statistical normal is relative to a certain context, and in this sense is open to 
influence from the essentialist normal. The essentialist normal conditions 
decisions concerning where and when to divide up a range of cases, plays a 
role in circumstances in which the most common examples are not in fact 
‘normal’ and helps to determine which contextual (environmental) conditions are 
appropriate. It might therefore be expected that given the proper (‘normal’) 
contextual conditions, the essentialist normal will find itself the most prevalent 
form. The context-relativity of the statistical normal also opens it to influence 
from wider culture and society. For example, when hospital laboratories were 
formulating “normal values” for physiological parameters in the United States in 
1920s and 1930s, they predominantly (and disproportionately) used data 
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acquired from healthy white volunteers (Crenner, 2014).  John Dupré has 
observed that “[i]t makes no sense to ask whether something is normal or 
abnormal without specifying what kind of thing of which it is supposed to be a 
normal or an abnormal instance.” As a result, “[t]axonomy must always precede 
judgments of normality and deviance. Conversely, to understand a judgment of 
normality correctly we must appreciate what taxonomic category is being 
applied to the subject of the judgement” (Dupré, 1998: 224-225). Whether an 
attribution of normality in a given circumstance is appropriate therefore depends 
on the identification and classification of kinds, and identification of the proper 
kind to which the target belongs, against which it will be assessed. What is a 
normal value or property of one kind of human, or one kind of organism, might 
not be so for another kind. For example, in Christopher Boorse’s influential 
naturalist biostatistical approach to defining health, in which “health is normal 
functioning, where the normality is statistical and the functions biological”, more 
than one standard for determining the normal is possible. This is because the 
judgement of investigators determines what parameter or parameters set the 
standard, and also how entities and processes are demarcated into groups 
(Boorse, 1977; Kingma, 2007).  
Health and medicine are the areas where debate over the definition and use of 
the term normal has been most contested in the philosophical literature. They 
were also original sources of the term normal, although Ian Hacking has also 
identified “nonmedical routes to the normal” which centre on the growing 
importance of standardisation in an industrialising world (Hacking, 1990: 164-
165). The search for human nature was replaced by the search for the normal 
human, and statistics was designed to facilitate that. The tension between the 
normal as a statistical measure (an average, a normal distribution) and the 
normal as a standard derives from the dawn of the normal (Hacking, 1990: 
168). That tension can play out in the statistical normal becoming the standard 
normal (as in health and disease; Boorse, 1977), or the standard becoming 
decoupled from the statistical, as is seen in the case of many model organisms.  
An advantage of the statistical normal is its apparent objectivity and neutrality. 
This is also one of the disadvantages, as this objectivity and neutrality is in fact 
coloured by judgements which may employ aspects of the reasoning associated 
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with the essentialist normal. If, on the other hand, a ‘purer’, more objective 
statistical normal were to be produced, it is difficult to see how it would be useful 
in scientific investigation, as it would include as part of the control or reference 
group an extremely wide range of variation (possibly continuous), which may 
include examples that are transparently abnormal.  
The entanglement between the essentialist and statistical normals requires 
some comment. Canguilhem began his analysis by recognising that "[t]he 
ambiguity of the term normal has often been noted. Sometimes it designates a 
fact that can be described through statistical sampling; it refers to the mean of 
measurements made of a trait displayed by a species and to the plurality of 
individuals displaying this trait-either in accordance with the mean or with 
certain divergences considered insignificant. And yet it also sometimes 
designates an ideal, a positive principle of evaluation, in the sense of a 
prototype or a perfect form. The fact that these two meanings are always linked, 
so that the term normal is always unclear, comes out even in the advice we are 
given to help us avoid this ambiguity” (Canguilhem, [1965] 2008: 122). The 
normal organism is one which has the capacity to shape its milieu, to make it 
normal for itself, but the milieu itself must be somewhat normal in the first place 
to enable the organism to possess exhibit this capacity. Consequently, we are 
not able to determine whether an organism or its milieu are normal by 
considering them separately. Building on this observation that it is the relation 
between an organism and its milieu that allows us to make judgements 
concerning whether either is normal, Canguilhem argued that it is something 
other than a statistical sense of normal that allows us to identify whether 
anomalies – new variants, for example – are normal or abnormal. On the 
statistical measure, they are surely abnormal, yet the biologist or medical 
doctor’s evaluation may deem it to be archetypally or prototypically normal. The 
archetypal normal may be based on a form of essentialist normal, though this 
need not necessarily be the case, as I will show when discussing how Wilson’s 
normal development fits into the taxonomy. In the prototypical normal, as with 
the archetypal normal, “the normal must be called an instituter of the norm, or 
normative” (Canguilhem, [1965] 2008: 127). The archetypal normal was said to 
“underlie” the prototypical normal. Canguilhem did not specify precisely what 
this meant. If, however, we consider a prototype to be something like a standard 
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generated by scientists or medics, it need not be determined by an archetypal 
normal, but perhaps must not become too distant from it. It is to the standard 
version of normal that I now turn.  
The standard normal is defined as a shared (community) research norm, based 
on an internalisation of normal development by researchers, as a result of their 
training, exposure to laboratory handbooks, and their own experience.127 
Internalisation has been defined as “the internal reconstruction of an external 
operation” (Vygotsky, 1978: 55). It is the process by which the explicit becomes 
implicit, or tacit. Drawing on an earlier example, it is the process by which 
System 2 cognitive processes shape System 1 processes. I gave the example 
of the effects of System 2 concentration on observing and recording embryos, 
but one might equally stress the role of education and training, for example 
through learning how to use normal series, identifying normal stages for 
particular organisms, and practices related to the standardisation of organisms, 
abstraction of variation and use of standards. One consequence of this 
internalisation is the evidence in modern biology of variation being 
“systematically” ignored in highly standardised model organisms (Carlson Jones 
and German, 2005: 83). It seems likely that the ‘systematic’ nature of the 
ignoring of real variation has its roots in the internalisation of community norms 
through training and materials such as handbooks, which abstract away natural 
variation to make the contents tractable and helpful for laboratory use. 
For the standard normal, rather than employing a natural state, embryologists 
can use a “reference state”, against which the effects (deviations from the 
reference state) of experimental manipulations can be measured (DiTeresi, 
2010: 16). Given the need for a standard against which the effects of 
experimental manipulations can be compared and the difference measured, it is 
clear that the advent of normal development as a standard was made 
                                                          
127
 Sabina Leonelli has identified the precise kinds of knowledge and skills that a scientific education and 
training is intended to introduce and develop in an individual. Both theoretical knowledge and 
embodied knowledge are required for “integrated understanding” (Leonelli, 2009: 205). Theoretical 
knowledge is access to “the articulated content of knowledge” such as “facts, theories, explanations, 
and concepts concerning phenomena that are available independently of specific procedures or ways of 
acting.” Embodied knowledge, on the other hand, “is the awareness of how to act and reason as 
required to pursue scientific research” (Leonelli, 2009: 196). As well as these two kinds of knowledge, 
there are also three kinds of epistemic skills that are vital for scientists to acquire: theoretical, 
performative and social (Leonelli, 2009: 201).  
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necessary by the introduction of experimental practices into embryology. 
DiTeresi goes further to say that it was the search for mechanistic accounts of 
development that led to the use of normal development as a standard (2010: 
17-18, 66). However, as in this period American biologists used experiments 
creatively to ‘generate working hypotheses’ (something I believe that Wilson 
did, including with Amphioxus), it was not necessarily the search for 
mechanistic accounts of development that provoked the adoption of 
experimental methods and therefore the eventual adoption of normal 
development as a standard (Maienschein, 1991b: 420-423). 
The reference standard normal solves many of the problems of the essentialist 
normal and the statistical normal. It transcends the tacit subjective judgement of 
individual scientists by being an explicit, well-defined community standard. It is 
produced in a form which can be transmitted, and can be accompanied by 
research materials including model organisms. It aids comparability between 
laboratories, and allows standardisation of training. Consequently, it permits 
scientists to move from one laboratory to another with greater ease. Finally, it 
allows the staging of samples and experimental work to proceed more smoothly 
and with less preparatory work, orientation and familiarisation with the material. 
The wheel does not have to be reinvented each time a new set of experiments 
begin. However, the reference standard, as we have seen, does have 
problems. In one sense, these problems are related to the narrowing of the 
range of organisms used, in another the amount of variation abstracted away to 
produce the standards – the series of stages deemed normal – in the first place. 
Once in place, the standards are difficult to reform or shift. In part this is 
because of their entrenchment in infrastructures of education, training, and 
material and technical resources. Crucially, they also shape what is regarded as 
normal in the first place, and the amount of variation deemed to be permissible 
within the range of the normal.  
In experimental embryology (and experimental biology as a whole), attributions 
of normality are tied to the need in experimental designs to use a control 
against which the effects of the experimental intervention can be measured. 
Normal development is such a control. We saw in previous chapters how the 
notion of an experiment incorporating a control group was (allied to an analysis 
 
213 
 
of the living system into causally-relevant parts) introduced into embryological 
work by Wilhelm Roux. He was himself inspired to do this because of the 
method’s use in physiology. Such methodology characterises much 
experimental practice today. However, the near-ubiquity of the usage of controls 
in experimental work in embryology and developmental biology does not imply a 
constancy of form and function of controls in all experimental set-ups. The 
linkage between controls and norms suggests that, if norms differ, then so do 
the controls. One way of ascertaining how (and giving an indication as to why) 
controls differ between particular experimental set-ups, is to ask the following 
questions: What is the control, how (when, where, and by whom) is it produced 
and enters into the experimental set-up, what role does the control have in the 
experiment, and how is the potential difference between treatment samples and 
control samples discerned?  
I provide the following examples of controls, by way of answering those 
questions.128 Once again, the focus is just as much on the process of 
production, as on the product. The first and second examples revisit Driesch’s 
use of normal tables in his sea urchin experiments and Roux’s use of controls in 
his experiments with Rana esculenta.   The third example considers ‘modern 
experimental embryology’ as examined by DiTeresi. Each of these results in 
very different controls, with different roles, processes of generation, and 
relations to the experimental set-up and situation. In the case of Driesch’s 
experiment, the control was the normal tables produced by Selenka. They were 
stripped of any indication of intraspecific variation at any particular stage of 
development, and were external to the experimental set-up itself. Roux’s 
controls, on the other hand, were part of the overall experimental set-up, and he 
was able to compare in a qualitative way the difference between what he 
observed in the control group, and the group of organisms which underwent his 
experimental intervention. However, Roux’s control was not the same as his 
normal development, which seemed to exist as a norm external to the 
experimental set-up itself. In modern experimental work, the control exists not 
just in the control group, but also forms part of the treatment group as well, 
insofar as some form of standardised organism is used. The standardised 
                                                          
128
 I do not include here the control of conditions, though this will be examined in the following chapter. 
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organism, bred to minimise variation within strains or varieties (to minimise the 
variation of possibly causally-relevant factors), functions as a control in making 
sure that all factors are as far as possible kept the same, with the exception of 
the factor to be varied in the course of the experiment. Here, the controls are 
produced predominantly outside of the experimental set-up itself. The part that 
is in the experimental set-up (the established control group) is usually compared 
to the treatment group by averaging the values for particular relevant 
parameters and comparing these to the average of the values for those 
parameters in the treatment group.129 
Examining the role of the creation of controls in experimental set-ups thus 
reveals not only the connections (but not 1:1 mapping) between the 
establishment of norms and controls, but also that the taxonomy of norms in 
which I have described the different ways in which normality can be discerned 
and attributed in biological practice is an analytic taxonomy. They are purified 
ideal types of ways in which normality can be established in and between 
organisms. In practice, there may be a mixing of different norm-establishment 
practices, at different points of the experimental process, or if only one type can 
be identified, instantiated in an ‘impure’ way. Later I revisit Wilson’s experiment 
with Amphioxus with these thoughts in mind.  
6.3.2. Abstraction 
Entailed by the practice of ‘managing variation’, all of these versions of ‘normal’ 
require, to a greater or lesser extent, processes of abstraction. As detailed in 
chapter 2, abstraction has been identified as a simplification which takes the 
form of an omission (Jones, 2005: 175), or a subtraction (Cartwright, 1989: 
187), but not a misrepresentation (Jones, 2005: 175), which is instead 
characteristic of idealisations (ibid.).  
Here, rather than worrying about whether such simplification constitutes a 
misrepresentation or not, I analyse abstraction as an ‘epistemic activity’ which 
                                                          
129
 Sometimes, however, control experiments set up within the framework of a wider set of experiments 
(with the aim of discounting the possibility that certain varying factors confound attempts to clearly 
discern the role that a particular factor of central interest plays), may involve a qualitative judgement of 
the significance of the difference in output values of particular parameters between control and 
treatment (Weber, 2005: 126). 
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“emphasises the actions, choices, displacements, conceptual and physical 
transformations involved in the creation and use of biological models” (Leonelli, 
2008: 527).  
Leonelli defines the process of abstraction as “the activity of selecting some 
features of a phenomenon P, as performed by an individual scientist within a 
specific context, in order to produce a model of (an aspect of) P” [italics in 
original] (Leonelli, 2008: 521). Crucially, there are many different ways of doing 
this, with different end products. Two examples of processes of abstraction are 
“intellectual” and “material” abstracting (Leonelli, 2008: 521-523). The former is 
a theory-guided process of abstraction “requiring no physical interaction with the 
phenomenal properties to be abstracted” which is “geared towards explanation” 
and aims “to uncover ways in which a model can be representative for a given 
theory” (Leonelli, 2008: 521). The latter is a theory-informed (but not guided) 
process of abstraction “performed by physical interaction between the 
researchers and the phenomenon to be modelled”, to produce something that is 
“taken to be representative of a set of phenomena” (Leonelli, 2008: 523).  
There are other ways of conceiving abstraction. Hans Radder has identified 
three ways of abstracting: of leaving out, setting apart and summarising. In the 
first way, “abstraction means that we leave out from the conceptual 
interpretation of the original process everything but the result” (Radder, 2006: 
109). In the second way, the “result of an observational process is set apart, or 
separated, from the original process” (ibid.). The third way is manifested “by 
leaving out the particularities or idiosyncrasies and by mentally setting apart 
what is relevant and common, we abstract a general concept from its individual, 
spatiotemporal instantiations” (Radder, 2006: 110). Radder, while accepting the 
importance of the first and second ways, rejects the third way as an explanation 
of concept formation, as he had previously argued that “[t]he observation of 
particular situations is always conceptually interpreted right from the start” and 
so abstraction could not adequately be interpreted “as a kind of inferential 
procedure from directly given, uninterpreted particulars to their conceptual, 
general representations” (ibid.).  
At different stages of scientific investigation, different abstractions may be 
performed and produced. Such abstractions will take the different forms so far 
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discussed, but also differ in their performers, producers, and users. The 
examples described by Leonelli (2008) and DiTeresi (2010) deal with what I 
shall refer to as ‘community abstractions’, which help to produce a norm and/or 
control, and which equip scientists with the particular means and heuristics with 
which to relate the treatment group in an experimental set-up to the control. It is 
a group of scientists or technicians (on a one-off or ongoing basis) who perform 
and produce the abstractions for internalisation, adaptation, and use by 
individual scientists. A distinction may be drawn between such ‘community 
abstractions’ and an ‘individual abstraction’ where the performer, producer, 
internaliser, adapter and user are one and the same individual scientist. The 
goals of such an individual abstraction may differ from those of a community 
abstraction, the latter of which is intended to be used as a community resource 
and must possess certain characteristics, such as being able to be scaled up or 
transmitted in some appropriate form or format. Indeed, the process of 
individualised abstraction may lead to a shifting of goals as a result of, and in 
response to, the process of abstraction itself.  
Standardisation is a key process of abstraction in modern biology, particularly 
when model organism systems are used in research. Standardisation, however, 
is not synonymous with abstraction, but is merely one way of (or motive for) 
abstracting. The products of abstraction may be genetically homogeneous lines 
of mice, ecotypes of Arabidopsis thaliana, verbal descriptions in a monograph, 
diagrams of stages of embryonic development in a handbook, or the concept 
that there are stages of embryonic development. The particular ways in which 
abstractions are carried out by a scientist, and then used in their work, may 
differ. But what they all have in common is that they are ways for the biologist to 
take account of the variation inherent in their objects and processes of interest, 
while omitting or simplifying some of that variation in the production of a 
particular abstraction.  
If we see the managing of variation as abstraction, we can therefore begin to 
see that the different processes of abstraction that may be employed by 
biologists correspond to the production of different norms; different normal 
developments, doing different work. Different kinds of epistemic processes or 
activities will produce different norms.  
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As suggested at the end of the fourth chapter, heuristics play a role in these 
processes of abstraction. Variation, as manifested by organisms, has to 
undergo abstractions to be transformed into a form which allows it to be 
conceived, represented, measured and compared in a manageable way. 
Heuristics are a ‘low cost’ (in terms of cognitive and other kinds of resources) 
way of doing this. Processes of abstraction affect how variation is represented 
and used in experimental situations. Three key ways in which it can do this are 
in terms of range, type and structure. The range of variation for any particular 
parameter is the total range of values which can be assigned to the members of 
a set depending on the parameter. The range of variation may be the heights of 
organisms, the numbers of bristles on a particular limb or appendage, or the 
networks of genes involved in a particular developmental process that is 
exhibited in many different species. The type of variation is what has been 
identified as the object or objects that may vary. For height it would be the 
whole organism, for number of bristles it is the limbs, for the developmental 
process it is the set of genes involved in it. Structure is the way in which the 
values are distributed, for instance, in terms of abundance and association with 
other values in the range. For height, the structure would probably be a 
continuous, normally-distributed bell-curve. For the bristles it would be discrete 
integers, but these may not be normally distributed, as there may be some 
developmental reason why there may only be a few bristles on the limbs of 
some species, multitudes on the limbs of other species, but no real range of 
intermediate values. For the genes, there may be several core genes which do 
not vary in their presence or role, there may be several that have specific and 
unique roles in only one species, then there may be a distribution of different 
types of other genes, which may be more or less prevalent across many or few 
species, and have constant or varying roles.  
There is no a priori way in which we might identify the nature of the structure of 
variation just by knowing that variation is exhibited. Identifying and measuring 
biodiversity, by way of contrast, requires that the variation of the natural world 
be already partitioned into different (nested) types – species, genera, families, 
and so forth – which can then be measured in their relative abundance. 
Variation in nature is structured, but it is structured in an indeterminate number 
of ways. It is up to the scientist’s abstractive work to bring out a particular way in 
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which the variation of biological objects of interest are structured, and also to 
impose some structure on it. These two aspects are not antagonistic or 
contradictory. In fact the imposing of structure will often work with the structure 
brought out – lines will be sharpened, fuzzy groupings made less fuzzy and 
more concentrated, boundaries and limits drawn. In this way, the process of 
establishing types from variation is advanced, and the normal is distinguished 
from the non-normal.  With all these ways in which variation can be abstracted 
different approaches may co-exist and help constitute the observed, measured, 
represented and compared variation.  
Presented like that, the processes of abstraction of variation that are needed to 
bring the ‘natural’ into an experimental situation, and to compare two sets of 
variation in that situation, seem very complex. And they are. Yet, when they 
actually take place, they do not (and cannot, if any experimental work is to be 
done at all) approach the level of complexity one might think is involved. This is 
where heuristics come in. Heuristics are ways of dealing with complexity – to 
transform a difficult and expensive (in terms of time, energy, and resources) 
problem into an easier one. As indicated previously, they do not do this by 
providing an algorithm for transforming the raw variation into usable variation, 
but rather with a rougher ‘rule of thumb’ that can allow for quicker 
selection/exclusion and organisation/representation. Irrelevant variation (for the 
particular purposes of the scientist – though here the possibility of excluding 
inconvenient variation arises) can be excluded. The variation which remains can 
be structured (falling in particular clumps, or in a continuous distribution, with 
one or a few peaks) and then represented in accordance with that structure, to 
enable it to be measured and provide a basis of comparison. As we have seen, 
the various ways in which that can be done can vary greatly, and can therefore 
produce different models of variation with different ranges and structure.  
Debate in the psychological literature on heuristics tends to focus on heuristics 
used generally by humans – the availability heuristic or the effects of anchoring, 
for example. There is disagreement on the value of heuristics for reasoning. 
Some psychologists (e.g. Kahneman et al, 1982) believe that the mind needs to 
be trained to override heuristics, which are regularly irrational in their products, 
albeit useful for reasons of minimising cognitive effort which might be directed 
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elsewhere. Other psychologists (e.g. Gigerenzer and Brighton, 2009) argue that 
heuristics often provide a more accurate result than the more time and energy-
consuming processes of taking all data points into consideration, which 
presents the possible problem of ‘over-fitting’ the data. Intuition tells 
experienced users of such data that certain data points are anomalous and 
should be excluded – not an infallible judgement, but given their expertise, often 
a useful one. Wimsatt’s (2007) focus on heuristics tends more towards 
Kahneman et al’s view that heuristics introduce systematic bias, and provides 
ways in which these biases can be exposed and analysed, to find out the 
precise limits of their usefulness and the ways in which their results may be 
interpreted. Gigerenzer and Brighton’s approach might be fruitful in considering 
heuristics as intuitions that can be trained and their effectiveness improved. 
This approach would be fruitful even if we do not accept that they can be 
improved to exhibit better representational accuracy than more laborious 
approaches.130 Increasing experience and familiarity with certain materials can 
be gained by training and working with those materials over a period of time.  
The extent and nature of that experience will condition how well a heuristic 
works for a particular purpose. A greater availability of observations and 
engagement with particular organisms will provide a larger bank of memories 
and associations with which to make intuitive judgements concerning those 
organisms. This will in turn lead the scientist to be able to make observations 
which other scientists lacking this bank of experience may not be able to 
make.131 The more appropriate deployment of heuristics, and greater availability 
of experience to inform them when deployed, may be the very essence of 
‘trained judgement’ as a representational ideal (Daston and Galison, 2010). 
Training may provide a concentrated form of this development, usually using 
proxy materials such as tables of normal stages, handbooks, demonstrations, 
and so on. If we consider that not only can an individual possess and develop 
                                                          
130
 However, in transforming ‘natural’ variation into a form useful for the practising scientist, 
representational accuracy is not necessarily the only aim. 
131
 A classic example of this is the work of the cytogeneticist Barbara McClintock. Her close engagement 
and observation of the chromosomes of maize enabled her to link her observations of the breakages of 
chromosomes with changes in the colouration of the seeds, to propose the existence and role of 
transposable elements. It took decades for her colleagues to accept this, in part (though not entirely) 
because they simply could not see what she saw, or make the conceptual connections she made (Keller, 
1983).   
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the power of such heuristics, but also a community, we may consider such 
training (and reference) materials, and also objects (such as strains of model 
organisms, methods and techniques, and so forth), as inculcating a kind of 
community heuristic. This reduces the heuristic load on any individual scientist, 
but also locks them (entrenches them, perhaps) to a certain extent into the 
particular heuristics embodied in those materials and practices, and the 
interpretations that most naturally or easily follow from the employment of those 
heuristics.  
6.4. Wilson’s normal development  
One lacuna of Rheinberger’s account, identified by Weber (2005: 149-153), is 
the absence of a discussion of methodological norms in the generation and 
reproduction of experimental systems. Indeed, despite the concepts of normality 
and deviance having a resonance and significance in the biological and 
biomedical sciences not shared with other natural sciences, these are not dealt 
with by Rheinberger in his work on experimental systems. Weber observes that, 
as much as they have a life of their own and generate surprises and questions, 
experimental systems are reproduced by scientists, and are therefore imbued 
with some purpose, direction, or telos. Building on Weber’s insight using the 
discussion of abstraction above, we might add to this that in foregrounding the 
experimental situation and its own dynamics, Rheinberger has left out the 
theoretical background which must either guide or inform the particular 
processes of abstraction at play in any particular experimental set-up. By 
theoretical background I mean nothing more than empirical knowledge and 
expectations relevant to the problem being explored by experimental set-up, as 
well as discipline-specific awareness as to what constitutes relevant and 
important questions, problems, results and interpretations. The theoretical 
background in this sense plays a role, regardless of whether the processes of 
abstraction are external to (and imported into) that experiment or series of 
experiments, or internal to them. The norms (and their theoretical background) 
should therefore play a part in the operation, interpretation and fate of an 
experimental system. I believe the taxonomy of norms provides us with a set of 
methodological-material norms which, in additional to the theoretical 
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backgrounds that scientists bring to experiments, can be integrated with the 
experimental systems approach to form the basis of an analysis of experimental 
practice in developmental biology. In this section, I use this combined approach 
to assess Wilson’s work, its significance, and fate. 
Questions of the relevance of the formation of particular structures at particular 
stages of development for evolutionary questions were touched upon in 
Wilson’s 1893 paper, but were not central. Instead, increasingly central to 
Wilson were the causes of forms and structures. To that end, he was explicit 
about the use of functional criteria to inform his construction of normal 
development. He cited the ability to develop to later stages as a criterion for 
developing ‘normally’, though some degree of structural correlation to functional 
later stages of development was relevant. Despite the functional grounding, in 
his description Wilson ended up generating a new structure-based normal 
development. Due to the differing requirements of the normal development for 
comparative purposes as an arm of an experimental set-up compared to other 
contemporary or modern uses of normal development, the process of 
abstraction required to produce the normal development was different. In the 
process of abstraction, scientists need to make decisions about what is left in 
the final representation of the varied phenomena that present themselves. In 
the case of Wilson in 1892/3, the goal of the experiment demanded a process of 
abstraction that was more sensitive to, and more inclined to include, the 
variation that was exhibited during his observations, compared with an 
abstraction for comparative morphological purposes. Thus we have a 
conception of normal development which includes within it wildly different 
organisations of the early embryo. It was the cause, and significance, of those 
early embryonic forms that was the subject of Wilson’s enquiry. He did not need 
to establish a single canonical form that early stages must take, and there was 
no prior theoretical reason why there must have been such a representation. 
Wilson’s method of producing normal development was to derive the normal 
from observations of many manifestations of forms already labelled ‘normal’. 
The abnormal was then judged to be anything that diverged from the 
expectations established of the normal so constructed. It would seem then that 
 
222 
 
the abnormal was identified using an intuition of the normal, rather than the 
other way round. 
‘Normal development’ was both an input and an output of the Amphioxus work. 
It was an input, because some idea of what constituted ‘normal development’ 
needed to be in place for the experiment to take place at all (for comparative 
purposes). The construction (or, we might say, reconstruction) of ‘normal 
development’ itself, through Wilson’s own processes of selection, exclusion, 
integration and recording, was guided by his own preconceived conception of 
what the ‘normal development’ of Amphioxus consisted of. These expectations 
guided Wilson’s interpretation of the forms he observed, but the different results 
he obtained compared with his predecessors showed that while the output was 
conditioned by the input, it was not fully determined by it. This is therefore an 
example of the third way that abstraction can be performed that Radder 
identified (2006). It evades the objections Radder has to the third way by 
summarising not from “directly given, uninterpreted particulars to their 
conceptual, general representations” but, using Radder’s first and second ways, 
by summarising from particulars interpreted using existing conceptions to 
produce new conceptual representations.  
If we consider normal development as part of an experimental system, we can 
see that the particular form which normal development took for Wilson, that of a 
range of variation encompassing all three cleavage-forms (and their 
intermediates), is an example of something moving from the periphery of focus 
to becoming a key component of an experimental system by functioning as a 
technical condition. In the work preceding the 1893 experiments with 
Amphioxus, the very variation in early embryogenesis which came to constitute 
part of the normal development as produced and used by Wilson was seen as 
‘noise’ causing problems in the embryological work he was conducting. This 
variation in normal development then became the question (or at least one of 
the most important of several questions) that he wanted to answer: what caused 
the different cleavage-forms in early development? The process of the 
development of normal forms therefore became an epistemic object. In the 
process of attempting to engage with this epistemic object, he produced normal 
development in the ways in which I described in chapter 4, and therefore 
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introduced normal development as a technical condition into his nascent 
experimental system.  
The processes that generated the forms which constituted a normal 
development was the epistemic object. The establishment of the normal 
development itself, and the existence of the normal development as a 
comparator against which the effects of the experimental manipulation could be 
compared, served as a technical condition. However, the reciprocal relationship 
between the epistemic object and the technical condition just described (each 
was needed to help constitute the other) meant that in this particular 
experimental system, we might only describe the epistemic object and the 
technical conditions as a proto-epistemic object and a proto-technical condition. 
In conducting the various elements of his experiment, Wilson was able to 
progressively differentiate the proto-technical condition of normal development 
from the epistemic object. In the early stages of the experimental system, the 
technical condition was to a large extent dependent on the presumed contours 
of the epistemic object, what processes and forms constituted a normal 
development. The distinction between them was therefore more diffuse and 
porous, and the epistemic object and technical condition of normal development 
were less differentiated. As a result of Wilson’s elaboration of normal 
development, through his observation of the individual developments of 
Amphioxus specimens, however, the technical condition of normal development 
became more distinct and differentiated, and less dependent, on the presumed 
epistemic object. The technical condition, by the process of the generation of a 
normal development, achieved some measure of independence from the 
epistemic object. It became more like a technical condition in a more mature 
experimental system; it increasingly fulfilled its function of framing the epistemic 
object, and was decreasingly affected in its own form and function by the 
epistemic object. There are thus differences to be drawn between experimental 
systems considered mid-stream (which even Rheinberger’s example does, 
starting at a point where there is already a well-established tradition of 
experimental practice in that field of biochemistry) and those which are 
considered at early stages like Wilson’s. In circumstances where the technical 
conditions themselves need to be generated, we would expect the initial stages 
of the experimental system to show the same sort of relationship between the 
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technical condition and the epistemic object as we have seen for Wilson’s 
Amphioxus experiment.  
We might also observe that in exhibiting variation, biological objects qua 
biological objects and not just as epistemic objects, are inherently vague. The 
process of framing and stabilising them, essential for the progress of 
experimental systems when one considers them as epistemic objects, may in 
fact end up concealing important aspects of their nature and relations rather 
than giving shape to them, when one considers them as biological objects. This 
was less of a problem in Wilson’s work, as variation was taken into account and 
incorporated within the normal development, which was generated as a 
technical condition and integrated into an experimental system configured to 
deal with specific questions which included the significance and causes of 
variation.  Was Wilson’s way of generating normal development fundamentally 
different to other ways? If it was, it would mean that other ways of producing 
and using normal development would not necessarily evade the problem of how 
normal development as a technical condition deals with certain kinds of 
biological objects.  To deal with this, we have to consider Wilson’s normal 
development in the light of the taxonomy of norms outlined earlier. 
Returning to the three types of normal outlined above, one would think that 
Wilson’s normal development would pertain to the third sense of normal, that of 
being a reference standard. In assessing this, we must return to the intimate 
connection between norms and the processes of abstraction which give rise to 
them. The reference standard and Wilson’s normal are both examples of 
material abstraction. They represent phenomena, and are produced “by 
physical interaction between the researchers and the phenomenon to be 
modelled” (Leonelli, 2008: 523). However, there are key differences. Firstly, the 
process of abstraction by which Wilson took his observations of the 
development of many individual specimens of Amphioxus was an individualised 
abstraction for specific, particular purposes. It was an individualised 
internalisation based on short-term experience, rather than a community 
abstraction intended to be a resource for a multitude of known and unknown 
purposes. While there were indeed shared research norms in play, in the sense 
of the proper conduct of scientific investigation in general, Wilson’s normal 
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development was not a community resource produced to be mobilised and 
circulated throughout a scientific community. Furthermore, while he had access 
to and used the accounts of Amphioxus development provided by the likes of 
Hatschek, Wilson did not have handbooks of ‘normal stages’, or other 
community resources such as standardised (model or otherwise) organisms. 
Wilson was the performer, producer, and consumer of the material abstraction 
(and shaper of the heuristics and the experiential material used by them), rather 
than just the consumer.  
The reference standard as a category in the taxonomy is based on an 
examination of the modern era of biology – with model organism systems, 
systematic training of experimental embryologists, and the presence of 
resources such as the normal stages of organisms in handbooks (DiTeresi, 
2010: 65-74). I contend that this norm does not apply to the use of normal 
development at the dawn of experimental embryology. While there were initial 
stage series being produced at the time, they were used in comparative 
embryology and not Wilson’s experimental study (Hopwood, 2007). 
Furthermore, there were neither model organism systems nor community 
organism standards at this time (Logan, 2002). There was a more opportunistic 
approach to the selection and use of organisms based on the problem at hand. 
This is related to the idea of organisms as cases, outlined by Rachel Ankeny 
(Ankeny, 2012). An organism used as a ‘case’ is intensely studied “with the goal 
of eventually elucidating norms or baseline patterns against which newly 
observed yet similar phenomena (e.g., in other species) can be compared” 
(Ankeny, 2012: 646).  
Cases help ‘tame variation’ when the sheer weight of it threatens to make 
meaningful scientific work impractical, as it threatens to in developmental, and 
particularly comparative developmental biology (Ankeny, 2012: 652). While 
Ankeny acknowledges that the selection of an organism as a case can be due 
to the “similarity provided by the organism in question in relation to the process 
or issue under examination” (ibid.), factors such as “historic primacy or 
importance,…experimental tractability, [and] manipulability” are also critical 
(ibid.).  
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We therefore need to rethink the taxonomy of norms categories in the light of 
the differences I have identified. There seem to be two options. One is to keep 
the category of reference standard and add a fourth more appropriate to the era 
I have described. The other is to expand the existing category by watering down 
the definition of a reference standard to include both modern and historical 
contexts. I am inclined towards the former option, providing as it does a clearer 
distinction between the practices of embryology prior, and subsequent to, the 
changes it underwent in the early twentieth-century. This might allow us to see 
how previous practices fed into newer ways of organising embryology and 
conceiving of the process of development, and what was left behind. It might 
also help us to compare the two different eras. Finally on this point, I would like 
to propose a new approach to using the classification of types of ‘normal’. 
DiTeresi presents them as separate and exclusive, but it need not necessarily 
be so. There are multiple ways that the objects of biological study can vary, 
even within one tightly defined experiment. The argument has not been made 
that previous ways of conceiving of and treating variation have become 
obsolete. Often prior ‘styles’ of thinking and practice go out of fashion and fade 
in significance, rather than going extinct (see Hacking, 1992a and Pickstone, 
2000). In one piece of work, two or more different means of treating variation 
may therefore co-exist. There is important future work to be done in 
ascertaining what the effects and significance are of the interactions between 
different types of ‘normal’ within a single piece of scientific research.  
What served as the control in Wilson’s work, and what was its relationship to 
the experimental set-up as a whole? The control was the normal development 
which he established as part of the experimental set-up itself. It was the range 
of variation exhibited in the control which served as the comparator for Wilson’s 
observations of the manipulated samples. Like other controls, as previously 
noted, one of the key reasons why normal development becomes employed in 
experimental embryology is because of its use as a benchmark (I avoid the 
terms reference and/or standard here as I have used them in very particular 
ways in the preceding text), against which the effects of experimental 
manipulations can be measured. From this, the investigator can surmise what 
he or she believes to be the causes of the difference, and infer from this the 
cause(s) of the normal phenomena. Normal development functions by 
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structuring the expectations of the observer. By taking into account the variation 
which is included in the abstraction process, it allows them to then ignore that 
variation when it is exhibited by the various samples at different stages that 
have undergone the experimental intervention. Normal development is therefore 
used as a point (or series of points in a process such as development) against 
which deviations can be determined or measured. The word ‘deviation’, as well 
as carrying some normative load, has roots in the Latin deviare, and has its 
earliest recorded uses in English in the seventeenth-century, when it meant 
“turning aside from a path or track” (OED, [1989] 2015b). If we see the normal 
course of development as a particular path or track, what Wilson did was to 
expand the number of alternative paths open in the early stages of the journey 
of the embryo. He broadened out the ‘point’ to a range of variation deemed to 
be normal. He did not, however, change the notion of a specific destination 
towards which all valid routes must ultimately tend. In fact, by making the end of 
the journey the criterion for discerning which paths or tracks were valid (or 
‘normal’) and which were not, he fixed the end-point of normal development by 
definition. While there was a broadening at one stage of development of what 
was considered to be normal, this was accompanied by a narrowing at the later 
stage.  
How are we to integrate this analysis of the different type of normal exhibited by 
Wilson’s work by considering it both as one norm in the taxonomy of norms, and 
as an experimental system? Precisely in the way suggested by Weber. Normal 
development is a technical condition, and the way in which is it produced, 
reproduced, transmitted, integrated into an experimental set-up and interpreted, 
involves methodological norms arising out of scientific practice itself. These 
methodological norms correspond to the different ways in which the normal can 
be produced and used in experimental embryology, that is, to the taxonomy of 
norms. In this way, the experimental system retains a life of its own, while also 
being guided by the problems prioritised by individual scientists and 
communities of scientists. Wilson’s own Amphioxus experiments demonstrate 
this. They were directed towards (multiple) ends, but ended up resulting in quite 
a different weight attached to the question of the mode of development to the 
weight attached to that question going into the experiment.  
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To assess the significance of this observation for modern developmental 
biology, we must assess the fate of particular concatenations of technical 
conditions associated with normal development, and the role of certain 
methodological norms in its production, as these issues lie at the heart of 
understanding experimental systems in modern developmental biology.  
6.5. Conclusion 
In previous chapters, the relationship between normal development and the role 
of variation in an experiment or series of experiments was touched upon. The 
extent to which variation functions as part of an explanans or explanandum, the 
amount (and types) observed, represented and managed in an experimental 
situation, and the ways in which it is treated, were all considered in the light of 
the work conducted by Edmund Wilson with Amphioxus.  
In this chapter, I have endeavoured to conceptualise further the nature of the 
relationship between the establishment of norms in scientific (more specifically 
biological, and embryological) practice, and the treatment and conceptualisation 
of variation. Integrating parts of the experimental systems approach introduced 
by Rheinberger and the taxonomy of norms I outlined, I have detailed a picture 
of normal development as a technical condition which contains within it a 
methodological-material norm conditioning the treatment of variation. To treat 
variation is to import it from a preceding setting (‘nature’, or from another 
experimental system), to detect and transform it, represent and distribute it by 
particular processes of abstraction, and use it as a control. Different 
methodological-material norms mean different technical conditions.  
For Wilson, I have situated his normal development in a fourth category in the 
taxonomy of norms, his normal development therefore being a technical 
condition of a different kind to those in modern developmental biology in which 
the reference standard norm predominates. Different technical conditions mean 
different experimental systems. The principle of supplementation suggests that 
a new element may not only amend the experimental system, but transform it. 
Different experimental practices involve and require different ways of producing 
normality – normality understood as both a technical condition and a 
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methodological norm forming part of a technical condition. Variation as a central 
characteristic of living things (and between living things) is relevant to any 
experimental system in the biological sciences, and is relevant to the questions 
being asked, the answers sought and the answers (and surprises) given. 
Therefore a control and/or a norm which incorporates certain assumptions 
about variation means that it will affect the way that variation is dealt with in the 
experimental situation; how it is interpreted, conceptualised, and fed into future 
experimental systems. The example of normal development displays why this 
may be the case. As an important technical condition, it incorporates 
considerable theoretical and practical background concerning variation – its 
treatment and conceptualisation – which surely impinges on the experimental 
system as a whole.  
Conversely, the system as a whole affects the parts. If an experimental system 
evolves to generate new questions regarding the nature of variation (for 
example, its causation, function and maintenance), the technical conditions 
incorporating methodological-material norms concerning variation and its 
management in experimental situations must surely come into question. There 
are many reasons why sometimes this is not the case; the dynamism and open-
endedness of experimental systems must be measured against the 
entrenchment of certain experimental programmes. One key reason for this can 
be the reliance on a particular model system which provides resources such as 
specimens, online genomes and ontologies, support and – intellectual and 
material – exchange networks. Other reasons may include institutional and 
funding factors, and the canalisation of scientific focus encouraged by the long 
training into certain ways of doing science for certain purposes. I examine these 
in more detail in the following chapter. There are many reasons why often the 
conservatism engendered by these factors just listed must be exposed and 
resisted – an experimental system is not dynamic and productive just by being 
an experimental system.  
There are many reasons why an experimental system can fail to reproduce or to 
run out of steam. It might do this if the latest manifestations of technical 
conditions, and the methodological-material norms which help to constitute 
them, are no longer appropriate to the investigation of the particular aspect of 
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the epistemic object under investigation. In that case, the system will cease to 
be productive.132 The system will have found itself captured by the technical 
conditions which should only provide a stage.  
To better appreciate this, we might consider how causal relationships are 
elucidated in biology. I have previously introduced the notions of permissive and 
instructive causation. These are related to the concepts of specific and non-
specific causes in development. The former pair of terms (instructive and 
permissive) captures the prevalent belief that in development, only the genome 
(with perhaps also some cytoplasmic factors in the egg, which are often 
ultimately be attributed to the maternal genome) functions as an instructive 
cause of the generation and/or maintenance of particular structures, functions, 
or features of the organism. All other factors, partitioned from the category of 
the genetic into the category of the environmental, are deemed to be merely 
permissive. They are the background conditions that allow these structures and 
functions to develop, but have no directive or creative role in those processes. 
This view, which has been prevalent either implicitly (as background theoretical 
assumption) or explicitly in biology throughout the twentieth-century (Gilbert, 
2003), has come under criticism both within and without the biological sciences 
in the last few decades (Lewontin 2001, Oyama 2000b, Griffiths and Stotz 
2013). However, despite seeming philosophically, theoretically, and even 
empirically robust, many of these challenges have suffered from not seeming to 
be amenable to the advocacy of concrete changes in scientific practice, either 
through the suggestion of a particular experimental programme, or new 
methodological precepts or norms. Too often, the proposal of a new way of 
conceiving development and the relation of causes in a complex four-
dimensional way, while seeming plausible in the abstract, has been viewed by 
many scientists as obscurantist once the problem of operationalising these 
visions becomes manifest. So I believe that a bridge must be built linking the 
conceptual with the practical and concrete. I will do this by linking the central 
role of norms and controls in the processes of abstraction lying at the heart of 
experimental practice to the way in which causal attributions concerning 
                                                          
132
 New forms of epistemic objects in modern biology in particular, including the processes of 
development, and how they relate to variation in terms of its generation, maintenance, and form, are 
linked with increasingly prominent questions which blur the lines between the study of development, of 
heredity, and of evolution. 
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organismal development are made. I do this in the next chapter using 
Woodward’s work on the three ways in which causes in the biological sciences 
are assessed: stability, proportionality, and specificity (Woodward, 2010).  
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Chapter 7 – Normal development, experimental systems and causation 
7.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter I posited normal development as a technical condition 
(incorporating methodological norms) in experimental systems used to 
investigate organismal development. In this chapter I expound some 
consequences of this view. The task will be to establish a link between the 
nature of normal development as a technical condition within experimental 
systems, and more ontological conceptions of normal development and 
variation in development, which arise from and reinforce the methodological 
norm. I shall do so first by developing the Rheinbergerian approach I have 
adapted for my purposes throughout the thesis, by assessing the role 
methodological norms such as normal development have in experimental 
systems, and how such roles change in mutual adaptation to the changes 
occurring elsewhere in an experimental system. I then examine how 
methodological norms might not change in a way that ensures such mutual 
adaptation, due to conservative processes that counteract the dynamic changes 
in experimental systems identified by Rheinberger.   
I then move on to the analysis of causation, by clarifying how technical 
conditions relate to the attribution of causal factors in development. I establish 
important links between the role of normal development in experimental 
systems and the sorts of empirical and theoretical products of such systems. 
This requires a discussion of how biologists assess candidate causal factors in 
the systems they study.  
The ability to successfully identify the causes of phenomena is central to the 
scientific and social worth of the biological sciences. However, the phenomena 
biologists deal with – not least, the complexity of the development of organismal 
form – often means that factors in biological systems are not merely partitioned 
into the categories of cause and non-cause. Instead, different candidate causes 
are considered to have more or less weight. One influential way of assessing 
the extent to which a proposed cause is relatively strong or weak has been 
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proposed by James Woodward (2010), and I provided an account of this in 
chapter 1.  
I use Woodward’s work as a basis for examining the role of normality as a 
technical condition. It is useful partly because of its influence and its use as 
common ground for opposing sides in a debate concerning causal attribution 
(Waters, 2007; Griffiths and Stotz, 2013), but also because I am concerned with 
processes – such as the process of development – and Woodward’s account 
centres on causal processes. By examining Woodward’s analysis of causal 
attribution, I demonstrate the intimate reciprocal relationship between the 
epistemic and the ontological, and suggest how this relationship might be 
transformed in developmental biology by changing the approach to producing, 
distributing and using normal development in comparative and experimental 
studies of development. The three attributes of stability, proportionality and 
specificity are strongly linked to whether some factor is attributed to be 
instructive or permissive. They help constitute explanatory frameworks in which 
the various factors relevant to and concretely involved in development are 
partitioned in terms of the instructive-permissive distinction. How the three 
causal attributes are used is not given, or logically necessary, but structured by 
the way in which norms are produced and integrated into overall experimental 
set-ups. They therefore provide an indication of how this entire theoretical-
material-practical system might be reformed, given changes to any one part of 
the system. This would be an example of a supplementation (Rheinberger, 
1997: 4). My task will not be to dictate the changes to this system from the 
outside. Neither will it be to simply describe what is going on. It is to introduce 
into the discussion a way of conceptualising the relations between theory and 
practice, drawing on the historical case I have outlined and analysed throughout 
this thesis as well as matters arising in modern developmental biology. The aim 
is that this will provide the critics of certain dominant (gene-centric, 
reductionistic, context-blind) ways of conceptualising and investigating 
development with ways in which they can bridge the gap between their abstract 
accounts, and the practical demands of scientists who need to continue 
producing and reproducing productive experimental systems. 
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7.2. Normal development as a technical condition 
In the previous chapter, I outlined the role of normal development within 
experimental systems. Operating as a technical condition, together with others, 
as a methodological norm it helps to provide the stable context within which the 
unstable and uncertain epistemic object can be framed. How does it do this, 
and how does this change over time? The short answer to the first part of the 
question is that it does so by providing a stable, standardised comparator 
against which the outcomes of experimental interventions can be compared and 
measured. In this section I develop this short answer, and in the process detail 
how normal development as a technical condition also primes observation and 
interpretation within the experiment, to guide the shaping of the epistemic object 
before the experimenters, and also guide the process of question-generating in 
and from the experimental system. The short answer to the second part of the 
question is that, in a successful and productive experimental system, change 
occurs by epistemic objects becoming progressively clearer and more 
stabilised, and becoming worked into the technical conditions of succeeding 
manifestations of the system. When the experimental system changes like this 
(new questions being generated, some of these tackled; technical conditions 
and epistemic object in a state of flux) the parts of the system must change to 
maintain a state of mutual adaptation. The function towards which the system 
must be adapted is the ability to appropriately frame the new epistemic object 
(to properly answer the new questions generated by previous iterations of the 
system), to be sufficiently stable to do so, and to keep generating new relevant 
and productive questions. Furthermore, the system must be flexible enough to 
be able to continue to generate surprise. 
7.2.1. Normal development as part of the technical conditions, and 
relationship to epistemic objects 
Experimental systems centre on the relationship of technical conditions, “tools 
to produce answers about epistemic objects” (Green, 2013: 171) and epistemic 
objects, objects of investigation.  In experimental systems, technical conditions 
(the technical assemblage) provide a relatively stable and controllable context 
for the investigation of the epistemic objects. As the epistemic object is by 
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definition “what one does not yet know” (though one knows there may be 
something interesting to know), they are less controllable and therefore less 
stable (Lenoir, 2010: xiv).  In the previous chapter, I argued that in Wilson’s 
1892 Amphioxus experimental system, the boundaries between epistemic 
object and technical conditions (especially the technical condition of normal 
development) were far more blurred and porous than in more mature 
experimental systems. This should not blind us to the reciprocal 
interrelationships between technical conditions and epistemic objects in more 
mature systems, nor to the dynamic process by which the epistemic objects of 
yesterday are sufficiently (though not necessarily completely or even 
adequately) understood and controllable enough to serve as the stabilised 
technical conditions of today.  
I will discuss shortly a key aspect of the relationship between the technical 
assemblage and epistemic objects, the fact that the technical conditions which 
constitute a technical assemblage must operate and mutually adapt to each 
other and to the assemblage as a whole to frame a given epistemic object. Any 
changes to a technical assemblage, such as change to an existing technical 
condition, or the removal or addition of technical conditions, should therefore 
lead to a change in the technical assemblage as a whole, through changes to 
the other existing technical conditions, and the relations been them. We would 
expect the technical conditions (and the technical assemblage as a whole) to 
adapt in response. We might also expect such a response as a result of a 
change in epistemic object.  
Wilson’s production of a normal development from scratch, albeit incorporating 
some knowledge of the embryonic development from Hatschek and other 
predecessors, was provided as an example of what I called a proto-technical 
condition. This is a technical condition in the making, one that serves as a 
technical condition by virtue of its relative stability compared to the epistemic 
object, rather than any absolute stability by a defined standard. Wilson’s normal 
development encompassed a wide range of early embryonic development, was 
functionally defined, but did not succeed in becoming part of other experimental 
systems, even if other embryologists such as Willey and Conklin acknowledged 
the polymorphic cleavage he found.  
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In the mid-twentieth century, the reference standard version of producing and 
using normal development, and the normal stages and standardised model 
organism strains associated with that, became a fundamental part of the 
technical conditions of modern experimental systems in developmental biology. 
Cheryl Logan has observed in her work on standardisation in experimental 
biology in the early-twentieth century, that “as procedures and instruments 
became more standard, the objects they measured had to be just as standard” 
(Logan, 2002: 354). Procedural standards, and standards such as normal 
series, demand standardised organisms which complied with those standards. 
The reference standards were and are external community-wide standards (and 
resources) to which the individual scientist must be initiated and 
accommodated, rather than being a control established by an individual 
scientist or team for the purposes of one or a series of experiments (Ankeny 
and Leonelli, 2011: 317-318). Normal development in its reference standard 
form is therefore able to travel further, and be incorporated into more 
experimental systems, in a way that Wilson’s normal development was not. It 
means results are broadly comparable between laboratories, and this enables 
communication and cross-fertilisation across developmental biology, and also 
between different disciplines and fields incorporated into various model 
organism communities (Ankeny and Leonelli, 2011: 318).133  
7.3. Change in experimental systems – mutual adaptation and 
maladaptation 
Mutual adaptation of the parts (the individual technical conditions) of the 
technical assemblage is required to provide a coherent frame to investigate the 
epistemic object, given that the technical conditions interact and sometimes 
overlap. Like nature, a well-adapted, functioning experimental system does not 
arise purely by chance, nor by design. François Jacob memorably invited us to 
consider that Nature “works like a tinkerer who uses everything at his disposal 
to produce some kind of workable object” or bricolage, without there actually 
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 Though the issues of comparability, reproducibility, and verification are extremely vexed, the 
community does all it can to standardise as many of the variables which could lead to failures in living up 
to those scientific virtues. 
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being a tinkerer, or bricoleur (Jacob, 1977: 1163). To produce the bricolage of 
an experimental system does involve bricoleurs, however, the scientists 
attempting to produce a successful experimental system. This process will 
involve modifying technical conditions, adding new ones, subtracting others, 
and relating them to each other (spatially and temporally) in different ways.  
Hacking envisages an “interplay” of the “elements” of a laboratory science 
(which he divides into fifteen categories of “ideas”, “things”, and “marks”), a 
“mutual adjustment.” If we characterise the laboratory sciences as generating 
successive experimental systems, these elements constitute the technical 
conditions, or parts of them.134 In the process of the operation and progress of 
an experimental system, these “plastic resources” can be reshaped to fit the 
changing requirements of the system, a change in the epistemic object for 
example (terms, but not translation into the language of experimental systems, 
from Hacking, 1992b).  
Andy Pickering also speaks of “plastic resources for practice” [italics in original], 
and he argues “that experimental practice should be understood in terms of the 
deformation and moulding of such resources, with the objective of achieving a 
three-way coherence [involving material procedures, instrumental models and 
phenomenal models] in which facts are sustained.” The process of making an 
experimental system work, to produce a fact, or give shape to an epistemic 
object, is described as “interactive stabilisation”, a term which stresses “the 
interdependence of the three elements of practice, the mutual credibility that 
each element bestows on the others when coherence is achieved.” Coherence 
is the point at which the elements of the experimental system function so as to 
“hang together and reinforce one another”, to allow the system to do its work 
generating data, phenomena, surprises and knowledge. Coherences are hard-
won however: “the end points of struggles against incoherences in experimental 
practice, and are always liable to come apart in future practice.” This is where 
the need to stabilise them originates, to accommodate them to the “resistances 
arising in the material world” [italics in original] which are aspects of nature or 
the material world, which to produce coherence must be discovered, controlled, 
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 Hacking’s elements may form part of a given technical condition, be shared with another technical 
condition, or actually be such a technical condition.  
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eliminated, harnessed, or accounted for. Coherence is no guarantee that the 
elements of the system are indeed right, but only that they fit together in a way 
that engenders confidence in the knowledge produced by the system 
(Pickering, 1989). An apparently productive and successful experimental 
system is no guarantee of the correctness of any of the assumptions built into 
any one aspect of it.   
Like the integrated organism, with parts mutually adapted by a tinkering process 
of evolution, the integrated experimental system, or the technical assemblage, 
is an integrated mutually-adapted whole which, nonetheless, is an open system 
amenable to external influence. It also possesses its own internal – 
developmental, one might say – drivers of change.  
Consequently, when one element of the system changes – the epistemic object 
for instance, or one of the technical conditions – so must the whole change. As 
a result, the parts in turn need to change, needing to be tinkered to frame the 
new epistemic object, to be mutually adjusted to function as a technical 
assemblage as a whole. This is the source of the principle of “supplementation” 
which Rheinberger identified for experimental systems – that adding, 
subtracting, or changing one element would – or at least should – change the 
whole (Rheinberger, 1997: 4). 
Rheinberger acknowledges that, as a result of the process of the continuation, 
bifurcation, and hybridization of experimental systems, “technical objects 
become integrated as stable subroutines into other, still growing experimental 
systems.” But as a consequence, this may generate “a historical burden” 
constraining the future development of experimental systems. However, he 
claims that these historical elements, if they begin to block the progress of 
experimental systems, are usually “completely replaced by subroutines that 
embody the actual stabilized knowledge in a subtler way” (Rheinberger, 1997: 
80-81). 
I wish to question that claim, at least insofar as it applies to aspects of modern 
biological research. Rheinberger’s account, and mine so far, has focused on the 
dynamic aspects of the process of changes in experimental systems. This focus 
is a strength of the experimental systems approach, but I wish to direct attention 
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instead to the potential role of what I term ‘conservative forces’. These 
conservative forces (in contrast to the dynamic ones) may entrench certain 
technical conditions and leave them less able to mutually adapt to changes in 
the experimental system and technical assemblage as a whole. Such 
entrenchments would become a problem if they cause the system to stop 
generating surprises, as the use of an entrenched constellation of technical 
conditions would reduce the capacity of scientists to frame different epistemic 
objects. 
Here I outline some of the conservative forces, with examples relating to normal 
development. These are ‘sunk costs’ and weight of infrastructure, resources, 
training, expertise, standards, and theory.  
As we have seen, normal development is something of a composite technical 
condition. It overlaps with other technical conditions such as model organisms, 
normal stages and the ‘human capital’ of scientific research, the training, 
experience, and skills of scientists and technicians themselves, as well as their 
empirical and theoretical knowledge and commitments. In economic theory, 
‘sunk costs’ – prior investment, for example to produce a piece of infrastructure 
such as a building – should be irrelevant in considering whether, for example, 
for particular purposes, the building should be renovated or torn down and a 
new one built in its place. The only consideration is the money to be spent now 
on that project, and the costs and benefits calculated to be associated with 
either option. In life, however, if not in economic theory, things are not quite so 
simple. The builders and users of the existing building may have very good (if 
intangible) reasons for preferring renovation over demolition, and the desire to 
retain things which took resources and effort to construct and maintain is 
understandable. Decisions are never devoid of context or consequences, and 
are seldom made on the basis of one criterion. For example, for environmental 
reasons, it may be preferred that no new building takes place, and that the old 
buildings should instead be renovated.  
Similarly, in scientific research, sunk costs are not irrelevant. It takes time and 
effort to produce the infrastructure (material, communicative, intellectual and 
human) to produce the technical conditions that form part of experimental 
systems. It would take quite considerable effort and upheaval to abandon such 
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infrastructure, or change it sufficiently to accommodate the need to constantly 
transform technical conditions, in response to changes in the wider 
experimental system. The training of scientists takes many years, and the 
resultant skills and expertise are hard-won. Using them is both satisfying (to the 
individual scientist) and productive (Leonelli, 2009), so they should not be 
abandoned lightly. Tacit and embodied knowledge and skill is not easily learnt, 
nor can it be acquired by everyone exposed to new training.135 Sometimes old 
dogs cannot learn new tricks (at least not very well, or quickly), and not 
everyone may have the talent or commitment to do so, even when young. 
Scientists are not an unlimited resource, funding for training is finite, and the 
skills, experience and knowledge that scientists have is not easily transferable 
or transmittable.  
Whole industries are built around certain pieces of equipment, the production of 
particular strains of mice, or zebrafish, or E. coli. The development of new 
industries for new technical conditions cannot happen overnight. The drive 
towards standardisation had good reasons behind it, and it produced its own 
momentum, which is difficult to shift. Standards take time, effort and resources 
to produce, and to be agreed, accepted and disseminated. It is not clear that 
standards, or the resources and communities associated with them, can be, or 
should be, abandoned for new ones.  Resources and institutions are often 
available and able to maintain and reproduce elements of a technical 
assemblage, but new elements require high initial start-up costs for which 
money, people and time may not be available. In the next section I deal with the 
role of empirical and theoretical entrenchment of technical conditions, and its 
consequences.  
Furthermore, given the difficulty of making an experiment work – selecting the 
sort of epistemic object, and producing and maintaining the sort of technical 
assemblage which is productive – there is a push toward stabilisation of the 
system. As Hacking observes, speaking about the “elements” of an 
experimental set-up in laboratory science, all of them “and more can be 
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 Burian (1993: 360) notes, along with Clause (1993) and Kohler (1994), the extent of the investment 
required to establish new organisms for research (particularly to produce a standard which is fit for 
experimental work in a number of different contexts), and also the accumulation of empirical 
knowledge, protocols and experience required to interpret results from these standardised systems. 
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modified, but when each one is adjusted with the others so that our data, our 
machines, and our thoughts cohere, interfering with any one throws all the 
others out of whack.” It is for this reason that fields “mature”, and stabilise. This 
occurs when “A collection of kinds of instruments evolves – an instrumentarium 
– hand in hand with theories that interpret the data that they produce.” A 
consequence of this is that “data uninterpretable by theories are not generated” 
and consequently, “[t]here is no drive for revision of the theory [or, indeed, the 
associated instrumentarium] because it has acquired a stable data domain” 
(Hacking, 1992b: 55). One need not accept this in full to realise that stability (or 
obstruction, or ossification) of an experimental system, or at least its technical 
assemblage, may occur due to the limiting of the type of data produced by a 
given assemblage. Similarly, this stability may limit the type of data thought 
relevant to forming the establishment of new epistemic objects, the stabilisation 
of old epistemic objects, and the reproduction of technical assemblages 
(Donaghy, 2014, makes a similar point concerning the use of data in building 
mathematical models of metabolic systems).  
There are therefore plenty of good reasons why technical conditions may 
endure, and these reasons may confound their easy replacement or 
modification as part of the normal dynamics of the progress of experimental 
systems. The questions this poses are: Does this potential entrenchment 
matter? Might established technical conditions find themselves out of sync with 
the rest of the experimental system? Might they become out of sync with new 
epistemic objects, other technical conditions, certain theoretical backgrounds?  
Also, does this entrenchment occur, what forms does it take, and do we have 
good reason to counteract such powerful conservative forces and also advocate 
the forcible alteration of a technical condition, such as normal development? If 
the dynamic processes associated with experimental systems fail, then surely 
intervention from outside (to unblock the process of the replacement of 
subroutines) is necessary. This is an example of how the articulation of the 
experimental systems approach might lead to the generation of some means for 
scientists to assess the dynamics and progress of experimental systems, with a 
view to identifying potential entrenchments and problems, to enable them to 
selectively and purposefully intervene to reform the assemblage. 
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The engineering-evolutionary epistemology of William Wimsatt can guide us 
here.  He has identified “generative entrenchment” as a key feature of evolving 
systems, and proposes that “[a] deeply entrenched feature of a structure is one 
that has many things depending on it because it has played a role in generating 
them” (Wimsatt, 2007: 133-134). Furthermore, different parts of a structure – or 
system – can be differentially entrenched. I have spoken of the evolution and 
progress of experimental systems throughout this chapter, but have so far not 
proposed that experimental systems undergo some form of selection process, 
or can be considered to evolve or adapt to forces outside of it.  
My talk of adaptation thus far has been more that of a Cuvierian correlation of 
parts than a Darwinian adaptation to external conditions. In my account it has 
been the correlation, not adaptation, to external conditions that is important. 
However, this does not discount the possibility (indeed the probability) that 
much sense can be made of the progress (not necessarily in terms of 
improvement, but in terms of continuation with change) of experimental systems 
in this evolutionary sense of selection acting on systems with differential 
adaptation, robustness, stability and fecundity. The ‘environment’ would be the 
scientific community, which selects particular experimental systems, or 
succeeding experimental systems. One way it selects is by opting for those 
which seem to answer questions deemed relevant and important by sufficient 
numbers, although not all parts of the community have an equal role in this, the 
disbursers of funds and appointments being key actors. There are other 
features which may make an experimental system more amenable to being 
‘selected’. One would be the greater capacity to generate surprises (a dynamic 
rather than conservative force). Another would be that it not require significant 
additional resources to continue, or to have an overwhelming justification for the 
production of new or modified technical conditions. Finally, an experimental 
system may be more likely to be ‘selected’ if it is productive and possesses a 
significant degree of internal adaptation – or in Pickering’s terms, coherence.  
Wimsatt emphasises the importance of the robustness and stability of structures 
and systems. That arrangement and interrelation of parts (in spite of various 
changes that are impinged upon it) must be able to be maintained in roughly 
that form, or occur in the normal progress of the system.  The system may be 
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adapted to external conditions, as well as possibly being internally mutually 
adapted (or maladapted). As Wimsatt relates: “Systems shaped by selection 
processes show significant degrees of adaptation, so things that become 
entrenched in them are commonly elements or parts of functional designs. If the 
system were not at least moderately well adapted, messing around with deeply 
GE'd [generatively entrenched] parts of it might not be so strongly selected 
against.” He continues: “Robust or fragile, if many other things depend upon it, it 
is then "essential" or at least conditionally "necessary" for what it does, so 
structures that survive leave it unchanged or only very slightly modified” 
(Wimsatt, 2007: 134). If the external conditions have selected for internally 
coherent, adapted, and stable configurations of technical conditions, the other 
technical conditions will depend on the technical condition of normal 
development.136 Changing it or removing it would occasion a transformation, or 
possibly a crisis, of the whole system. The only alternative to this picture is a 
more modular view of the technical assemblage, in which individual technical 
conditions may be changed or removed without having much of an effect on the 
other technical conditions, or the technical assemblage as a whole to any 
significant extent. However, the fact that normal development as a technical 
condition has co-evolved (and co-varies) with other technical conditions (such 
as model organisms, handbooks, and experimental designs) and that there is 
overlap between these technical conditions, suggests that experimental 
systems involving normal development are rather more entangled than modular.  
This demonstrates how, if normal development becomes a problem in some 
way, as I intend to suggest it has, it will be difficult to reform or shift. But not 
impossible to reform or shift. Wimsatt’s metaphors between the entrenchment in 
(natural) evolutionary processes and the processes by which elements become 
entrenched in cognitive and cultural (and architectural) structures can only go 
so far. The engineering approach, focused on tinkered fixes, which seems to be 
how natural evolution proceeds, also allows for the complete stripping down and 
re-construction of structures. If one element is no longer available, or desirable, 
a new structure or system can be designed to function without it. It may require 
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 In the sense that because of mutual adaptation, all other technical conditions depend on any given 
one. 
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considerable toil to get the new system to work, but if it needs to be done, an 
engineer will probably manage it.  
Wimsatt makes the wry but serious observation that “Scientists rarely do 
foundational work, save when their house threatens to come down about their 
ears. (Philosophers like to mess around with foundations, but preferably in 
someone else's discipline!)” (Wimsatt, 2007: 137). In other words, speaking in 
terms of the framework within which I have worked in this chapter, scientists will 
only radically transform a system when it is needed, because it is no longer 
productive of surprises or questions, for example.137 The system may be 
producing inappropriate results, not generating the sorts of questions that the 
scientists can actually make much use of (the surplus yields fewer and fewer 
progressive leads we might say), but as long as it is still functioning to some 
extent it will be tolerated. The house may be riddled with damp, but to tolerate it 
is possibly the only option. Philosophers, on the other hand, are therefore in a 
position to observe and point out maladaptations, blocks, or epistemological 
obstacles. Scientists, because of their alternative enculturation and perspective, 
may not be able to see these in quite the same way.  
There are many different ways in which any one technical condition or the 
technical assemblage as a whole can be a problem: obstructing discovery about 
the epistemic object, constraining questions that can be asked using 
experimental systems, being out of sync with the theoretical background, and 
being out of sync with the conceptual or material aspects of one element in the 
technical assemblage, or the rest of the technical assemblage as a whole.  
7.4. Empirical and theoretical consequences of the role of normal 
development 
The role of a technical condition is to “set the boundary conditions of 
experimental systems and in the process create the space in which an 
epistemic object can unfold” (Rheinberger, 2010a: 218). As a result, “technical 
conditions determine the realm of possible representations of an epistemic 
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 I am using more of an organismal metaphor of interacting and interrelated parts, rather than the 
foundations and building metaphor of Wimsatt. 
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thing” or object (Rheinberger, 1997: 29). The technical assemblage therefore 
plays a key role in shaping empirical data, theoretical knowledge, and future 
technical conditions and subroutines.  The nature and arrangement of the 
technical conditions and their mutual establishment of the space, stage, and 
boundaries is therefore crucial. Not only for future experimental systems, in 
terms of their technical conditions, the new epistemic object, the questions 
generated and chosen, but also for the theoretical background which informs all 
of that, and the interpretation of the products of an experimental system, such 
as the data and phenomena that is observed (and what is observable, of 
course).  
Instantiations of normal development as a technical condition in experimental 
systems in modern developmental biology involve, as we have seen, an 
abstraction of variation at various points in its production. This includes the 
choice of a limited number of model organisms, the selective breeding of those 
organisms to produce strains possessing limited variation and insensitivity to 
environmental conditions, the theoretical background which is based on the 
instructive-permissive distinction, and the foregrounding of empirical results 
which confirm and extend such a distinction. This is not to say that generating 
and recording variation is not relevant to model organism-centred research. 
Indeed, often one of the first stages in the production of a particular variant or 
strain of a model organism is to identify the level of some type of variation it can 
be made to exhibit, often as a result of induced mutations. For example, in 
Drosophila melanogaster, workers in T. H. Morgan’s laboratory screened the 
myriad flies produced by the so-called “breeder reactor” for mutants (Kohler, 
1994). In zebrafish, a useful model organism in developmental biology due to 
the range of mutations exhibited, mutagenesis screens were used to identify 
mutations and their relative frequency at certain loci (Meunier, 2012). However, 
such practices, which identify, map, and assess the significance of variation, are 
limited to a particular type of variation, namely genomic variation. One does not 
have to adhere to the thesis of causal parity or causal democracy (Oyama, 
2000a) to acknowledge that to investigate and explain particular developmental 
events or phenomena requires reference to entities or processes, and the 
variation thereof, which do not refer back to the genome or relevant genomic 
variation. Even if one held that the genome was somehow causally special, by 
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exhibiting and possessing a higher magnitude of causal specificity, stability and 
proportionality, it would not always be practical to give a causal account solely 
in terms of the genome and its variation. There is therefore a need for the 
strategy of identifying and mapping variation in the production of particular 
variants or strains of model organisms to be generalised to other forms or types 
of variation, as well as genomic variation. 
In chapter 4 I demonstrated that the particular way in which Wilson produced 
and conceived of normal development led to a different framing of the epistemic 
object – the processes of development – than Driesch and Roux. Key to this 
was not only his own role in generating it, but also the range of variation 
included within it. This provided him with a more sensitive test of whether and 
how his experimental intervention made a difference to the courses and results 
of the developmental processes. It also allowed him to assess the causes of the 
variation he saw in the embryonic development of Amphioxus.  
For Wilson then, his technical conditions allowed him to embrace the variation 
in developmental processes revealed in his results. Conversely, the need to 
standardise and strictly control the technical assemblage mean that scientists 
are pressed to try and reduce variation in technical conditions, and also in the 
consequent observed data and phenomena which give shape to the epistemic 
object. Various procedures are employed to try and deal with variation – re-
calibration, re-orientation and re-running of the technical assemblage, or 
manipulation of the results to remove the variation considered to be due to 
various possible sources of error. These kinds of experimental systems are 
therefore set up in such a way that when they do generate ‘surprises’ in the 
form of variation presenting itself when it ‘shouldn’t’, potentially posing 
questions about the source and significance of that variation, such surprises 
and questions are unwelcome, and are discarded by the experimenters along 
with most of the rest of the ‘surplus’ generated by the system. Furthermore, they 
are less likely to actually produce variation, or have as an epistemic object, 
some thing or process which instantiates variation or variability as a core 
property. It would not be chosen, nor would it be framed in such a way by the 
technical assemblage which has evolved from preceding iterations of the 
experimental system. This is not necessarily a problem. A surplus of questions 
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is always generated by experimental systems, and only a few can be pursued. 
Therefore even if only a small subset of generated questions may lead to the 
framing of an epistemic object which does instantiate variation or variability, it 
would be possible to explore these. If variation and variability are key concerns 
of some group or groups of experimentalists, however, such a system will not 
be productive of a high number of relevant questions.     
There might be a further problem if the reproduction of the technical 
assemblage, as part of the progress of experimental systems, reproduces the 
assumptions and biases of it (in total, and of constituent elements) too faithfully, 
by re-confirming in the empirical results the material and intellectual background 
underlying them. This may occur, for example, through the processes of 
abstraction used in the production of normal development. The cycle of 
experimental practice from the production of an experimental system involves 
interpreting results and selecting new questions from the surplus generated and 
producing or reproducing succeeding experimental systems. This cycle raises 
the possibility of the transformation of a methodological precept into a 
theoretical or ontological one, through its framing of successive epistemic 
objects in such a way that it comes to colour (or, perhaps, solidify) the 
theoretical background and the technical assemblage. This would explain the 
slippage of normal development from methodological element to something 
more ontic.  
But I need to demonstrate exactly how this process might occur. I do so in the 
next section, where I consider the establishment of causal accounts and 
attributions as a key product of experimental research. Such attributions of 
causality underpin many technical conditions, the relationship of these 
conditions and the technical assemblage to the epistemic object, the 
interpretation of results and the selection of problems. An analysis of causal 
attributions, and the role that aspects of normal development as a technical 
condition might have to play in it, is therefore an essential part of the argument 
in this chapter.  
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7.5. Assessment of causal factors in development 
Woodward identified stability, proportionality, and specificity, as three 
interrelated attributes of causal relationships. Stability is the criterion which 
depends on a “relationship of counterfactual dependence” which holds against a 
range of changes in background conditions. A causal relationship can therefore 
be more or less stable depending on the amount of changes to background 
conditions that can occur while the relationship still holds (Woodward, 2010: 
292). Proportionality is simply the criterion that the level of explanation or causal 
account is appropriate to a given explanandum. That is, it is not too broad and 
general, or too narrow and particular. Any posited causes must fit with their 
effects (Woodward, 2010: 298). Woodward identifies two notions of causal 
specificity in the biological sciences. The first is that a cause is specific if it has 
a fine-grained influence on the effect, the second “that a causal relationship is 
specific to the extent that a single (type of) cause produces only a single (type 
of) effect, and to the extent that each single type of effect is produced only by a 
(type of) single cause” (Woodward, 2010: 308).  Woodward frames the second 
sense of specificity by asking whether it is “the case that within the specified 
range of kinds of effects, a particular kind of cause produces only one kind of 
effect from that range and is it the case that for a given effect, it is (capable of 
being) caused only by a single kind of cause within some pre-specified set of 
alternatives?” (Woodward, 2010: 311). He answers this by stating that “C will be 
a more (rather than less) specific cause (in the one to one sense) to the extent 
that it causes only a few different kinds of effects within a pre-specified range” 
[italics in original] (ibid.).  
In chapter 1 I delineated the connections between the three criteria. But as well 
as their more logical interrelation, one must also acknowledge that they are not 
assessed separately when a potential cause or causes are considered. 
Together they form part of the more or less intuitive apparatus with which 
biologists (and non-biologists considering biological work or systems) approach 
a particular proposed causal mechanism, or the design of experiments, or a 
wider programme of work to examine the causal mechanisms at play in a 
particular biological system of interest. In the next section, I examine how these 
criteria link the ontic (attributions of causality) with the practical, with a view to 
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assessing the ways in which such criteria are (implicitly, or explicitly in different 
ways from that in which Woodward detailed them) conceived and employed in 
the generation of questions, experimental situations, observations, 
interpretations, and the communication of new biological knowledge.   
In previous chapters, I gestured towards Woodward’s account, and linked it with 
the idea that the processes of ontogenesis can be (and are) partitioned into 
instructive causes and permissive conditions. Specifically, when a factor is 
labelled instructive, it is because it possesses the linked attributes of biological 
causation in a stronger sense than other comparable factors. It is deemed to be 
more specific and more stable. Permissive conditions are deemed to be less 
specific, and less stable. However, although, as Woodward argues, “a concern 
with whether causal relationships are specific, stable and so on arises in a very 
natural way in many biological contexts” (Woodward, 2010: 288), I argue that 
the way in which causal relationships are investigated and framed are 
dependent on the particular context or set of contexts in which the investigator 
or investigators are operating. That is, the experimental system. I therefore 
establish a link between the epistemic nature of normal development as a 
methodological norm operating as a technical condition within experimental 
systems, and an ontological conception of normal development and variation in 
development, which arises from, and reinforces, the methodological norm. Of 
course, experimental systems are not hermetically sealed, and they generate 
surprises. There are, therefore, possible countervailing forces to the process of 
entrenchment just sketched.  
The criteria of specificity, proportionality, and stability can only be assessed 
relative to a given context. The way in which a causal relationship is deemed to 
be stable, proportional, or specific, depends on the system, relations of interest, 
and experimental set-up. For example, Woodward acknowledges that in the 
event that a causal relationship cannot be assessed against a complete and 
exhaustive range of “background conditions”, “we rely on (i) subject matter 
specific information to tell us which sorts of changes in background 
circumstances are most “important” for the assessment of stability and/or (ii) 
attach particular importance to stability in background circumstances that (again 
perhaps on the basis of subject matter considerations) are regarded as “usual” 
 
250 
 
or “normal”” (Woodward, 2010: 292-293). More pragmatic considerations of 
what background conditions can be identified, controlled, recorded and 
measured may also affect which background conditions are used to assess the 
stability of causal relationships.  
These considerations are present when assessing proportionality. Woodward 
observes that “which level (or levels) is (are) most appropriate will be in large 
part an empirical, rather than a priori matter – empirical in the sense that it will 
depend on the causal structure of the situation under investigation.” 
(Woodward, 2010: 297). Furthermore, Woodward emphasises that “the 
investigator’s purposes, and in particular what it is that the investigator wishes 
to explain or understand should also influence the choice of level” (ibid.). 
Therefore, the question that the investigator wants answered, the problem 
solved and the explanandum sought, sets the level at which the criterion of 
proportionality then determines whether a putative cause is a ‘good fit’. 
The role of the investigator in establishing the level at which an explanation is 
sought is also crucial in considering how specific a cause is. The disagreement 
between Waters and Griffiths and Stotz hinged on the different effect they used 
as an example. For Waters the effect was the sequence of nucleotides in the 
precursor m-RNA, and therefore only DNA had any causal specificity. For 
Griffiths and Stotz, considering a polypeptide or a functioning protein as the 
effect of interest means that, alongside DNA, factors other than DNA can be 
deemed causally specific. Woodward notes that, for the second notion of causal 
specificity, specification of a restricted range is required. He observes that “it will 
often be intuitive enough what sort of range is reasonable and non-artificial in 
particular cases.” (Woodward, 2010: 311). This “intuitive” sense requires 
unpacking, and linking to the way in which norms are generated, reproduced 
and used by scientists, working with particular experimental systems.  
To start with, it harks back to the discussion of normal development by Michel 
and Moore cited in previous chapters, that “[i]ntuitive definitions of normality 
maintain certain assumptions about the individual, the environment, and the 
types of processes that create the individual’s behavioural repertoire (including 
the symptoms characteristic of abnormality)” (Michel and Moore, 1995: 411). 
This can be extended to encompass other sorts of assumptions. Given the role 
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of the management of variation in normal development, assumptions 
concerning the extent and significance of biological variation in objects and 
processes of interest are likely to be central. It will not be crucial here to 
establish the precise processes by which such assumptions underpin an 
intuition of normality in scientists, merely to note that such an intuition is 
present, and the form in which it currently takes. That said, it is important to 
note that there may be multifarious means by which assumptions and intuitions 
concerning normality are transmitted, generated, internalised, and reproduced. 
These may range from: the wider sociological context (the concept, with 
normative load, of normality engendered by State bodies in the nineteenth-
century for example, see Hacking, 1990); the exigencies of scientific 
communities (the need for reproducibility and the establishment of ‘objectivity’ 
driving efforts to standardise scientific objects such as reagents, strains, and so 
forth, see Porter, 1995); the reciprocal relationship between epistemic activities 
and ontological principles (identified by Chang, 2009); the greater ease of 
controlling ‘environmental’ conditions than internal, particularly genetic, 
conditions; and other reasons suggested in the course of this thesis so far.  
As established by DiTeresi (2010), a current intuition concerns normal 
development as a reference standard – researchers are trained to work with 
particular model organisms (or, more precisely, particular strains of certain 
organisms) for which normal stages have been compiled. These model 
organisms come in standardised forms, with as much variation being bred out of 
them as possible (that is, within strains – there may be considerable variation 
between strains of the same model organism, as different strains are needed for 
different sorts of work). There is then a canonical reference form which 
represents the normal, and becomes internalised as the intuitive idea of the 
normal. Intellectually and materially, variation has been abstracted away.  The 
experimenter will, with these organisms, change one or more variables, and 
observe the effects of the change against the reference standard, the normal 
development.  
Given that the set of causal relationships (assessed to a significant extent by 
pre-existing norms and assumptions concerning normality) presumed to be 
strong support the elements and configuration of the technical assemblage, the 
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interpretation of the results generated by the experimental system, and the 
decisions made concerning succeeding epistemic objects and technical 
assemblages, the nature of one particular technical condition – normal 
development as a reference standard, for example – will play a key role in 
entrenching certain theoretical norms, and also methodological and epistemic 
norms.  
In Wilson’s research in the early-1890s, he became concerned with finding a 
way to ascertain the roles and relative significances of mechanical and inherited 
causes in differentiation and the production of particular cleavage-forms in early 
development. This led him to devise an experiment in which at different stages 
of development he manipulated the mechanical conditions experienced by 
blastomeres, and observed the effects of these manipulations on the pathways 
and outcomes of development. I have described how he created this 
experimental system, producing a proto-technical condition to frame his proto-
epistemic object. He started not from a bifurcation of a prior experimental 
system, and was not working in a mature discipline. But he still brought 
theoretical norms (expectations as to the nature of development, and of the 
development of Amphioxus in particular) and methodological norms to the 
system. Both of these can be seen in the way in which Wilson designed the 
experiment around the two kinds of cause he expected to play a role, and in 
terms of which he interpreted the results to produce a modified version of the 
mosaic theory. Wilson’s experimental system was nascent, not mature, and the 
causes he invoked were broad, opaque and abstract. Modern experimental 
systems exist in a mature field, and the causes they invoke are more concrete 
and well-defined. Despite this difference with my main case study, in modern 
experimental systems candidate causes are still investigated to ascertain their 
role in developmental processes; are assessed in terms of their specificity and 
stability. My case study demonstrated how normal development can come to be 
produced and used as a technical condition as part of an experimental system. 
It grounded my analysis of how normal development functions as a technical 
condition more generally, and finally it shows us that normal development can 
be construed and used differently. Modern experimental systems need to 
successfully frame their epistemic objects as much as Wilson’s needed to, and 
did, at the dawn of experimental embryology.   
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7.6. Conclusion 
I have established that normal development, as it is currently constituted as a 
technical condition, may in many cases be a block on the further progress of 
experimental systems. I have suggested that this might be the case where 
investigators seek to focus on biological variation and variability, which requires 
that the technical assemblage work to frame an epistemic object which might 
have an additional dimension of variability. This builds on my previous analysis 
of the role of normal development in managing variation, and the different ways 
in which different versions of normal development may lead to different 
strategies for abstracting variation. In the concluding chapter, I outline some 
burgeoning areas of research where the focus on biological variation suggests 
the need for a technical condition more sensitive to, representative of, and 
capable of representing and framing, epistemic objects involving a 
consideration of variation.  
The main conclusion is therefore that even though many forces act against the 
change of entrenched technical conditions, such as normal development, in 
certain circumstances it may be necessary. How it might be done is quite 
another question, and it is beyond the scope of this thesis to provide a detailed 
and programmatic answer, but the case study of Wilson provides us with some 
possible indications. There are some additional indications that I would like to 
suggest. Firstly, there are already attempts to develop standards which 
encompass a considerable – more naturalistic – range of variation. One such 
example is the Standard Event System pioneered by Ingmar Werneburg (2009), 
which involves the identification of developmental characters, allowing scientists 
to identify which are present or not at various points in development, allowing 
intraspecific variation to be revealed within a standardised framework.  
Technical developments in imaging and processing large numbers of embryos 
and new computational tools to automate the process of observation, 
measurement and analysis of samples, will enable scientists to better 
apprehend the level of variation present in nature or standardised strains. 
Additionally, it will allow them to collate enough results to allow comparison 
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between the variation of control treatments and experimental treatments, while 
having enough samples to ensure it is statistically significant.  
The history and philosophy of biology has the potential to offer much towards 
this reconfiguration that I propose. Firstly, it is able to apprehend and identify 
the sort of epistemological obstacles that entrenched technical conditions, such 
as normal development, constitute. Secondly, it is able to bring a historically-
grounded philosophical approach to key methodological problems by asking – 
and attempting to answer – new questions. I detail some of these new 
questions in the concluding chapter. 
More concretely, my case study of Wilson has shown that normal development 
can incorporate a wide range of variation, and still successfully work as a 
tractable technical condition framing an epistemic object. It shows us that a 
different way of producing normal development is possible, for instance, by 
using a functional criterion.  
The question now posed is to what extent should and can we, in modern 
developmental biology, take variation seriously methodologically, epistemically, 
and ontologically. This is the natural point at which this thesis leaves off, and 
the future work will begin, as I detail in the concluding chapter.  
In the final chapter, I describe and suggest new ways of conceiving of normal 
development, and new ways of treating, abstracting and conceptualising 
variation, building on the lines of argument and approaches established in this 
and previous chapters. 
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Chapter 8 – Conclusion 
8.1. Key findings 
In my analysis of the assessment of causal factors identified as relevant to 
biological processes, I have elaborated on existing debates by discussing the 
role of normal development. I have been allowed to do so by the role allotted by 
Woodward to background conditions in attributing strengths or magnitudes to 
particular candidate causal factors. Background conditions are not external to 
the experiment, but a part of it. Technical conditions which serve to frame the 
epistemic object are there in part to background (and thus control and manage) 
certain conditions, and foreground (and thus manipulate and vary) others. This 
is the link between the Rheinbergerian part of my analytical framework and the 
Woodwardian part. The role of technical conditions in defining and managing 
(by excluding as well as controlling) the background conditions, helps us to 
understand how normal development affects the theoretical aspects of 
developmental biology by shaping how causal attributions are made. Critically, 
using my case study on Edmund Beecher Wilson, I have assessed how 
biologists form normal development as a technical condition in the experimental 
systems they devise, to allow them to make experimental manipulations in the 
processes of development, and to be able to make comparisons between 
embryos.  
I have also demonstrated how causal attributions can be shaped by normal 
development in a particular direction, such as recapitulating the instructive-
permissive distinction. Furthermore, I have shown how those causal attributions 
can lead in turn to the entrenchment of certain technical conditions, such as 
normal development. It is on the role of normal development as a technical 
condition, which I have considered to be in part a methodological norm (after 
Weber, 2005), that I focus in this conclusion.  
In this thesis I have identified how (and why) a version of functionally-defined 
normal development comprising a wide range of early embryonic variation was 
generated by Edmund Wilson (1893), and what the effects of this were. I went 
on to compare Wilson’s normal development to other manifestations of normal 
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development in the work of Hans Driesch and Wilhelm Roux, and also to other 
modes of normal development that have been identified more generally. As 
indicated above, I have analysed what role normal development plays in 
experimental systems and in attributions of causality.  
In this concluding chapter, I identify some possible implications of this in the 
light of some new developments in the biological sciences, and end by 
pinpointing what questions are opened up by my work.  
One of these implications centres on the distinction between instructive causes 
and permissive conditions, which was implicit in Wilson’s 1896 definition of 
normal development. The instructive-permissive distinction was a crucial 
conceptual component of experimental systems in developmental biology from 
the twentieth-century onwards (Gilbert, 2003). It was complicated somewhat by 
the discovery of induction by Spemann and Mangold ([1924] 1974) and related 
work, but was raised again to prominence with the rise of genetics, and the 
advent of developmental genetics. This is a simplification of a rich historical 
picture of course. But what is not in doubt is that by the end of the twentieth-
century, something approaching a theory of development had arisen in which 
differentiation (as the central organising principle of development) was driven by 
differential gene expression. In principle, if not in practice, organismal 
development could be reduced to the genomes of an organism and its mother. 
It is on this role of DNA and the genome that some of the analyses of biological 
causality that I have described and used in this thesis have been elaborated. 
Empirical, theoretical and philosophical problems with the instructive-permissive 
distinction have instead led to the identification of biological specificity as the 
key criterion establishing DNA as a special type of cause in biological 
explanations. This has animated discussions concerning the attribution of 
causality, and strength of causality, in biological systems. Woodward’s 
manipulationist theory of causation has been used as a battleground, initially 
between causal selection and causal parity, and also for more finely-tuned 
debates concerning the location and distribution of biological specificity (Griffiths 
and Stotz, 2013, Waters, 2007; Weber, 2013). Many of these arguments, 
though dealing with processes such as the expression of DNA, RNA editing, 
and folding of proteins, seem to exclude temporality as a dimension or factor of 
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interest. They focus on processes which occur at unspecified times in an 
organism with no given history. While the implications for an understanding of 
development are apparent (and are sometimes made so), the examples 
provided are not explicitly developmental processes. They are not located in 
time, or assessed with reference to the production of a structure, or the ongoing 
processes involved in a structure. Additionally, they do not give any indication of 
the types of causal scenarios exhibited in more macro-level processes: in other 
words, the particular combination and timing of different types of causal 
specificity that might be involved. Producing a catalogue or taxonomy of causal 
motifs encompassing these different types of causal specificity might enable us 
to make progress in this endeavour. 
In my assessment of normal development, I detailed what I called a taxonomy 
of norms, which I expanded by adding the individualised standard based on 
functional criteria used by Wilson. This demonstrated that in the early days of 
experimentation in embryology, there were different ways of managing 
variation. More than this, though, it allows us to detail explicitly the advantages, 
disadvantages, and biases associated with each of the norms. In this way, it 
provides us with the possibility of developing a resource along the lines of 
Wimsatt’s catalogue of reductionist heuristics (2007). This would recognise their 
importance in scientific work, but seek to make explicit what role they play in 
shaping investigation and interpretation. Like those heuristics, they are only 
analytically separate; in practice two or more norms are likely to coincide in any 
one use of normal development as a technical condition.  
The three prior versions of normal – essentialist, statistical, and reference 
standard – all found a place in scientific practice in embryology or 
developmental biology. The final normal, the one I identified, did not. The 
individualised abstraction of Wilson had the advantage of including within it a 
wide range of variation, defined as normal as a result of functional outcomes. It 
was therefore more sensitive to the exact effects of experimental manipulations. 
Producing the normal development himself allowed Wilson to really appreciate 
what was and was not important in the changes he observed. As an individual 
abstraction, however, it suffered from some of the same disadvantages as the 
essentialist normal. Furthermore, as a normal incorporating a wide range of 
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variation it was less tractable for further transmission and easy use in 
laboratories, unlike the reference standard. It was, to a large extent, a local 
standard which was labour-intensive to produce.  
It is important to recognise, however, that although the taxonomy I have 
detailed provides four norms with certain characteristics, each of those norms is 
historically-situated and conditioned by contexts of use and production. The 
essentialist normal has a long history, but still has a history. The average or 
statistical normal derives from particular State and medical practices in the 
nineteenth-century. The reference standard normal relates to the rise and use 
of normal stages and model organisms. And finally, the functional normal arose 
in the context of Wilson’s entry into experimental work and his recognition of the 
variability of Amphioxus development, which was an advantage for the 
particular questions he wanted to answer.  
To be clear, the norms to which I have referred throughout the thesis are norms 
of a special type. That is, they are not broad, science-wide norms like Mertonian 
(and related) norms of science (Merton, [1942] 1973). They are activity-specific. 
These kinds of norms with which I have been concerned have been defined as 
“action-oriented prescriptions” (Alegre, 2013: 3229) or “an abstract principle that 
guides action” (Smokler, 1983: 129). Crucially then, the norms are guides (of a 
material and conceptual nature), or heuristics, which allow the scientist to focus 
on what conduct and information is necessary to achieve a particular goal. The 
norm, the guide to action or prescription, is designed for a particular goals or 
intended outcomes. The production and transmission of the successful norm 
must therefore ensure that it incorporates the right kind of guidance (but not too 
much) to ensure the scientist can use it. It is a tool, a technical condition, and 
one which, in the case of normal development, incorporates social (their 
formulation and dissemination, including education and training) as well as 
material (organism strains and normal stages) aspects and methodological 
prescriptions. I have focused on the latter two aspects, but also on the 
conceptual consequences of them. Just as the norms themselves must be 
understood in the contexts of their origin, production, and use, so must the 
advantages and disadvantages associated with them. These relate to the social 
and economic organisation of science, methodological and epistemic norms, 
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and material and technical infrastructure. There is therefore the possibility that 
new combinations of these norms, produced and operated in different ways, 
may preserve or amplify the advantages of existing or prior norms, and 
ameliorate some of the disadvantages. I explore this possibility in the following 
sections.  
8.2. Implications for the analytical framework 
I now explore the implications of my work for the elements of the analytical 
framework I used in this thesis. Firstly, I have built on Rheinberger’s 
experimental systems approach by taking it into previously unanalysed areas. 
Previously, the approach has been used to assess and characterise already 
mature fields of experimental endeavour. I have used it, instead, to focus on the 
advent of an experimental system in which the scientist – Wilson – brought 
techniques, questions, observations and experience from prior non-
experimental work, rather than evolving his experimental system from a prior 
one. In many respects, Wilson’s work with Amphioxus was an attempt to 
‘bootstrap’ an experimental system. One of the key technical conditions, the 
normal development of Amphioxus, was generated as the experimental system 
itself was. Consequently, while the technical conditions of Wilson’s experimental 
system were relatively stable compared to the epistemic object, in absolute 
terms they were altogether less stable than technical conditions in more mature 
fields, and the lines between his technical conditions and the epistemic object 
were considerably blurrier. A further development of Rheinberger’s account was 
the discussion of the conservative forces which serve to entrench certain 
technical conditions in particular assemblages. I gave an account of how this 
could occur, and how it relates to other – theoretical – entrenchments as a 
result of bias in the sorts of questions generated by experimental systems and 
their filiations.  
It was at that point that I was able to draw together the two main elements of the 
framework, and in so doing link the practices of biological research with the 
theory deriving from it and guiding it. The latter is the interpretation of the nature 
and specific details of the causal structure (including assessment of candidate 
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causal factors and relations) of biological processes of interest.138 Woodward’s 
work on causation is intended to be sensitive to the actual way that causes and 
causation are invoked and used by scientists. It is not, however, centred on the 
practical aspects of creating an experimental system and drawing conclusions 
about the relative weight of causal factors by interpreting the less than clear 
results of a series of experiments.139 Conversely, while Rheinberger’s deep 
engagement with exactly those practical details does yield a new understanding 
of theoretical developments in the biological sciences, it is not related to the 
causal aspects of biological theory. My thesis has attempted to use each 
approach to close lacunae in the other. By focusing on how processes of 
management and abstraction of variation in the practices and resources of 
normal development help create background conditions, we can more clearly 
assess how causal attributions are made in biology. Likewise, a focus on causal 
attributions can help us to further understand the consequences of what is 
produced by experimental systems. The practical and experimental turns in 
philosophy of biology have served to provide a counterbalance, a corrective, 
against the tendency to focus too much on theory. My work has aimed to 
analyse the relation of theory and practice using the intersection of the two main 
elements of the analytical framework of this thesis.  
8.3. Implications for biological research 
In this section I identify two changes to the biological sciences that suggest that, 
in some cases, the technical condition of normal development needs 
reformulation and reintegration into new experimental systems. Firstly, I point to 
a shift in the organisation of some important new areas of research in the 
biological sciences towards a more naturalistic mode. The way in which 
biological research is being reorganised in this way undercuts many of the 
                                                          
138
 The biological processes mainly being those of organismal development, the processes being of 
varying granularity in space, time, structure and function. 
139
 Though, characterising his approach as a functional account of causation, he does claim that “[o]ne of 
the attractions of the functional way of thinking about causation is that it recognizes an important place 
for methodological considerations in thinking about causation” (Woodward, 2014: 701). This is 
undoubtedly true, and has allowed me to “evaluate methods of testing and reasoning, and concepts we 
employ in terms of whether they help us to realize scientific goals” by drawing upon elements of 
Woodward’s work, but it is reasonable to say that it is still not central to Woodward’s own work on 
causation (ibid.). 
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philosophical and practical objections to a more naturalistic mode of 
experimentation. Such a naturalistic mode would greater reflect natural variation 
in investigations.  
Secondly, changes in the problems tackled in key areas of the biological 
sciences dictate that greater attention should be paid to biological variation. I 
provide examples such as evolutionary developmental biology (evo-devo) which 
show a greater interest in variation as something which investigators wish to 
explain, and examples where certain research questions demand that the 
experimental set-up itself be more sensitive to biological variation.  
Following the discussion of these two changes, I outline the opportunities 
provided by various theoretical, empirical, technical and material developments 
in the biological sciences. These can be exploited and developed in taking 
variation seriously as part of an altered set of practices concerning normal 
development. To achieve this is not unproblematic, so I follow this by discussing 
the various obstacles that such an approach may face. I conclude by 
suggesting ways in which such challenges can be met, or at least begin to be 
tackled, and also outline the work that History and Philosophy of Biology can 
undertake to contribute. This includes, but is not restricted to, developing a 
programme of work to tackle various conceptual and practical issues 
concerning the nature of biological variation and its investigation.  
8.3.1. A new naturalism? 
From the beginning of the twentieth-century, biologists have rigorously reduced 
the variation of factors present in the experimental systems they set up and use. 
When variation presents itself, it is often viewed as a source of error, and 
therefore identified and removed from future experimental runs, or removed in 
the process of post-experimental calculation, analysis, and interpretation 
(Carlson Jones and German, 2005). Such treatment of variation has been 
consistently criticised since the beginning of the twentieth-century, particularly 
by those adhering to the ‘naturalistic’ or natural historical orientation in the 
biological sciences (Mayr, 1982: 540-550; Michel and Moore, 1995: 383-392). 
By ‘naturalistic’ (and ‘naturalist’), I mean the opposition to (and opponents of) 
conducting science in highly controlled artificial laboratory conditions, and 
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advocacy of working in less tightly controlled conditions more reflective of the 
context in which objects of study normally exist ‘in nature’.  
These naturalists argue that if objects and phenomena in the laboratory are 
managed in such a way that they do not reflect the conditions in nature outside 
the laboratory, no inference can be made between results obtained in the 
laboratory and what ‘really happens in nature’. Ian Hacking has advanced a 
powerful argument against the naturalist objection to the stripping away of the 
richness and complexity of life to produce controlled artificiality in the laboratory.  
This is that “mature laboratory sciences are true to the phenomena of the 
laboratory”, phenomena that may only be produced in the specially controlled 
conditions of the laboratory (Hacking, 1992b: 60). There is no easy inference 
from the findings of the laboratory to those of nature, and such an inference is 
not really the point.140  
One way in which the results of laboratory investigations can help to understand 
and intervene in the world outside the laboratory is to “remake bits of our 
environment so that they reproduce phenomena first generated in a pure state 
in the laboratory,” which, if the aim of knowledge is ultimately use-oriented, 
poses fewer problems in terms of translation from the laboratory to ‘nature’ 
(Hacking, 1992b: 59).141 Furthermore, though in the laboratory we cannot 
replicate the complexity of nature nor produce general laws with applicability in 
natural situations, we can export from laboratory systems “somewhat invariant 
causal principles”, which can be used to successfully understand and intervene 
in the world outside the laboratory (Waters, 2008: 717). This seems to blunt the 
criticisms of those such as Bolker (1995, 2012, 2014) and Love (2010), who 
inveigh against the use of a narrow range of highly standardised model 
organisms which are bred to exhibit as little morphological and ontogenetic 
inter-organismal variation as possible.  
                                                          
140
 Though Ankeny and Leonelli (2011) would argue that research centred on model organisms is 
precisely aimed at gaining a comprehensive understanding of the workings, processes, and mechanisms 
of a single organism, which can then be used to approach more specific problems and questions in other 
organisms.  
141
 We might observe the changes that have occurred in the natural environment resulting from the 
adoption of certain modes of agricultural production as an example of this.  
 
263 
 
New fields of research, however, particularly those concerning human health, 
have arisen from the realisation of the importance of variation in shaping 
outcomes. The discovery of the role of variants of different genes in influencing 
response to a potential pathogen (for instance, through the Human Leukocyte 
Antigen immune system genes) is one example of a set of findings that have led 
to the recognition that understanding the scope and effects of natural variation 
should be an important part in biological research (Davis, 2014). In this respect, 
such research therefore needs to be ‘closer to nature’ and take account of (and 
include) variation and some of the complexities and relationships exhibited in 
the objects and processes in which researchers wish to intervene and 
control.142 Here the inference from laboratory to nature (or field, or body) 
matters.143 The variation which exists in ‘nature’ – in and between organisms, 
between environments – now matters greatly. For example, in personalised 
medicine, the aim is to identify certain factors in particular groups of people 
which can affect the efficacy of a particular treatment, or inform treatment 
options by providing insight concerning the prognosis for a particular condition. 
To use a sample population in laboratory or epidemiological studies that has 
had considerable amounts of natural variation extracted from it seems to be 
foolhardy in the context of such research. Another area of burgeoning research 
concerns the microbiome (philosophical research as well as biological, see 
Dupré 2012; O’Malley 2013). Researchers examine the microbial flora present 
in organisms, and the role of different varieties of microbiotic flora and their 
relations with the host in developmental and physiological phenomena of 
interest (Blaser et al, 2013; Cho et al, 2012). There is a particular interest in the 
diversity of microbiotic communities living in, and interacting with, macrobes, 
and the significance of variation in this between individuals at particular stages 
of development, and between different stages of development within individuals 
(Gritz and Bhandari, 2015; Schloissnig et al, 2013; The Human Microbiome 
Project Consortium, 2012; Turnbaugh et al, 2009). The need to take account of 
naturally occurring variation is central to this research.  
                                                          
142
 It seems that Woodward’s interventionist account of causation is even more suited to this kind of 
research than more ‘traditional’ research.  
143
 We may observe here than rather than laboratorising nature, the impetus is towards naturalising the 
laboratory.  
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8.3.2. Explaining variation 
There are also new developments in the biological sciences which stress the 
importance of variation as part of the explanandum as well as the explanans. 
This may be because this explanandum is crucial to providing part of the 
explanans of another explanation (in some cases linking this concern with 
variation with the concern with variation presented in the previous section). But 
all the same, a renewed interest in studying the causes and biological 
significance of variation has emerged in parts of the biological sciences.  
This is not a new thing. In the early twentieth-century, prominent scientists such 
as William Bateson, Nikolai Vavilov and Theodosius Dobzhansky saw the 
investigation of the nature of variation as central to their studies of heredity and 
evolution. Similarly, the whole field of population genetics can be seen as 
interested in variation, or more precisely the inheritance of genetic variation. 
The point is, however, that there is a renewed interest in variation, in fields (i.e. 
outside of genetics) which had not previously been concerned with it, such as 
biomedical science and developmental biology. 
In burgeoning fields such as evo-devo and developmental evolution (devo-evo), 
ascertaining the origin of novelty (through new variants being generated) is 
central to many research programmes. In evo-devo, the aim is to enhance or 
extend the neo-Darwinian theory of evolution (also known as the ‘Modern 
Synthesis’) by accounting for the generation of novelty through studying the 
developmental mechanisms which produce such novelty and allow it to be 
inherited (Pigliucci and Müller, 2010). The origin and nature of variation is 
therefore central. Yet, in evo-devo at least, criticism has been levelled that in its 
own research practices it fails to take account of much organismal and 
ontogenetic variation, as a result of using standardised model organism strains 
(Love, 2010). Very few researchers take variation seriously in the organisms 
they use, or incorporate a range of variation in organisms (or at least, variable 
organisms) into their work, with some notable exceptions (e.g. Hall, 2014; 
Hallgrímsson et al, 2012).  
Love’s critique makes clear that this is problematic for evo-devo because the 
question of phenotypic plasticity is often a central part of investigations in that 
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field. If (non-hereditary or non-genomic) variation is abstracted away, 
phenotypic plasticity (phenotypic variation generated by developmental 
changes), which ordinarily would present itself, would do so to a far lesser 
extent. His proposed solution is to use a greater range of model organisms and 
create alternative periodisations or stagings, based on using different 
characters to those currently used in normal stages. This would ensure that the 
periodisations thus established could not be collapsed into a single 
periodisation. Consequently, variation would be revealed rather than abstracted 
away (Love, 2010). I return to these two suggestions shortly. 
There are other problems besides those identified by Love. One is that even 
though the production and distribution of strains of model organisms aims at 
standardisation and a reduction in inter-organismal variation, there is evidence 
that a considerable (and, probably, biologically relevant) amount of variation 
remains (Carlson Jones and German, 2005). This should not be a surprise. 
Even genetic clones kept in ostensibly identical environments would experience 
some difference in microenvironment, such as position in the uterus, or place in 
the laboratory. They may possess different epigenetic markers or inherited 
maternal RNA affecting gene expression, or will simply develop in a (slightly) 
different way due to stochastic variation in early development.  
As well as the practical implications of a renewed or greater focus on variation, I 
close this section by suggesting that it may also lead to a re-alignment of central 
theoretical and conceptual parts of the apparatus of developmental biology. 
One of the central problems in developmental biology is differentiation, and one 
of the main ways of explaining differentiation is through differential gene 
expression (Love, 2014: 41-47). In one respect then, this suggests that variation 
is central to developmental biology. Variation in cellular environment between 
cells affects variation in gene expression between cells, which causes the 
variation in the types of cells observable in more mature organisms. This basic 
story, augmented by other developmental processes (such as cell migration and 
adhesion as well as induction), is of course true, and is a triumph of twentieth-
century developmental biology and genetics. But it is only central if one wishes 
to interpret those types of variation, and the processes associated with them, as 
central. Alternative ways of formulating principles of developmental biology may 
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be possible, and are indicated by certain empirical findings. Associated with this 
is the need to consider different ways in which variation can manifest itself and 
prove itself to be biologically – causally – relevant. The three sets of empirical 
findings I would like to discuss are developmental plasticity, transdifferentiation 
and the role of the microbiome in macrobiotic development. These phenomena 
call into question the idea that there is a set mode and temporality to the 
developmental process in any given type (such as, but not restricted to, a given 
species or variety) of organism. 
Developmental plasticity is defined as “the ability of an organism to react to an 
external or internal environmental input with a change in form, state, movement, 
or rate of activity”, and we might add, developmental fate (West-Eberhard 2003, 
33). It thus creates and responds to variation. Plasticity is conceived in 
opposition to differentiation, each process constraining the other (Bateson and 
Gluckman, 2011). Developmental plasticity is the ability of the organism, as part 
of its normal development, to vary in outcomes measured at particular stages of 
development (multifinality), and of routes towards certain outcomes at certain 
points.144  The phenomena of developmental plasticity suggest that organisms 
exhibit variation in outcomes and pathways towards outcomes. This can include 
different neural and vascular connections and networks, the different 
phenotypes exhibited by the planktonic crustacean Daphnia depending on early 
exposure to chemicals indicating the proximity of predators (Gilbert and Epel, 
2009), the formation of the different castes of social insects (Rajakumar et al, 
2012), or the responses of plants to environmental conditions.145 Developmental 
plasticity is dependent upon the capacity of the organism to use cues from the 
environment as signals to be interpreted by developmental processes. The 
                                                          
144
 A plasticity of an altogether higher order is the plasticity of the modes of development themselves, as 
a result of the interaction of evolutionary and developmental processes which shape the very nature of 
development, and more specifically, the type of life cycles which constitute development (Minelli, 2014, 
2015). I have tried to use language which avoids a bias towards adultocentric conceptions of 
development, or mistaking the direct development characteristic of mammals as paradigmatic of even 
vertebrates, let alone other creatures. 
145
 These are just some examples, relatively simple ones at different ends of the granularity scale, in 
which environmental signals are causally efficacious in selecting between limited numbers of possible 
phenotypes. What is important about them is that there is not a default phenotype. Other examples 
with a less limited number of possible phenotypes would include angiogenesis and the formation of the 
integrated vascular network, and the equivalent processes in the formation of the nervous system, in 
which the developing system is in constant interaction with the new environments it encounters at 
every stage. There is no predetermined plan, but the eventual networks are the result of that ongoing 
reciprocal interaction.  
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range of relevant variation (internal or external) which can produce functional 
organisms at a given end-point is therefore widened – a wider range of variation 
becomes relevant for understanding the variation between forms of a given 
type.  
Similar to developmental plasticity, the phenomenon of transdifferentiation leads 
one to focus on the multifinality of developmental processes. Therefore the 
variation in outcome and processes of development, as well as the variation in 
different factors and processes (internal and external) which affect these, is 
central to understanding development.  Sometimes these varying factors 
present in the life cycles of organisms in a reliable and stable way, other times 
not so. The variation in that reliability may be worth investigating in itself. 
In standard accounts, the central process of differentiation in development is 
described as hierarchical and irreversible. Germ-layers are specified, then 
tissues within them, then cell-types within them. Cells become ever more 
differentiated, and with the exception of stem-cells, this is a one-way process. 
However, the “transformation of one differentiated cell type into another” [italics 
in original] (Slack, 2009), or transdifferentiation, calls into question the 
hierarchical and one-way process of differentiation, or indeed the idea that a cell 
is even differentiated when it seems to be.  
Transdifferentiation invites us to consider that rather than this phenomenon 
being an exception to the ‘normal’ model of differentiation, it may in fact be one 
process or tendency amongst many that interact, counteract, or act as part of 
the developmental process as a whole with other tendencies. This may include 
the role of stochasticity in development (Kupiec, 2014). Indeed, the 
maintenance of a differentiated state is itself an active process – the need to 
faithfully transmit epigenetic marks through DNA replication and cell-division 
(Bateson and Gluckman, 2011, 58) – and therefore not a spontaneous or 
default condition.  
Transdifferentiation directly challenges the central principle of differential gene 
expression. The observed variation in the various cell types at any one time in 
an organism’s development can be attributed to the active stabilisation of that 
variation (e.g. Minelli, 2014), and the source of that variation can be attributed to 
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a wider set of causes than the genealogical pathway of a particular cell. A wider 
range of causal factors therefore become relevant for understanding the 
existence, persistence and nature of differentiated cell types. 
Microbes are increasingly thought to play an instructive role in the development 
of the organism, and in differentiation and other countervailing processes 
(Blaser et al, 2013; Cho et al, 2012). The need to take naturally-occurring 
variation into account is relevant to the investigation of the developmental and 
physiological function of dynamic interactions between developing macrobiotic 
organisms and more or less closely associated microbial communities. The 
microbiome contributes external signals (if one does not consider the 
microbiome to be part of the human organism itself) shaping developmental 
‘decisions’ made at various stages. In understanding the ongoing dynamic 
variation in and between microbial communities in different developing 
organisms, scientists can make sense of the reciprocal, iterative relationships 
between the organism and succession of microbiotic communities that it hosts 
and interacts with. Monogenomic differentiated cell-lineages are not just ‘there’ 
in the first place to interact with the microbiota (developing an insight in Dupré 
2012).  
Given the key role of the microbiome and the phenomena of transdifferentiation 
and developmental plasticity, the way that variation is managed and the causal 
relevance of certain types of variation for given outcomes of interest are 
assessed should depend on a more explicitly articulated justification for dividing 
systems up into potentially relevant causes and background conditions. More 
varying factors would therefore be incorporated into the realm of potentially 
relevant causes and there would need to be more explicit reasons within the 
context of the research situation for making certain potentially varying factors 
invariant. Putative ways of measuring causal specificity offer ways to do this 
that can be explored and developed.  
8.3.3. Opportunities and prospects 
One problem with a greater focus on variation is that if experimenters were to 
measure more variation, and use this to divide up samples, they will be left with 
very small sub-samples, below the numbers needed for statistical significance. 
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One way of getting round this is to systematically analyse what variation is 
relevant. Another way is to increase the number of samples. Robert Kohler’s 
(1994) account of Morgan’s fly laboratory emphasised the importance of 
generating a large number of flies for inspection. The large number of flies 
allowed even rare mutations to become apparent. Once an observation of a 
new mutant was made, investigators were mentally prepared to observe it when 
it appeared again, as they did. Awareness of variation permits the detection of 
it. Large numbers may reduce the variance exhibited in a given population of 
samples, but they increase the number of variants observed. Methods of 
dealing with large numbers of samples have been slow to enter parts of 
developmental biology (excepting much research involving yeast), but they are 
being developed (Tills et al, 2013). We increasingly have the means to produce, 
analyse and interpret large amounts of data concerning embryonic 
development, in an increasingly automated way. This has the potential to 
reshape our perceptions concerning the extent and significance of variation in 
development.  We also increasingly have the computing power and the 
statistical tools to deal with multivariate complexity, which will be essential in 
dealing with the larger number of varying factors and assessing causal 
relationships between them. 
Finding and elaborating new methods to deal with greater amounts of variation 
could (and should) generate new ways of producing and using normal 
development, ones that encompass all variation deemed to be normal. The 
question that should guide the abstraction process to produce new normal 
developments should be: does the organism show the requisite plasticity to 
remain functioning at an appropriate level? The new standard would therefore 
take its lead from the criteria used by Wilson as far back as 1892. This new 
standard would make functionality the basis of standards of the normal.146 
Developing such a standard would be challenging, as attributions of 
functionality are often dependent on context and mode, rather than an overall 
level of functioning (Amundson, 2000). Here, the insights of Michel and Moore 
                                                          
146
 Robert Wachbroit has demonstrated that both goal and etiological theories of function appeal in 
some way to what he calls the “biological concept of normality”, which would seem to pose a problem 
for defining the normal in terms of the functional (Wachbroit, 1993). However, as his “biological concept 
of normality” incorporates functional criteria itself, this is less significant and problematic than is 
implied. 
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concerning the equifinality and multifinality of development can help clarify that 
a functional standard would not be restricted to specific modes of existence, or 
specific routes between two modes. Instead of being concerned with particular 
functions, metrics of functional level could be produced.147 These would identify 
the overall level of functioning exhibited by the organism (or part thereof), and 
then derive the normal from that. Marcel Weber (2013) suggests a further 
constraint, arguing “that the relevant counterfactuals that guide causal selection 
in biology are counterfactuals that describe interventions that are biologically 
normal” [italics in original]. Such interventions are identified as being those “that 
could naturally occur as part of the normal biological functioning of an 
organism.” This would still require a judgement to be made by investigators, but 
rather than the implicit and intuitive judgement of normality that Michel and 
Moore rejected, this would be explicit, and open to critique (for one possible 
model, see Hall, 2014).  
Emerging model organisms provide an opportunity to produce standards more 
appropriately suited to research concerned with the role of context and variation 
in development (Bolker, 2014).148 New periodization methods, with some of the 
attributes called for by Love, are being developed. Examples include the 
Standard Event System (Werneburg, 2009). The Standard Event System (SES) 
explicitly rejects the use of terms such as “normal stages” and “normal 
development” as unacceptably typological. It works by identifying the time at 
which certain developmental characters (for example, the presence of a certain 
number of somites) appear. Each of these characters is assigned a “Standard 
Event Code” (SEC), with associated description and illustration. The 
investigator, observing the embryos, fills out an SES-formula. This lists the 
SECs below a section where they enter (amongst other information) the 
species, breeding temperature, and age in days. They may then add other 
forms which include drawings or photographs of the specimens. The SES 
reveals heterochrony, interspecific variation and intraspecific variation in a way 
                                                          
147
 This is an important point to clarify: I am focusing on a global criterion of function and functionality, 
not on individual sub-organism functions, and therefore most of the debates concerning function are 
not relevant here. 
148
 These new model organisms may even include microbes, which have been proposed as models for 
specific developmental mechanisms (rather than developmental phenomena), and which may have 
their representational worth as models improved by synthetic biology or natural engineering methods 
(Love and Travisano, 2013). 
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in which standard staging systems do not. The SES presumes no set stages, 
order of stages and characters associated with those stages. It instead allows 
the observer to record what is and what is not there at any particular point in 
time, in a form which is easily digitised, comparable, and extendable.  Another 
example is the proposed use of ‘developmental steps’ (Scholtz, 2012). A 
developmental step is defined as “a describable and comparable 
(homologisable) pattern at any moment of development” [italics in original] 
(Scholtz, 2012: 147). Like the SES, using developmental steps would allow 
developmental variation to be recorded rather than being resolved into highly 
abstracted stages. 
Automation and in silico methods offer new possibilities, but should be 
approached with caution. Automated processing of embryos could allow a 
greater number of embryos to be assessed, but also incentivises 
standardisation and reduction of variation to make samples uniform enough to 
be efficiently processed.149 One solution would be to automate only part of the 
process, such as the videoing of samples and computerised three-dimensional 
morphometric analysis. Other aspects of the process would involve human eyes 
and interpretation. Some limited level of automation does pose the possibility of 
getting round some of the problems raised by the human staging of embryos, 
such as focusing on one feature as a primary criterion and assuming that all 
others follow from this at a particular stage.150 This is a habit encouraged by the 
need to stage many embryos quickly, but inhibits the apprehension of variation, 
for example of the timing of the appearance of particular structures.  
In silico methods offer a possible way around the problems associated with 
producing contextually-relevant normal development, which implies the use of 
local standards, which has practical problems as well as causing problems of 
translation, commensurability and reproducibility. There will still be the 
requirement for high-quality data to be inputted into computer systems however, 
and data produced in silico will no doubt require in vivo validation to satisfy 
community standards after results have been produced. To deal with the 
possible problems associated with the production of local standards, some  
                                                          
149
 An important point made to me by Jennifer Cuffe. 
150
 I owe this insight into the realities of staging embryos at the bench, and the shortcuts (or perhaps 
heuristics) used by practising scientists, to an illuminating and helpful discussion with Brian K. Hall.  
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inspiration might be found in efforts to develop tools to integrate different 
ontologies (in the computational sense of the word; Leonelli, 2010): in particular, 
families of related ontologies encompassing small datasets produced in 
different contexts for different purposes. This is an acute issue in ecology, and 
part of the solution is to ensure that certain standards are formulated and used. 
These would concern data collection, the recording of the “structure, content 
and appropriate usage” of data, and the development and use of software to 
ensure that data are able to travel outside their particular context of production 
(Madin et al, 2008).  
8.4. Open questions 
Given that variation is a constitutive feature of living things, biological variation 
must be taken account of in experimental biology. Furthermore, the practical 
and conceptual problems and questions raised by this should be confronted by 
philosophers of biology. In experimental practice, I propose that the normal 
development incorporates a wider range of variation, and that the experimental 
set-ups themselves must incorporate more variation into experimental designs. 
In my ongoing and future work, I aim to explore the implications of ‘taking 
variation seriously’, conceptually and practically.  
In the conceptual sense, I would like to develop my nascent analysis into the 
place of normal development in the practical-theoretical framework of modern 
developmental biology. This will entail an examination of the conceptual and/or 
theoretical structure of developmental biology, a task which has already begun 
(Minelli and Pradeu, 2014). In particular, the concept of differentiation in 
development, how this relates to normal development, and how it is also relates 
to the concept of specificity, needs to be explored further. The effects of current 
shifts in the practice and theory of modern biology (not restricted to 
developmental biology) on the concept of biological specificity are under-
analysed.  
A task inextricably linked with this is to detail exactly how variation is dealt with 
(practically and conceptually) by developmental biologists, and what factors are 
implicated in variation in this treatment. This would involve a systematic study of 
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literature, the design and distribution of questionnaires and analysis of the 
results, and close study of several laboratories. The ways in which the 
introduction of in silico methods, the ability to generate large amounts of data, 
and the drive towards more naturalistic mode of research have changed 
experimental practices concerning variation are of extreme interest. 
I have already identified some of the problems associated with a programme for 
a variation-sensitive developmental biology. As a start to the philosophical part 
of that programme, I suggest several areas for future research. On a more 
conceptual level, we require a clarification on exactly what biological variation 
is, how it relates to other concepts of similarity and difference in biology, such 
as (bio)diversity, and how it relates to various ways of producing and 
conceptualising ‘types’. We also need to identify how the ways in biologists 
work affects their attitudes concerning the extent and relevance of biological 
variation; how they apprehend it, observe it, measure it, and integrate it into 
their ongoing experimental and theoretical work. Going to the heart of how a 
variation-sensitive developmental biology might work are questions concerning 
how one determines what variation is to be included in the normal development, 
what functional level is and how it might be defined. Finally, the question is 
posed that if the programme is successful, and experimenters aided by 
technological developments produce normal developments incorporating the 
range of variation that they deem appropriate for their own experimental 
programme, therefore producing their own local standards, what implications 
does this have for the notion of standards, for the production, export, and 
integration of data, and for commensurability in general?  
Developing research projects that speak to these questions will entail close 
discussion with developmental biologists themselves, and close analysis of their 
work. The task of this thesis has been to assess the role of normal development 
in embryology and developmental biology. I have identified new ways of 
thinking about critiques of certain aspects of modern biology, and in doing so 
have endeavoured to identify ways in which those critiques can be harnessed to 
suggest practical changes to the way that experimental work in developmental 
biology is conducted.   
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